


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UNITED STATES AND 'NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER'

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pp 3-16

[Article by I. D. Ivanov]

[Text] One element of the total process by which the general crisis of capitalism is now growing increasingly severe is the continuous dramatic intensification of conflict between imperialism and the developing states, the struggle of these states for their economic independence, for the extension of decolonization to the economic sphere as well and for the reorganization of international economic relations on the basis of just and democratic principles.

This struggle is facing each nation directly with the question of its political feelings about the basic principles and specific requirements of this kind of reorganization, including attitudes toward the program for establishing a "new international economic order" (NIEO), which was set forth and is now being defended by the young states. I will remind my readers that the declaration and program of action for establishing the NIEO were adopted in spite of stubborn resistance on the part of the imperialist powers and the sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in April-May 1974 at the insistence of 114 developing states belonging to the United Nations and supported by the socialist countries. Later, the trade and political premises of these resolutions were given concrete form in the "Manila Declaration" of the developing countries, submitted by them to the Fourth UNCTAD Session in Nairobi (May 1976), and in the Economic Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo (August 1976). These four documents now constitute the basis of the developing countries' position in international economic organizations.

Specifically, they demand reform of the entire system of economic relations between the developing and developed capitalist countries, the elimination of all inequalitarian aspects of the system and all remnants of colonialism, and the institution of special measures to accelerate the development of the young states, particularly through the stabilization of world raw material markets, the augmentation of the revenues of its exporters, assistance in the industrialization of production and exports, the expansion of assistance

in economic development and a reduction of the cost of such assistance, the reinforcement of state sovereignty over natural resources and effective control over the activities of international monopolies and, finally, co-operation among the developing states themselves. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community support the just, anti-imperialist demands of the young states,¹ including those aimed at the eradication of colonialism and neocolonialism, the consolidation of national sovereignty, the normalization of trade in raw materials, the industrialization of the economies and exports of the liberated states, control over international corporations, more effective assistance in the economic development of these states and the transfer of technology to them.

The problem of the attitude toward the NIEO is of exceptional magnitude for the United States in its capacity as the political and economic leader of the capitalist world and the largest trading partner of the developing countries--a partner which is increasingly dependent on their supplies of raw materials and fuel. "In the search for ways of achieving a new international economic order," Senator A. Ribicoff acknowledged in his special report to the American Congress, "the developing countries are addressing their demands primarily and mainly to the United States."² This makes it even more important to try to determine the United States' current position in this important sphere of international economic relations and to express some views on the possible directions of its further evolution.

From Neglect to 'Dialog'

The United States, just as the other Western powers, responded from the very beginning to the NIEO program, which was essentially anticolonial and anti-imperialist, with poorly concealed irritation. Veiled threats began to appear in the American press and speeches by U.S. politicians in connection with the "aggressive" and "thoughtless" demands of the developing countries, which were first simply ignored as "utopian" ideas.³ American delegations were issued a political directive to stubbornly resist even the mention of the very term "new international economic order" in intergovernmental documents. The American Trade Act of 1974 canceled the import privileges of the developing countries which practices some of the more radical premises of the NIEO (expropriation of the property of international monopolies, the creation of "anti-cartels," etc.).

Experience quite quickly showed U.S. ruling circles, however, that irritation was a poor guide in politics and that American imperialism's position in the world was already much too weak to allow it to openly ignore the program of the 114 developing countries whose just demands were being supported by the socialist community. Above all, due to the changes in the correlation of class forces in today's world and the relaxation of international tensions, there is now much less opportunity to implement the previous imperialist dictatorial economic and political policy in relations with the developing countries. The national liberation movement is leaning more and more on the political, moral and material support of the socialist countries, which has

already made the process of economic decolonization irrevocable and has forced imperialism to transfer to the defensive position in trade and politics, particularly within the framework of the United Nations and its agencies. It has become known that the United States itself is already so dependent on trade with the developing countries that open trade and political confrontation with them would have an extremely severe effect on the U.S. economy, particularly under the conditions of the economic crisis of the mid-1970's. In 1976, around 35 percent of all the petroleum used in the United States was imported from these countries (this proved the illusory nature of R. Nixon's "Self-Sufficiency Project"), 45 percent of the cobalt, 50 percent of the manganese, 56 percent of the aluminum, 82 percent of the tin, etc.⁴ In turn, the developing countries were the recipients of around one-fourth of all American exports, and it was in these countries that thousands of branches of U.S. multinational monopolies were located in the role of "hostages," as well as more than one-quarter of their foreign direct investments, amounting to 29 billion dollars.⁵

From the purely political standpoint, it was equally impossible for the United States to continue ignoring the NIEO program because of the obvious harm this course would inflict on its already low international prestige and because of the danger of the United States' political isolation in the United Nations, which would be incompatible with the American claim to the "guiding role" in the capitalist world.

Finally, after the developing countries had encountered the reluctance of the West, especially the United States, to discuss the NIEO specifically and fundamentally, they began to institute some of its measures unilaterally. The average annual number of incidents of the nationalization of branches of American international monopolies in these countries rose from 50 in the 1955-1961 period to 281 in the mid-1970's. Another 17 associations--in addition to OPEC (petroleum) and CIPEC (copper)--were either created or became the subject of negotiations concerning their creation, to unite the countries producing raw materials and foodstuffs (tropical wood, rubber, bananas, cocoa, copra, coffee, groundnuts, pepper, sugar, tea, bauxite, iron ore, mercury, tungsten, etc.), taking in a total of more than 70 developing countries--associations with the primary and immediate function of standing up to the West's raw material monopolies and taking away their control over the system by which the capitalist countries are supplied with raw materials and fuel. As a result of these actions, for example, the proportion accounted for by the international oil cartel (as we know, five of the "seven sisters" making it up are U.S. monopolies) was 30 percent in the worldwide capitalist production of crude oil in 1975, 47 percent in oil refining and 45 percent in petroleum sales while respective figures for 1963 were 82 percent, 65 percent and 62 percent.⁶

Under these circumstances, the U.S. business community and, later, American political circles became more aware of the serious nature of the young states' demands and of the fact that these demands were backed up by real political and economic power. This activated the "instinct for adaptation"

to new conditions in the contemporary world, and the outright rejection of the NIEO program gradually gave way to a realization of the inevitability of trade and political dialog with the liberated countries. Besides this, the Ford Administration's initiative in this matter was connected with its lack of support in Congress and the coming elections of 1976.

A different situation took shape in Carter's Administration. His foreign policy advisers quite quickly detected the "spirit of the times." The motto of "more open diplomacy" in relations with the developing countries came into being in their midst; within the context of this motto, the new President first tried to take a broader look at things, no longer calling the NIEO simply "one of the major challenges issued to us (the United States--I. I.) as a nation," but also "one of our grandest opportunities" to create a "new system for economic progress and cooperation" in which the special interest of the United States would be safeguarded with more objective consideration for such realities as economic decolonization and the nation's dramatically increased dependence on foreign trade.⁷ The new terminology moved from Carter's speeches to official U.S. statements in the United Nations. Carter's advisers saw "more open diplomacy" in its ideal form not merely as a passive response fitting the NIEO "ticket," but as a means of returning the political initiative to Washington in relations with the developing states by working out, in counterbalance to the NIEO, Washington's own, "alternative" program in this area and by making this specific program the point of departure in any ensuing dialog.

American Principles of Dialog

The rhetorically new elements in the approach to the reorganization of international economic relations, however, are obviously coexisting in the minds of the authors of the American alternative with all of their inherited ideas about concrete dialog and the evident absence of a political desire to agree to the young states' just demands. For example, this "new" U.S. position is still based on the same doctrine of "interdependence" which was once necessary to H. Kissinger as a means of theoretically substantiating the "danger" of any disruption of the old procedures in world trade that had developed in the colonial era. It is true that Carter and his advisers have tried to develop this doctrine somewhat by giving it a more dynamic appearance in comparison to Kissinger's static, "untouchable" version. In particular, A. Young, new permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, R. Cooper, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Atlantic Council experts do not exclude the possibility of the reorganization of the present international trade system as such, but on the basis of some kind of "common goals" of the West and the young states that are "mutually acceptable to all" instead of on the basis of the NIEO.⁸

The most important of these "common goals" is interpreted quite simply as joint social maneuvers for the purpose of "preventing the increased risk of political disturbances which could make way for regimes with an antagonistic attitude toward the social values which we in the West consider to be of

primary importance."⁹ In other words, reference here is still being made to the "link" between the former bourgeois mother countries and the former colonies for the purpose of keeping the latter from choosing a socialist orientation, and Washington's most "reliable" allies still primarily include nations in which a reactionary dictatorship serves as the means for maintaining the political supremacy of the national bourgeoisie.

Outside the boundaries of this general bourgeois solidarity, however, the "common goals" immediately disclose their pro-American emphasis. "No one nation or group of nations," R. Cooper, for example, writes, "can take on only obligations. No one nation or group of nations can demand only advantages for itself. All of us must receive our share."¹⁰ In other words, the Carter Administration's development of the doctrine of "interdependence" also actually demands a transition to a particular system of relations between the young states and the West, in which any assistance in economic development would already not only call for reciprocal political concessions, but also specific economic concessions from the developing countries. In essence, this would cancel out the principle of nonreciprocal benefits that these nations so painstakingly won from the West within the UN framework. Washington has already used this approach, not only in theory but also in practice, during the current round of GATT trade negotiations, at which time the developing countries were requested--in exchange for concessions on the part of the United States--"to make their contribution to the liberalization of trade by relaxing their restrictions on imports to the degree to which they are given greater access to the markets of the industrial countries."¹¹

The "inherited" conceptual element of the American alternative is also dramatically reinforced by the fact that it is based on the United States' traditional social doctrine which rejects any form of economic organization other than "free enterprise." The United States, according to R. Cooper, intends to "fundamentally emphasize the desirability of preserving the relative freedom of markets from any kind of control on the part of national governments and international organizations."¹² This doctrine, however, is being subjected to detailed and logical criticism in the contemporary world in general and the developing countries in particular. "The developing countries," acknowledged the extremely authoritative American economist C. Kindleberger, "are moving more and more in a direction which differs from the free-market model propagandized by the United States in terms of the entire vast group of economic issues.... They, (these nations--I. I.) are exposing the theory of the liberal marketing system as a neocolonialist system which will continue to practice the economic subordination of countries even after they have won their independence."¹³

The incompatibility of the American platform with the genuine interests of the developing countries is also evident in the fact that, in the final analysis, it places the same emphasis on their disunification and on intervention in internal affairs by means of foreign economic pressure. People in the United States are openly saying, for example, that they will agree to compromises only with the "moderate" leaders of these countries, and, as

we know, a special policy is being implemented in relations with a number of petroleum-exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran and others) which are receiving generous military and technical assistance from Washington.

It is not surprising that the American principles of dialog have not been greeted with enthusiasm in most of the developing countries. Moreover, they have not met with complete "mutual understanding" even among the United States' allies in the Western world. Naturally, ruling circles in Western Europe and Japan have displayed just as hostile an attitude as American ruling circles toward the very idea of economic decolonization. But their much greater dependence on imports of raw materials, inter-imperialist conflicts, the relatively strong position of leftist forces and the experience of economic reconstruction after the loss of their colonies are objectively motivating Western Europe, and even Japan, to negotiate with the liberated countries on positions that are closer to at least some of the premises of the NIEO.

Just 15-20 years ago, these "differences in interpretation" would not have stopped the United States and would simply have led to its unilateral advancement of its alternatives in line with the policy of the fait accompli. Now the situation is different. Although the United States is still the leader of the Western world, it has lost its position as its absolute ruler. For purely economic reasons alone, the United States can no longer play its previous role in the "asymmetrical and hierarchical system in which it was the banker of the entire world, the last refuge, not only in the sense of guaranteed security but also in the sale of surplus commodities, a source of scarce items and necessary capital, the custodian of the international monetary system, including exchange rates, and the creditor of nations that had reached the point of total crisis," C. Kindleberger writes.¹⁴

Washington has also realized the extreme danger of new differences of opinion with its allies. For this reason, when the United States was facing the prospect of the difficult job of opposing the collective demands of the developing countries, it was forced to coordinate the specific content of "more open diplomacy" in regard to the NIEO with its OECD partners. This coordination began at the London meeting of the "big seven" in May 1977 and was continued during the final stage of the "North-South" talks in Paris (summer 1977). Here the developed capitalist nations and the developing countries (or, more precisely, 19 of the countries belonging to the second group) reached a compromise on 20 of the 41 issues discussed. As a result, the "American alternative" did not win enough international recognition, and the present position of the United States in regard to the NIEO demands represents a combination of strategic concepts and operational, one-time decisions, the implementation of which largely depends on the general position of the OECD, and this position is necessarily of a defensive nature. Andrew Young himself has described it as "negotiations and agreements, but also the absence of agreement."

World Raw Material Markets

A central position in the NIEO program has been assigned to the problem of stabilizing world raw material markets, which make up the basis of the developing countries' exports and the trade in which is characterized by constant fluctuations in demand, prices and the income of exporters. The integrated program for raw materials (IPRM), proposed for stabilization, envisages the completion of international trade agreements on 18 major types of raw material commodities (coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, cotton, rubber, jute, coarse fiber, copper, tin and others) for the purpose of restricting fluctuations in their prices to a specific level and range. The specific mechanism proposed for this restriction involves the manipulation of "buffer stocks" of ten of the abovementioned commodities that can be stored for long periods of time. These would be bought up to supplement reserves when prices drop and sold in the event of a rise in prices. The accumulation of stocks would be financed through the creation of a "common fund" of contributions from exporters and importers (approximately 30 percent would be contributed by the developing countries and 70 percent by the developed nations), and any temporarily available portion of this fund could be used to assist the developing countries.

During the entire postwar period, the United States had invariably advocated the "totally free play of marketing factors" in the raw material markets and, for this reason, its initial reaction to the IPRM was particularly negative. Later, however, the U.S. position underwent a definite evolution: The nation's strained raw material balance necessitated more frequent speculations about the possibility of guaranteed imports of raw material over the long range, and the other Western countries, which had much less raw materials of their own, demanded that a compromise be reached with the developing states with consideration for at least some of the elements of the IPRM.

For this reason, soon after President Carter's inauguration, his administration announced that the policy of nonrecognition of international stabilizing measures would be revised. "We are prepared," R. Cooper said in November 1977 at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly, "to endorse any trade agreement that would be just and effective, and we support the idea of creating some kind of fund to ensure the financing of buffer stocks in connection with these agreements." But this general statement of agreement conceals many conditions. For example, by "just" agreements, the United States means only those which do not lead to a rise in the prices of the raw materials it imports, and by "effective," it means agreements which insure the exporters' level of income rather than the level of prices--that is, agreements which motivate them to increase their volume of raw material exports at low prices. For this reason, the United States' consent to take part in talks on the conclusion of such agreements will still be "individual" rather than automatic, and will depend on the nature of the method of control proposed and the U.S. interests connected with this. As yet, the United States has only endorsed agreements on coffee, wheat, tin and sugar and consented to conduct concrete talks on copper, bauxite and iron ore.

Particularly sharp differences divide the United States from the developing countries in the issue of the "common fund" for financing the buffer stocks of raw materials. From the very beginning, Washington has opposed its creation, underscoring the fact that the present system of "compensatory financing," controlled by the International Monetary Fund (and the prevailing influence here is enjoyed by the United States) and providing for short-term refundable loans to the young states, is sufficient for insuring the income of raw material exporters. Only direct pressure by the United States' allies at the London summit meeting and the threatened failure of the Paris conference forced the United States to agree to an apparent compromise, but one which essentially has nothing other than a name in common with the proposals of the developing countries.

For example, the joint Western proposals do not allow the general fund to perform any functions connected with the rendering of financial assistance to the developing countries. Moreover, they propose that the very creation of the fund should not be financed through government contributions, but primarily by means of the countries' "own funds" within the framework of international trade agreements, and by means of loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the United States plays the first violin here as well) and from the private money market. This kind of system will make fund operations dependent on the international banking monopolies from the very beginning. Finally, the West is demanding that the administration of the fund not be based on the principle of "one nation--one vote," but on the "weighted" distribution of votes in accordance with the proportion accounted for by individual states in world raw material trade--this would transfer the control of the fund over to the Western nations themselves. It is not surprising that the young states refuse to negotiate on these terms and, in December 1977, demonstratively cut short the UNCTAD conference on this matter.

Trade in Finished Industrial Items

The instability of revenues from raw material exports, just as the fact that the narrowness of the domestic market makes industrialization of the developing countries only possible when there is a high export quota in production, necessitated the comprehensive industrialization of their exports long ago. For this reason, one of the primary trade and political demands, which was advanced as early as the mid-1960's, concerned the establishment of preferential conditions for imports of their finished items in the markets of the developed nations. These demands were only partially realized in the form of a general system of priorities, which was only adopted by UNCTAD in 1972-1974. According to its terms, finished industrial items can be imported by the developed nations at lower customs rates (and, in some cases, duty-free) for 10 years. The creation of this system, however, did not even come close to solving the problem of industrializing the exports of the young states, since it only established limited competitive privileges for their commodities, and the lowering of customs duties has been partially "compensated" for by the non-customs restrictions imposed by the Western countries in recent years on imports in "liberalized" categories, particularly

in the trade in textiles, clothing and footwear. Besides this, the Western countries are still escalating customs duties to the degree that imported commodities have been processed. Even now, after the institution of the system of priorities, all of this is complicating the developing countries' transition from raw material exports to industrial exports.

For this reason, the measures in the NIEO program that fit into this system were acknowledged to be inadequate, and the developing countries demanded that the system also be extended to semimanufactured products, that the preferential duties be extended beyond the 10-year limit, that the institution of non-customs restrictions on preferential commodities be prohibited and, finally, that the special interests of the nations exporting tropical goods be taken into account, particularly during the course of the present ("Tokyo") round of GATT trade negotiations.

Due to increased protectionist feelings in the United States, however, all of these demands fell on extremely barren soil from the very beginning. The United States was the last nation to endorse the general system of priorities (not until 1 January 1975) and it restricted the implementation of this system by a number of substantial provisions. For example, it declared that, after instituting the system, it would still reserve the right to reduce preferential state aid to the developing countries. Furthermore, the preferential terms were limited to total duty-free imports of only 25 million dollars for each individual commodity from each individual country. Besides this, the United States has not extended the system to nations which have nationalized the property of American international monopolies without compensation, or to countries that are party to export associations and are "disrupting" the network by which the United States is supplied with raw materials (these are chiefly members of OPEC). Finally, the concessions granted can be unilaterally canceled by the President in the event of "disorder" in the American market due to increased imports of, above all, such goods as footwear, textiles, watches, steel, glass and electronics. On the whole, the system covers American imports totaling 2.5 billion dollars, or only around 8 percent of all imports from the developing countries (excluding petroleum).¹⁵

Nonetheless, protectionist circles in the United States have called even these concessions excessive and have launched a campaign for their actual revision on the basis of the exceptions stipulated in the Trade Act of 1974.

As a result, the administration's willingness to agree to the new demands of the developing countries in this area turned out to be minimal in comparison to President Carter's original statements. It was only the pressure exerted by the United States' allies that caused this nation to express its willingness to consider the possibility of granting the young states new import privileges, but only at the "Tokyo round" of negotiations, on an individual basis and on the condition of reciprocity. It is not surprising that this approach brought the discussion of these matters to an impasse, particularly in connection with the fact that "protectionist pressure in the United States is concentrated precisely in the branches where many

relatively progressive developing countries have been able to establish their own export potential."¹⁶ As a result, representatives from the developing countries at these negotiations in the beginning of July of this year expressed their disillusionment with the preliminary results of this "round."¹⁷

Aid, the Transmission of Technology and the International Monopolies

The unresolved problem of exports and the scarcity of funds for economic development are forcing the liberated countries, particularly those with no oil, those that are least developed and those that have suffered the most from the economic crisis, to sink deeper and deeper in debt. Their total debts already exceed 200 billion dollars. In this area, the NIEO program calls for broader financial assistance on easier terms. In particular, within the framework of the UN recommendation that the financial means offered to these nations be increased to 1 percent of the GNP of the developed nations, it sets a "subceiling" of 0.7 percent of the GNP. These funds must not be provided through exports of private capital or commercial loans by the developed nations, but through referential intergovernmental loans with a maximal proportion of nonrefundable subsidies. Besides this, the program proposes the cancelation of the debts (at least partially) of the least developed countries, the cancellation of interest rates for the nations that have suffered the most from the crisis, the extension of the repayment period and the allocation of special drawing rights to the young states in amounts that exceed their proportional official quotas in the IMF.

The United States is the largest "donor" in the capitalist world. With time, however, its share of total assistance has begun to decrease. It occupies only the 12th place among the capitalist countries in terms of the correlation between this assistance and its GNP, since it only allocates 0.26 percent of its GNP for this purpose. Exports of private capital are constantly accounting for a larger share of total American assistance, while state allocations were the same in the mid-1970's as in the early 1960's--only around 4 billion dollars.¹⁸ When Carter came to the White House, he made a number of widely publicized statements about the need to extend government assistance and put it in order, and reports appeared in the official press on the United States' intention to increase the sum of all types of financial means transferred to the developing states to 0.5 percent of the GNP within 5 years.

It became clear quite soon, however, that even if the United States was prepared to expand its assistance, this would only be on its own conditions and not on the conditions of the NIEO. In particular, almost all of the increase was to be sent through the channels of the same IBRD and the UN development program, the administration of which was headed by a U.S. representative. Besides this, the United States opposed any kind of moratorium on payments or cancellation of the debts of the developing countries, "motivating" this position by the fact that such measures would "undermine faith" in these nations as borrowers on the part of private banks. The United States also objected to the allocation of extraproportional volumes

of SDR to the young states. Finally, Congress made substantial cuts in Carter's requests, and A. Young, U.S. representative to the United Nations, was charged with the task of announcing that the United States' ability to render assistance depends primarily on the state of its own economy and that it was now suffering from high prices on raw materials and fuel. In this way, the question of aid was again "tied up" with the American demands that the developing countries guarantee supplies of raw materials to the United States at "acceptable" prices. This has made the prospects for expanded American assistance (and on easier terms) quite uncertain.

Furthermore, the program for the establishment of the NIEO devotes special attention to the need to expand and simplify the transfer of modern technology to the developing countries as an important factor accelerating their economic growth and the industrialization of their economies and exports. At present, this large group of states only accounts for around 2 percent of the world volume of research and development and, for this reason, they depend totally on imported technology, spending around 3-5 billion dollars a year on its acquisition.¹⁹ In addition, around 90 percent of the patents registered in these nations belong to foreign firms and are frequently used not for the introduction of patented inventions into the local economy, but only for the patent protection of sales of goods (often at higher prices) produced by the international monopolies and for the blocking of local research projects.

The young states are justifiably insisting on assistance in the establishment of their own scientific facilities and on the right to choose the technology they wish, to adapt it to local conditions and to import it without any obligation to allow foreign capital to enter their nations. They also advocate reform in the international patent system, which would make the rights of foreign patent holders conditional on their obligation to also incorporate the use of patented technology in the local economy. Finally, the NIEO program, particularly the decisions of the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly and UNCTAD-IV, call for the development and adoption of a "code of behavior" in the area of technology transmission, which would establish the basic just norms of this kind of transfer, without any of the inequitable and restricted business practices characteristic of the monopolies, and the norms in this code must extend to international transactions and to the transmission of technology to the branches of international monopolies in the developing countries.

The policy of the United States, which accounts for around 60 percent of world exports of technology, will play a cardinal role in the outcome of any negotiations in this area. But it is precisely this technological leadership that allows the United States to adhere to its particularly unyielding stand. For example, although Washington has recognized the young states' right to choose the technology to be imported and their right to adapt it and has agreed to cooperate with a number of regional centers set up by the young states for the transmission of technology, it still insists that this kind of transfer can be accomplished best through the entry of the capital of international monopolies into the economies of

these states. The United States also opposes any kind of radical reform in the international patent system, primarily assigning this system the function of "the proper protection of privately owned technology." Moreover, increasingly frequent appeals are being heard in the United States for the restriction of American technological exports in general, since they can promote the appearance of competing enterprises overseas--enterprises which will be capable of undermining U.S. commodity exports and flooding the domestic American market with cheap imported goods.

Making reference to the same old principles of "free enterprise," the United States is resolutely objecting to the compulsory nature of the "code of behavior." "The U.S. Government cannot tell American companies where and how they should transmit their technology," declared, for example, A. Young. "The decisions made by these firms on the export of capital or technology depend only on them. To a significant extent, however, they also depend on the conditions created for this by the host countries themselves."²⁰ On the last of these "grounds" the United States has advised that even in the optional variant of the code, the transmission of technology be made conditional on "reciprocity" on the part of the developing countries in the form of a favorable investment climate for foreign capital. At the same time, it has fiercely protested the extension of the code to the operations of branches of American international monopolies in the developing countries and has made every attempt to limit the list of restrictive business practices which the code is supposed to pronounce illegal.

One particularly crucial issue for the United States within the context of the NIEO is the question of transnational corporations. In 1976, 223 of the 422 such corporations with a turnover of more than 1 billion dollars each were American companies which handled around half of all U.S. exports and a quarter of the nation's imports, as well as the lion's share of profits from foreign capital investments.²¹ They now constitute the basis of the overseas economic empire of U.S. financial capital, American control over foreign sources of raw materials and fuel and the exploitation of the developing countries through a system of monopolistic pricing, serve as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in this region of the world and, for this reason, enjoy the direct diplomatic and financial support of Washington.

The role played by the transnational corporations as neocolonialism's "expeditionary corps," however, is well known to the developing countries themselves. "With the probable exception of the CIA," TIME magazine wrote, "no American invention has evoked as much suspicion, mistrust and condemnation as the international corporation."²² It was precisely within the framework of the NIEO, as well as the Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of States, adopted at the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly, that the developing countries--with the direct support of the socialist nations--demanded guarantees of their complete sovereignty over national natural resources and the unconditional right to control and regulate the operations of transnational corporations on their territory. In this connection, the UN Commission for Transnational Corporations was assigned the

priority task of working out another "code of behavior" for these corporations and establishing a comprehensive system of information on their activities.

The developing countries--again with the support of the socialist nations--are demanding that this code be of a compulsory nature, be directed at the transnational corporations, contain a detailed list of norms which would exclude the possibility of their intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, restrictive trade practices and abuses committed against trade unions and consumers, and that it obligate these corporations to adhere to the national priorities and plans for development of the host countries, strictly observe tax, currency and other legislation and transmit sufficient information to local governments for effective control over their activities.

At first, the United States opposed this code on principle, still citing the same postulate about the "injurious nature" of government intervention in private business affairs. But the odious behavior of the United States' own transnational corporations, particularly in connection with the energy and currency crises, when this behavior was utterly inconsistent with the national interest, as well as the active involvement of Western European and Japanese companies in the U.S. economy, motivated the government to reconsider its view and consent to the elaboration of some kind of document in the United Nations to regulate the activities of these corporations. This document, however, as it was understood by the American side, was not supposed to be compulsory, but merely optional, and aimed at governments (of the host countries) as well as at corporations. This last condition was necessary to the United States so that the obligations of U.S. monopolies stemming from the code would be "balanced" by reciprocal privileges, particularly the establishment of a favorable investment climate for them, favorable national regulations concerning their activity (that is, the same regulations as those governing local enterprises) and the guarantee that local courts would have virtually no jurisdiction over investment disputes.²³ It is easy to see that this would not be so much a matter of restraining the transnational corporations with their expansionism and aggressiveness, as of guaranteeing them opportunities for revenge in the struggle against the young states, investing them with "quasi-sovereign" rights and limiting the state sovereignty of the developing countries. Under these circumstances, the UN Commission for Transnational Corporations has still not been able to progress any further than an annotated table of contents for the code.

The Modernization of Tactics

The United States' stand on the NIEO in the form in which it has been described above is far from a final one, even though it has figured in international negotiations in 1978. Discussions are still going on in the nation's political and business communities on ways of clarifying it further, since the American bourgeoisie is well aware that the future correlation of class forces in the world will quite seriously depend on the social path chosen by the young states. "Our duty," A. Ribicoff appeals, "is to continue assisting the developing countries so that they can become real partners in

the economy of the Western world"²⁴--that is, so that they will be firmly attached to the capitalist economic system. The need to pay some kind of additional price to achieve a lasting compromise with the national bourgeoisie in these countries is also dictated for the United States by the exceedingly rapid increase in trade with the young states, the strong dependence on overseas petroleum, etc.

The main hope for this kind of eventual compromise has been placed in the gradual "embourgeoisement" of the developing countries from the inside, but an important role has also been assigned to the promotion of this process from outside, particularly from the United States. "The development of capitalism in the young countries," V. I. Lenin wrote, "is significantly accelerated by the example and assistance of old countries."²⁵ In this connection, diplomatic experts have recommended a unique variation of the theory of "building bridges" to the developing countries "which have become convinced in practice that they share a growing community of interests with the developed (capitalist--I. I.) countries in many contemporary economic issues."²⁶ According to American political and business circles, these countries are Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Brazil, Zaire, Chile and several other nations. Above all, however, "we must," R. Cooper notes, "continue our efforts toward integration in the world (capitalist--I. I.) economic structure...of the key OPEC countries."²⁷

In turn, Senators Javits, Ribicoff and others who were members of U.S. delegations at various international economic forums of recent years have provided advice on the "modernization" of the tactics of American participation in such undertakings. Above all, they have advocated the rejection, although not necessarily in practice, of the previous great-power egocentrism of American policy, which is now leading to utter isolation. "Lately, our diplomats have invariably reassessed the impact of the 'American position' or what the United States wants, thinks or says to its partners," wrote A. Ribicoff. But now, "no one nation acting alone can have any chance for success in any such undertaking as the restructuring of our relations with the developing countries.... The Americans do not always have to be the first to advance some kind of proposals. We must listen to others more."²⁸

In respect to negotiations with the developing countries within the United Nations, Atlantic Council experts recommend that the government carefully work out all proposals in advance, coordinate the tactics used in making statements at individual forums and make more frequent use of "package" agreements with other countries--that is, the exchange of concessions of varying nature that are equivalent en masse. In reference to tactical considerations, they recommend that the greatest emphasis be placed on "pragmatic" compromises, unofficial negotiations, preliminary and routine consultations with the "more interested" young states, etc. In other words, the United States, which previously depended most on its means for exerting pressure in bilateral relations, is beginning to actively learn the art of multilateral economic diplomacy.

In this connection, appeals for the renunciation of the past underestimation of the role played by the United Nations are being heard more and more frequently in the nation. Criticizing the State Department and the White House for their failure to pay more than "episodic" and "marginal" attention to this organization, renowned American political scientist C. Mains noted that UN debates have now acquired such international repercussions that their effect can now be felt everywhere outside of this forum, and that, for this reason, the United Nations deserves "much more serious treatment than in the past," right up to the engineering of a special "UN policy" as part of the general foreign policy of the Washington Administration.²⁹

The modification of U.S. tactics in this direction has permitted this nation to lessen its isolation in regard to the NIEO somewhat or to at least "dilute" it in the general position of the group of Western nations. Even here, however, the American positions that are most conservative in essence have only been consistently supported by the FRG, Japan and England, while the Scandinavian countries and Holland make up a "liberal" bloc which is prepared to meet the developing countries halfway in many issues, France is trying to conduct an "independent" policy, and the foreign trade interests of Australia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and New Zealand correspond directly in some areas to certain demands made by the developing countries.

Under these conditions, U.S. diplomacy, with the most lively support from Peking, is attempting more and more frequently to resort to distracting demonstrations, alleging that the West does not have to fulfill any kind of obligation to the young states until equal commitments have been taken on by the socialist countries. Besides this, they wish to impose the obligation on the socialist countries of allocating the same percentage of their GNP (1 percent) for assistance as the developing countries are demanding from the imperialist nations--and not even in a bilateral manner, but largely through the channels of multilateral assistance controlled by the West--for example, through the IBRD; they also want the socialist countries to "liberalize" their state monopoly on foreign trade, to join the IMF, etc.

It is easy to see that if the funds of the socialist countries were to fall into the hands of these organizations, they would be used for the "construction of capitalism" in the developing countries and for financing the West's policy of social maneuvering in dealings with the national liberation movement. For this reason alone, not to mention the fact that the socialist countries are historically unconnected with the factors which caused the retardation of the former colonies, this idea is totally demagogic. The volume and value of the assistance given to the young states by the socialist countries and its fundamental difference from the assistance of the West are quite well known and, for this reason, it was with good reason that UNCTAD-IV deleted the mention of the "1 percent" from the resolution concerning economic relations between the socialist and developing countries.

It would be difficult to predict the further evolution of the United States' position in regard to the NIEO in detail. Much will depend on the economic situation in the nation, the interrelations between the White House and Congress, the atmosphere in the OECD, the degree of unity achieved by the young states themselves and the prospects for consolidating their natural alliance with the socialist community. We can assume with some degree of certainty, however, that the United States will ultimately have to become involved in many international trade agreements, including those in which the regulating mechanism will consist of "buffer stocks," to give the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America some additional concessions which transcend the boundaries of formal reciprocity, to expand the volume of assistance and to agree to compromises in the regulation of the terms governing the recovery of world ocean resources. Whether it wants to or not, the United States will also have to participate in a businesslike manner in the drafting of the "codes of behavior" for transnational corporations and for parties involved in the transmission of technology, although a stubborn struggle over their legal status is still to come.

Therefore, experience is providing us with more and more new evidence of the fact that the struggle for the reorganization of international economic relations on the basis of just and democratic principles is now acquiring an increasingly irrevocable nature by virtue of the present correlation of world class forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. The USSR's position on this issue was set forth in the Soviet Government's declaration "On the Reorganization of International Economic Relations" (PRAVDA, 5 October 1975), and the collective position of the CEMA members was set forth in their declaration submitted to UNCTAD-IV (VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, No 8, 1976).
2. "U.S. Senate. Committee on Finance. UNCTAD IV and the New Diplomacy of Interdependence," Washington, 1976, p 2 (hereafter called U.S. Senate. New Diplomacy").
3. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1977, p 415.
4. "International Economic Report of the President 1977," pp 10, 12.
5. "UN. Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination," New York, 20 March 1978, p 242; "U.S. Senate. New Diplomacy," p 2.
6. "UN. Transnational Corporations," pp 39, 55, 320-327.
7. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 11 April 1977, p 331.

8. Ibid., 19 September 1977, p 387.
9. "The Atlantic Council. The United States and the Developing Countries," Boulder (Colorado), 1977, p 42.
10. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 14 November 1977, p 702.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 February 1978.
12. FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1977, p 74.
13. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1977, p 414.
14. Ibid., p 413.
15. "International Economic Report of the President 1977," pp 22, 25, 186.
16. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 February 1978.
17. TRIBUNE DE GENEVE, 5 July 1978.
18. "International Economic Report of the President 1977," pp 32, 169.
19. Doc. UNCTAD TD/190, p 2.
20. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 19 September 1977, p 386.
21. "UN. Transnational Corporations," pp 43, 288-313.
22. TIME, 6 June 1976, p 38.
23. GIST, August 1977, p 1.
24. "U.S. Senate. New Diplomacy," p 4.
25. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 3, p 490.
26. "The Atlantic Council," p 131.
27. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 18 April 1977, p 382.
28. "U.S. Senate. New Diplomacy," p 6.
29. FOREIGN POLICY, July 1976, p 805.

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THE 'LEBANESE CRISIS,' 1958-1978 (FROM THE 'EISENHOWER DOCTRINE' TO FIGHTER PLANE DIPLOMACY)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
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[Article by L. I. Medvedko]

[Text] The decision on the simultaneous sale of American aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, announced by Secretary of State C. Vance in mid-February and sanctioned by the Senate in May 1978, was evaluated in the Western press as the "most sensational" and most "ticklish" of all the foreign policy decisions made by the Carter Administration up to the present time. Some saw it as a "new approach" by Washington to settlement in the Middle East while others felt it was almost a departure from the traditional American course of onesided orientation toward Tel Aviv. The NEW YORK TIMES even announced the beginning of a new stage in American policy in the Middle East in connection with this "complex" transaction, christening it "fighter plane diplomacy."¹

Twenty years ago, when the United States was involved in armed intervention in Lebanon in 1958, Washington essentially acknowledged the bankruptcy of its recently announced notorious "Eisenhower Doctrine" by resorting to "gunboat diplomacy." In March 1978, when Israeli pilots dropped their fatal cargo on Lebanese cities and villages from the same fighter-bombers which the United States had sent Israel in the course of many bilateral deals, as well as the new "complex" transaction, the common feature of the Eisenhower Doctrine and "fighter plane diplomacy"--their reactionary and aggressive essence--was revealed as a symptom of the previous neocolonialist course in U.S. Middle Eastern policy. This is particularly apparent in the example of Lebanon. American Middle Eastern policy absolutely cannot escape the vicious circle of bankrupt neocolonialist doctrines which emphasize either the filling of nonexistent "vacuums," or the encouragement of the expansionism of aggressive Israeli groups, or flirtation with Arab reactionary forces, or the first, second and third of these simultaneously. The new Israeli aggression, which was actually supported by the United States, demonstrated the hypocrisy and falsity of Washington's policy of "striking a balance" in the Middle East.

In A Vicious Circle

Through the prism of decades, we can see not only the contradictory nature of U.S. Middle Eastern policy, but also the fallaciousness, hopelessness and danger of this course to the cause of peace in this region and throughout the world.

For 30 years now, the Middle East has been living in an atmosphere of crises, internal strife and wars, which have been unleashed or provoked by Tel Aviv, with imperialist groups acting behind the scenes. By implementing an openly aggressive and expansionist policy against the Arabs, Israel became a tool and forepost of imperialism in the Middle East. The United States has repeatedly announced a course toward a "balance of power" in its Middle Eastern policy verbally, but, through its actions, has given obvious preference to Israel. It is precisely to that country that American weapons have been sent in huge shipments. American assistance offered to Tel Aviv through government channels alone totaled 600 million dollars by 1956--that is, two-thirds of the sum received during the same period by all of the Arab countries. Besides this, Israel had received 7.7 billion dollars through the World Zionist Organization by 1957.²

Due to the unsettled nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the range of "balancing" in Washington's Middle Eastern policy, just as the methods of its implementation, changed depending on the concrete international situation and the alignment of forces within the United States itself and in the Arab countries. During periods marked by the greatest upsurge in the liberation movement in the Arab world, when the economic and political positions of reactionary forces grew weak, the former colonizers and neocolonizers either resorted to overt armed aggression or incited Israel to commit aggressive actions by openly supporting this nation. In both cases, they were pursuing neocolonialist goals. Israel, however, was pursuing expansionist goals in all of its wars with the Arab countries: While it was attempting to overthrow the progressive regimes in Syria and Egypt, it simultaneously tried to extend its borders by annexing the Arab lands it had seized. Since Israel's expansionist aims were supported by the imperialist states, especially the United States, the struggle against Israeli aggression and for a just solution to the Palestinian problem contributed to the development of Arab solidarity, which acquired clearly defined anti-imperialist aims despite its national basis. Acknowledging this, Washington preferred to avoid direct involvement in openly aggressive actions against the Arab states for the time being, granting freedom of action to Israel and the former colonial powers.

As historical facts testify, however, the United States did not categorically oppose the use of force, neither during the period of the Suez crisis of 1956³ nor later, if circumstances made it necessary to impede developments in the Middle East that threatened the West.

The last troop carriers taking interventionist troops away from Egypt had not even returned to England and France as yet when the U.S. President announced the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine on 5 January 1957. In a special message on policy in the Near and Middle East, he demanded the authority to use American armed forces in this region, as well as allocations to finance a "program of military assistance and cooperation" costing 200 million dollars. This doctrine was based on J. F. Dulles' false "vacuum" theory: It implied that the liberated peoples, particularly the Arabs, were not capable of controlling their own destiny, building their own state system and economy and establishing relations with one another and, for this reason, allegedly needed outside assistance, without which "disorders" and "disorganization" would supposedly arise. From the very beginning, the propaganda concerning the "vacuum" theory was intended to camouflage American expansion in the Middle East, as well as other regions of Africa and Asia.

The "vacuum theory," just as the later "balancing" policy and "fighter plane diplomacy," is based on taking advantage of the existence of after-effects of Israeli aggression and the unsettled nature of the Middle East crisis as a whole in the interest of U.S. monopolies. It is precisely for this reason that American diplomacy has attempted, both within the United Nations and directly in the countries of the Middle East, to prolong the stay of Israeli troops on the territories they have seized, thereby exerting pressure on the Arab countries, after the cessation of hostilities in 1956, and later again in 1967, 1973 and 1978.

The Arab countries, however, were not at all pleased with the "role of the vacuum" assigned to them by American imperialism. It turned out that no one wished to consider himself a "blank space." This theory, which offended the national dignity and pride of the Arab people, was immediately rejected by them (in addition, most of the Arab countries also rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, and it was only supported officially by Libya and Lebanon). Even the Arab states that were dependent on the United States took a reserved or cautious view of the ideals proclaimed in the Eisenhower Doctrine. And although J. Richards, the U.S. President's special representative, put forth a great deal of effort to widen the group of the Eisenhower Doctrine's supporters, he was not able to achieve its official recognition by Saudi Arabia or Jordan. It was only through the exertion of tremendous pressure that the Americans were able to force Jordan to enter into the economic commission of the Baghdad Pact.

The governments of a number of Arab countries decisively rejected U.S. intervention. When Syria rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, it announced that it would defend the legal right to safeguard independence and territorial integrity. Washington responded by turning up the pressure. The machinery of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine began to work at full speed. Plots, threats, provoked border incidents, demonstrations of military strength and armed blackmail were put in motion. In 1957, two plots against the government were exposed in Syria, and American diplomats and CIA agents were involved in both.

These recent historical facts naturally come to mind today, 20 years later, because the arsenal of contemporary counterrevolution, acting in concert with imperialist reaction, consists of the same methods--"slander, the misinformation of the public, economic blockade, sabotage, the organization of hunger and ruin, bribery and threats, terrorism, the organization of political assassinations and fascist-style pogroms."⁴

Under these conditions, American propaganda and diplomacy have stopped talking about "filling the vacuum." American imperialism is counting on stirring the Arabs up against one another. The imperialists are planning to use the exertion of others to attain their own goals--namely, to isolate the Arab countries from the world revolutionary movement, and from the Soviet Union above all, and, after dividing the Arab world, stopping the process of consolidation on an anti-Zionist and, consequently, anti-imperialist basis.

American historians E. Fisher and M. Bassiouni recall in their book "Storm Over the Arab World" that Eisenhower and Dulles were already negotiating with King Saud and the regent of the Iraqi king in Washington in 1957 on the creation of a U.S.-supported "royal alliance for the suppression of Arab revolution." "Only a few Americans," they write, "realized the importance of this meeting in U.S. history. Monarchs were received in the capital named after a hero of the American Revolution to work out plans to stifle revolution."⁵ At that time, Washington was not able to set up some Arab countries against others. Despite the anti-Syrian campaign launched by the United States, even the Arab countries which had officially accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine dissociated themselves from the American course of preparations for aggressive actions against Syria, and political figures in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan announced their "willingness to assist" Syria to repulse the aggression.

When events in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and later in Iraq, began to develop in a direction displeasing imperialist circles, when their creation, the Baghdad Pact, fell apart after the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq and when this threatened the positions of neocolonialism in general in the Middle East, the United States resorted to the direct use of military force in 1957 and 1958. It organized armed intervention in Lebanon and prepared to unleash aggression against Syria and Iraq. Ten years later, in July 1967, the United States gave Israel its blessing and assistance in aggressive actions against the Arab countries. Twenty years after the American intervention in Lebanon, this Arab state again became the object of wide-scale armed aggression, which was again accomplished by the Israeli expansionists with the blessings and assistance of Washington. These expansionists were pursuing, as we now see quite clearly, overt colonizing goals.

Some political scientists and writers believe that it was precisely the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact that involved the Middle East in the cold war. But the matter was not simply limited to this. While such Arab countries as Syria and then Iraq were actually teetering on the brink of "hot war" at the end of the 1950's when they were made the objects of the aggressive course of American policy, the Eisenhower Doctrine played an even

more sinister part in the case of Lebanon. It turned this little Arab country into an arena of bloody civil war in 1958 with subsequent armed intervention by American imperialism. Afterwards, each time imperialism assigned priority to the methods of dividing the united Arab anti-imperialism front, stirring up inter-Arab conflicts and, as it were, "Arabizing" the Middle Eastern crisis, Lebanon became an even hotter spot and more dangerous seat of tension in the Middle East. This was the case soon after the end of the Israeli aggression in 1967. This was also the case in the mid-1970's, after the end of the October War of 1973. The difference between the events of 1958 and subsequent years was that the intensification of the later internal political crises in Lebanon was accompanied by military provocation and aggressive sorties on the part of Tel Aviv, which ended in 1978 with its overt and extensive armed aggression.

The Lebanese 'Oasis' in Flames

A relatively short time ago, the American and Western European press called Lebanon a "showcase" and "oasis" of the West in the uneasy Arab East. In support of this myth, the press cited the fact that although Lebanon shared borders with "militant Israel" and "turbulent Syria," all Arab-Israeli wars and Arab revolutions were supposedly passing it by without affecting the Lebanese "oasis of stability." As for the sorry events of 1958, bourgeois historians preferred to blame them more on religious and inter-Arab conflicts than on social class differences. Lebanese bourgeois political scientist K. Salibi, however, admits that this crisis had a social as well as religious basis in his book entitled "Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1956-1976," published in New York. In later years, Salibi writes, it was difficult for Lebanon to remain uninvolved in the stormy events in the Middle East and the international arena, when "the Arab national liberation movement, with a great deal of support in Lebanon, was regarding the Soviet Union as a friend and the United States as its enemy."⁶

In 1958 Lebanon became the scene of bloody events resulting from civil war and foreign armed intervention, and in the 1970's it became the scene of a new bloody tragedy which culminated with wide-scale Israeli intervention in Lebanon. This country has historically and traditionally been regarded as the West's economic and political basis of support in the Arab East, the West's contracting partner, commercial middleman, financier and, to a significant degree, spokesman, and even a promoter of Western policy. Nonetheless, paradoxical as it may seem, the West, especially the United States, not only proved unable to guarantee Lebanon's security, integrity and sovereignty, but essentially aided in turning it into a scene of bloodshed and a victim of aggression.

The ruling clique in Lebanon, represented by President C. Shamun, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Malik and other pro-Western leaders, immediately responded in the 1950's to the appeal to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine. It was no coincidence, American writers note, that in 1957 and 1958 "Dulles wanted very much for Shamun to stay in his post, as there was no other leader in the Arab world who supported American ambitions so eagerly."⁷

This is why, when a popular armed demonstration against Shamun and the pro-Western government began in Lebanon in May 1958, the U.S. ambassador in Beirut called a secret meeting with representatives of Lebanese reactionary forces for the purpose of taking immediate measures for his protection. The Sixth American Fleet was reinforced and additional Marine units and transport planes were sent to the East Mediterranean. The U.S. Army group located in West Germany was brought to a state of combat readiness for "possible action in the Middle East." Therefore, even then U.S. ruling circles were planning open armed intervention. The staging of the preparations for this intervention was approximately the same as 2 decades later, in the 1970's: Diplomatic methods and subversive actions were put in motion to disunite Lebanese progressive forces and take advantage of the religious, ethnic and social conflicts fostered by the nation's government structure. In the 1970's, the same Shamun and other right-wing Christian leaders were quite zealous, within the framework of Washington's "sequential diplomacy" and "balanced" policy in the Middle East, first in working with Sadat and Arab reaction to break up the united Arab anti-imperialist front and to suppress its vanguard--the Palestinian resistance movement--and then to promote, with the aid of Israel and the United States, the partition of the nation after the pretended withdrawal of Israeli troops from South Lebanon.

The people's rebellion in Lebanon in 1958 took the form of civil war, but not one between Moslems and Christians. It was clearly anti-imperialist in nature and already displayed a tendency to evolve into a social revolution against the conservative social structure, the remnants of colonialism, the brutality of feudalism, opportunism and clericalism. Despite widespread support from outside reaction, the course of the civil war promised a complete victory for the anti-imperialist forces. The ruling circles of the United States and England saw that they would have to hurry if they wanted to prevent the total collapse of the puppet regime of Shamun. The rebellion in Lebanon impelled the imperialists to institute the use of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, the cornerstone of which was Iraq. Shamun officially requested Iraq for military assistance, making reference precisely to the Baghdad Pact. With the guidance and active participation of the Americans, troops from Iraq and Jordan prepared to enter Lebanon. American planes were ready to carry them there. The United States and England promised to completely secure the planned operation with military, political and economic means. Israel, at that same time, expressed its willingness to help in suppressing the popular rebellion in Lebanon. Permission to use the skies above Israel if the immediate transfer of replacements became necessary arrived from Tel Aviv. In this way, the armed intervention in Lebanon was supposed to represent the culminating point, the demonstrative denouement of the undercover "trilateral plot" cooked up by imperialism, reaction and Zionism. This plot was not only aimed against Lebanon, but also against Syria and Egypt and against the Arab revolutionary liberation movement as a whole.

By 17 May 1958, a decision had been adopted on the rendering of support to the Shamun regime at a meeting of the Baghdad Pact's military committee. In the second half of May and in June, Iraqi soldiers and officers were flown to Lebanon. The question of the invasion of Lebanon by Iraqi and Jordanian armed forces was discussed in the U.S. State Department during Washington visits by leading figures in the Iraqi-Jordanian federation. To camouflage the intervention being planned, American propaganda began an anti-Egypt campaign in 1958 by accusing the United Arab Republic of "intervention in Lebanese affairs." In the 1970's, Israeli intervention in South Lebanon was preceded by the same kind of vicious propaganda campaign, this time directed against Syria and the PLO.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, a variation of the notorious neocolonialist "carrot and stick" policy, envisaged, under the guise of struggle against "international communism," the use of U.S. armed forces against the less obedient Arab states and the offer of American military and economic "aid" to the more loyal pro-Western regimes. Washington felt that the ideal variant was one in which the "stick" would be in the hands of those who were willing to receive the American "carrot" as a makeweight to the obligations they had taken on by endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine. In 1958, however, the United States had to take the "stick" into its own hands. The military mechanism of this doctrine was completely put in action later, when the hard-won Baghdad Pact lost royal Iraq, its principal and only Arab link, which was regarded by the imperialists as their most reliable and most loyal ally in the entire Arab world.

The July Revolution of 1958 in Iraq brought the Baghdad Pact to the brink of catastrophe and simultaneously demonstrated that American strategic plans in the Middle East were resting on quicksand, and that the policy based on the Eisenhower Doctrine was just as unrealistic as the previous Anglo-French policy. Imperialist circles, however, did not wish to reconcile themselves to defeat. Ignoring the recent and, it would seem, obvious lesson of the Suez crisis, Washington and London resorted once again to the bankrupt military methods of "gunboat diplomacy," beginning the "Blue Bat" and "Goldfish" operations almost simultaneously in Lebanon and in Jordan.

The names given to these operations were in no way consistent with their insidious purpose and aggressive goals. Within 3 days after the revolution in Baghdad, naval landing forces disembarked under the barrels of the weapons on American ships standing off the coast of Lebanon and under the cover of hundreds of aircraft in Lebanon. These troops--numbering around 17,000--exceeded the size of the entire Lebanese Army. On the morning of 17 July, the English "Scarlet Imps" parachute brigade landed in Jordan. English reinforcement troops simultaneously arrived in Aden, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. In all, the United States and England concentrated land troops numbering around 70,000 during this period in the Middle East. Around a thousand planes were located at airforce bases and on aircraft carriers, and naval forces had up to 120 combat ships and troop carriers.⁸ The American planes and ships were equipped with atomic weapons.

For the first time since the Suez crisis, the United States and England acted in concert in the Middle East. Their common interest and goal of suppressing the Arab national liberation movement prevailed over their rivalry. Both governments used purely colonial methods to safeguard the petroleum interests of their monopolies and retain the political and military positions of neocolonialism. In essence, this was an updated variant of the "trilateral aggression," since Israel was also indirectly involved.⁹

It is indicative that the intervention forces in 1958, just as in the 1970's, made every attempt to take advantage of the presence of troops on Lebanese territory to suppress progressive forces, to reinforce their own positions and to accomplish the most unceremonious intervention in the internal affairs of this nation. The American occupation troops in Lebanon openly supported reaction. Representatives of the United States carried out direct intervention in the election of a new president; this was done, in particular, by State Department Emissary Murphy, who came to Lebanon for this purpose. While it was actually supporting reactionary groups, the United States was stirring up civil war in its own interest. This planted the seeds which produced bloody shoots once again in the 1970's. The American intervention and occupation, which were carried out under the guise of "aid" to Lebanon, contradicted the resolution of the UN General Assembly and actually served the interests of the colonizers and their proteges.

But theirs was a lost cause. The demands of the Lebanese and Jordanian masses, supported by the entire progressive world public, forced the imperialists to implement the decisions of the UN General Assembly on the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from Lebanon and Jordan. English and U.S. plans to stifle the national liberation movement in these countries and to extend the aggression to Iraq and Syria were wrecked. The failure of the Anglo-American intervention reaffirmed the fact that, after Suez, the military methods of imperialism were powerless in stopping the Arab national liberation movement. This was also reflected in the inglorious end of the Baghdad Pact, on the ruins of which the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was created a year later and turned out to be still-born, since all attempts to involve the Arab states in this organization were futile.

The total bankruptcy of the Eisenhower Doctrine became the finale of the American intervention's collapse. On 10 December 1958, the Lebanese Government officially rejected it.

The forced withdrawal of the American and English intervention forces from Lebanon and Jordan and the disruption of the plans to organize armed intervention against the Iraqi Republic reaffirmed the role of the Soviet Union as a reliable and strong basis of support in the struggle of the Arab people for their freedom and independence. This role was repeatedly demonstrated by the Soviet Union in later stages of the Middle Eastern conflict during the course of the Arabs' struggle to eradicate the after-effects of the Israeli aggression of 1967 and the new "Lebanese crisis" which was

largely a result of Washington's encouragement of Tel Aviv's expansionist aims and aggressive policies.

Soon after the Israeli aggression of 1967, Lebanon was drawn into the sphere of the Middle Eastern crisis and experienced internal political upheavals. At the end of 1968 the Israeli militarists bombed and shelled a number of villages in South Lebanon, made raids and punitive expeditions into the depths of the nation and accomplished a landing operation at the airport in Beirut, where 13 civilian aircraft were fire bombed. Israel was actually waging undeclared war against Lebanon.¹⁰ The Lebanese "oasis of peace" became engulfed in the flames of war. Under these conditions, bourgeois right-wing Christian leaders and Lebanese capitalists advocated a policy of maneuvering, "with an ear to the West and an eye on the Arab countries." They were hoping that the United States would never allow Israel to occupy Lebanon.

Washington, however, limited itself to periodically issuing formal reprimands to Tel Aviv while actually encouraging its aggressive actions in every way possible. Their goals were largely the same. Imperialism, Zionism and reaction were striving to isolate Lebanon from the Arab anti-imperialist front of struggle and to weaken or, if possible, liquidate the Palestinian movement, as well as progressive forces in the nation. Tel Aviv did not conceal the fact that the main purpose of its aggressive sorties was to weaken and demoralize the Palestinian resistance movement and simultaneously sow enmity between this movement and the Lebanese authorities. Attempts were made to accomplish a unique "pincer-movement" against the Palestinians and Lebanese progressive forces: While Israel continued its armed operations in the southern regions of Lebanon, local reactionary forces began to incite overt and armed confrontations with the Palestinians, relying on the direct support of Arab reactionary forces and imperialist circles in the West. "The course toward open armed suppression of Palestinian resistance in Lebanon," Salibi writes, "was followed particularly consistently and resolutely after President Franjiyah, whose policy was actively supported by the United States, came to power."¹¹ Another author, E. Khuri, notes in his book "Crisis in Lebanon" that rightist forces were supported by armed formations of the pro-American National Liberal Party, headed by former President C. Shamun, the Phalangists of P. Al-Jumayeh, the so-called Zghurta Liberation Army, including supporters of President S. Franjiyah, the right-wing extremist "Cedar Defense Front" military organization headed by F. Shimali, the organization of Maronite (Catholic) monasteries headed by Bishop S. Kassis and a unit of the Lebanese Army, reinforced by volunteers commanded by Colonel A. Baraqat.¹²

In their books, Khuri and Salibi refute statements made by some Western bourgeois writers, who have alleged that the conflicts which occurred and are still occurring in Lebanon were mainly confrontations between Lebanese Christians and Palestinians. After listing around 20 different Lebanese parties and organizations making up the Lebanese national patriotic forces and comprised of Moslems as well as Christians, Salibi, in particular, notes: "The situation was complicated by the fact that all of the Lebanese

parties and groups, as well as the Palestinians, were well armed and, for this reason, confrontation on any level would inevitably have resulted in horrifying bloodshed and destruction."¹³

The bloody events in Lebanon, which were twice incited by rightist forces in the middle and end of 1975 and which continued with brief intervals throughout 1976, actually evolved into a civil war, accompanied by Israeli armed operations on the Lebanese border, which ended in March 1978 with wide-scale Israeli intervention in South Lebanon and the occupation of a large part of Lebanese territory. During the civil war of 1975 and 1976 and the new armed conflicts subsequently incited by right-wing extremist forces, around 60,000 people died, even more were wounded and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians lost their homes and means of subsistence. The nation's material losses are estimated at a sum equal to several times Lebanon's annual income. As a result of the open armed aggression unleashed by Israel against Lebanon in March 1978, 1,700 square kilometers of Lebanese territory were occupied, around 2,000 people, according to the estimates of the American magazine TIME, died, around 4,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were wounded and more than 200,000 lost their homes.

'Balancing' at a Lean

The bloody events in Lebanon and the subsequent wide-scale armed aggression by Israel and its occupation of a large part of Lebanese territory took on a prolonged nature, because they were the direct result of the prolonged Middle Eastern conflict and the still-present after-effects of the Israeli aggression of June 1967, as well as the maneuvers of American diplomacy and the separate bargains made behind the scenes by Egyptian President As-Sadat after the October War of 1973. As it grew more prolonged, intense and widespread, the "Lebanese crisis" became a new component of the Middle Eastern conflict, considerably complicating it and drawing it into an even tighter knot. Due to Lebanon's unique geographic, economic and political position and the specific conditions in which the "Lebanese crisis" developed, it became, as it were, a reflection in miniature of the intricate Middle Eastern knot comprised of many conflicts and unsolved problems connected with the unsettled nature of the Palestinian problem and the Israeli conflict with the Arab countries, conflicts and differences between the Arab states themselves, the intrigues of local reactionary forces and, naturally, the neocolonialist maneuvers of the imperialist states and their competitive struggle for Middle Eastern oil and spheres of influence.

The tragedy of Lebanon was one of the results of American diplomacy's maneuvers in the Middle East. We know that right-wing Christian forces were striving to split Lebanon in half during the course of the first stage of the "Lebanese crisis," until the end of 1975. Nonetheless, the United States, even when there was a noticeable preponderance of progressive forces, comprised of the Palestinian resistance movement and national patriotic forces, which then controlled most of Lebanese territory, did not embark, and would not allow Israel to embark, on widespread aggression to divide Lebanon and establish Israeli control over part of its territory.

This was not done because, within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Washington and Tel Aviv were hoping mainly for the division of the Arab world and the reinforcement of separatist and pro-American tendencies within this world. American armed intervention or the untimely occupation of part of Lebanon by Israel could have put centripetal forces in motion in the Arab world and seriously impeded the conclusion of a separate agreement by As-Sadat with Israel with American mediation and might have diminished U.S. influence in the Arab world.

A fairly important part in this was also played by Washington's desire to avoid open confrontation with the Soviet Union, which had issued serious warnings about the dangerous consequences of intervention in the "Lebanese crisis" and about the serious responsibility the United States and aggressive NATO circles would have to assume if they did intervene. Washington also had to consider the implications of the unique position of some Western European countries, particularly France, which feared that open intervention in Lebanese events and the division of Lebanon could create new difficulties in relations with the Arab states.

The United States and Israel, on the other hand, hoped to prolong and intensify the "Lebanese crisis" to achieve the goals they were pursuing in the Middle East. This was made particularly apparent by the new dramatic intensification of the crisis at the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, despite the fundamental agreement that had been reached at that time with the active assistance of Syria on the cessation of bloodshed in Lebanon and on the terms for the political settlement of this crisis. At that time, the Western and Arab press reported unequivocally that the armed confrontations that had broken out in Lebanon on an even greater scale were deliberately provoked for the purpose of diverting public attention from the separate agreement concluded by As-Sadat with Israel in September 1975--an agreement which evoked widespread protest and indignation in the Arab world.

By involving the Palestinian movement and Syria in the "Lebanese crisis," imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction wished to bleed them white in civil war, divert them from the anti-imperialist struggle, diminish As-Sadat's isolation and, under the guise of mediators in the "Lebanese crisis," augment the role of Arab reactionary forces in Middle Eastern regulation. Subsequent events completely confirmed the fact that after the separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai had been signed, Lebanon not only became the target of Israeli armed provocation, but also essentially turned into one of the objects of the neocolonialist "trilateral bargain" concluded by imperialism, Zionism and reaction to divide the nation and the Arab anti-imperialist front.

The Western, including the American, press, as well as Israeli newspapers, did not deny that there had been extensive cooperation and interaction between Lebanese reactionary forces and Israel in the struggle against the Palestinian resistance movement and the national patriotic forces of Lebanon. The French press, for example, reported that weapons from Israel and from some of the NATO countries were being delivered to Lebanese ports controlled by rightist forces.

After the agreement on the cease-fire in Lebanon had been concluded at the end of 1976, Tel Aviv declared that its southern regions were a "semi-vacuum" and began working toward the establishment of de-facto Israeli military control in these regions and toward their gradual economic integration.

Tel Aviv's expansionist claims and aggressive plans, reinforced by overt blackmail and threats of a "preventive war" against the Arabs, did not grow less intense; they became increasingly bold and irrepressible as partial measures were taken with the active assistance of Washington in line with "sequential diplomacy" and as concessions were made by As-Sadat, who had embarked upon a course of overt compromise and capitulation. The mechanism governing the operation of U.S. "balanced" policy in the Middle East at this time was based on some measure of restraint of the mainspring of Israeli expansionism under Washington's control until a specific time and on the encouragement of Arab reactionary forces to capitulate. At that time, as the Syrian newspaper AL-BA'TH reported, the Arabs "were given sweet words" while Israel was given real support.

It is quite indicative that, not long before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Israeli Defense Minister Weizmann made a secret visit there to coordinate actions with right-wing Christian leaders. Within the framework of the same "trilateral bargain," soon after the Israeli troops' armed intervention in South Lebanon to the accompaniment of continuous shell-fire there and the explosions of bombs dropped by Israeli pilots from American planes, the same Weizmann conducted personal negotiations with President As-Sadat in Cairo and Israeli Prime Minister Begin requested larger and quicker shipments of American arms to Tel Aviv at his meeting with the President and the Pentagon chiefs. At that same time, American-Egyptian contacts continued on various levels, particularly A. Atherton's negotiations in Cairo. Washington, Tel Aviv and Cairo painstakingly tried to convey the impression that all of these contacts and negotiations had no connection with the events in Lebanon and had a more important purpose--to work out the bases for a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement and a plan for "long-range" strategy in the Middle East. The world press, including some American press organs, noted with amazement that, in the communique on the talks with Begin, Washington officially preferred to remain silent about the bloody events in Lebanon and decided not to condemn the Israeli aggression, not even formally.

It is not difficult to find a direct connection between these events and the American policy of "balancing" between Cairo and Tel Aviv--or, more precisely, between Arab reaction and Zionist circles with obvious leanings toward Israel. This is particularly attested to by the "complex" deal so noisily announced in Washington that is part of the "fighter plane diplomacy" in the Middle East and the many bilateral agreements on deliveries of American weapons to Israel, which have totaled 14.2 billion dollars just in the last 10 years.

While Egypt has only been promised outdated American aircraft and Saudi Arabia is being sold modern American weapons with a number of provisions and what amounts to American control over the use of these weapons, Israel is already using the latest American F-15 fighter planes and cassette bombs to destroy Lebanese civilians and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Although American officials have acknowledged Israel's violation of its agreements with the United States concerning the use of these bombs only for the purpose of "self-defense," they have decided not to even admonish Tel Aviv, much less impose penalties. Moreover, when Israel issued a "complaint" to Washington, alleging that the Palestinians were using "American light artillery and ammunition" that had been shipped to Saudi Arabia to repulse Israeli aggression in South Lebanon, the Pentagon investigated the matter quite thoroughly and assured Tel Aviv that "the possibility had been excluded." It also informed Israel that the obsolete planes promised to Egypt and the latest American aircraft sent to Saudi Arabia would not be used against Israel.

These examples conclusively prove that the policy of "balancing" is being conducted by Washington with strong leanings toward Tel Aviv. The Senate amendment increasing the number of aircraft for Israel within the framework of this "complex" transaction corroborates that these leanings have become even more pronounced since the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. All of this graphically illustrates the anti-Arab aims of the Americans' so-called "fighter plane diplomacy" in the Middle East. It was none other than President J. Carter himself who revealed its true essence by announcing that the complex sale of American aircraft in the Middle East "is a well-balanced transaction which will provide Israel with superior air power and will simultaneously serve as a demonstration of friendship with the moderate Arab states."¹⁴ In other words, the United States intends to continue supporting Tel Aviv in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and as for the "moderate" States with their conservative reactionary regimes, Washington has expressed its willingness to "demonstrate friendship" depending on how effectively they promote American interests in the Middle East.

The separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiations mediated by the United States revealed the maximum capabilities or "limits of pro-Arab orientation" in Washington's so-called "balanced course" in the Middle East.

Under the influence of various internal political, military, economic and international factors, U.S. Middle Eastern policy, just as before, is extremely contradictory. On the one hand, some people in Washington are beginning to realize the hopelessness of Tel Aviv's aggressive and expansionist policy which is increasingly working against U.S. long-range interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, Washington has continued to objectively encourage Israel's aggressive aims and to prevent the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. In practice, this policy is not leading "step by step" to a just and comprehensive settlement, but to a return to the familiar situation of "neither war nor peace," which Tel Aviv

would like to interpret in a new way after the latest Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement: To lead the Arab countries out of military confrontations without giving them a just peace in exchange.

The fact that pro-Israeli tendencies still prevail over pro-Arab feeling in Washington's Middle Eastern policy cannot be regarded as only the result of a specific correlation of domestic political forces in the United States or of the fact that Tel Aviv and the Zionist lobby in the United States are prevailing over the monopolistic circles which are connected with Arab oil and which therefore oppose exclusive emphasis on Israel. It appears that an equally important role is played by the fact that neocolonialist circles have been able, by paying the price of certain concessions on the oil front, to win more active support from Arab reactionary forces on the political front. With the aid of these reactionary circles, imperialism has been able to not only exert military pressure through Israel on the Arab liberation movement, but also to put the financial and political levers of Arab reaction into motion, simultaneously reinforcing them with its own direct and indirect economic and military pressure. Washington has not been able, however, to escape the vicious circle in which American Middle Eastern policy has been trapped for a long time. On the one hand, it has agreed to take a step toward comprehensive settlement by adopting the joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East--a statement which is consistent with the spirit of international detente. On the other hand, American diplomacy has continued its undercover activities in preparation for new separate agreements unconnected with the Geneva Peace Conference, which was reflected in the unproductive Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in July 1978, in which the U.S. secretary of state participated directly, and the equally unsuccessful attempts to continue "shuttle operations" in the Middle East. All of this has only complicated the situation in this region even more.

This policy is absolutely devoid of promise. It only encourages the irresponsible expansionism of Israeli aggressive circles and ignores the true interests of the Arab people. In the final analysis, it is not in the U.S. interest either and it is complicating the search for peace and settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. This was even acknowledged by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a meeting with J. Carter on 23 March 1978 after Begin's visit to Washington. Even Senator J. Javits, one of Israel's most loyal and active friends, called the prospects in this situation "extremely disillusioning" and Senator C. Percy admitted that the Begin Government, taking advantage of Washington's protection, had "taken a backward step in the peace-making process."

In light of these facts, many American press organs have concluded that the mechanism of the poorly "balanced" Middle Eastern policy of the United States, which is trying to find a compromise between the expansionism of Tel Aviv and the compromisory nature of Arab reaction, is obviously breaking down since it has not been able to lead Middle Eastern regulation out of its impasse.

The escape from this vicious circle should not be sought in the encouragement of violence and partial separate bargains, but in the only correct course, aimed at a comprehensive just settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict on the principles agreed upon and expressed in the joint statement issued by the USSR and the United States on 1 October 1977 in their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, a mechanism expressly created for the achievement of a settlement in the Middle East and endorsed by all of the parties concerned.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 February 1978.
2. "Protiv sionizma i izrail'skoy aggressii" [Against Zionism and Israeli Aggression], Moscow, 1974, p 180.
3. Although the United States did not participate directly in the hostilities against Egypt in 1956, its armed forces in the East Mediterranean and in the Middle East demonstrated their support for the aggressors in every way possible. Using the excuse of the "need to protect the life and property of American citizens" (Washington has subsequently used this excuse several times for military demonstrations against the Arab countries), the United States immediately took part in the anti-Egyptian campaign of military threats to the West. The entire 6th American Fleet, located in the Mediterranean, quickly approached the coast of Egypt, and later American Marines even landed in Alexandria, again for the purpose of "guaranteeing the security of U.S. citizens" (T. K. Belashchenko, "SShA: 200 let--200 voyn" [The United States: 200 Years--200 Wars], Moscow, 1976, p 192).
4. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 30.
5. E. Fisher and M. Bassiouni, "Storm Over the Arab World," Chicago, 1972, p 124.
6. K. Salibi, "Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1956-1976," New York, 1976, p 11.
7. E. Fisher and M. Bassiouni, Op. cit., p 138.
8. "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [International Relations Since World War II], vol. 3, Moscow, 1965, p 622.
9. A telegram sent by a representative of the Iraqi monarchy to the United Nations, which was later made public, indicates that Israel had agreed to allow an Iraqi division to pass through its territory

to Lebanon as early as the end of June 1958. On the eve of the revolution in Iraq, a decision was made at a secret meeting of the cabinet of ministers on Israel's participation in the Lebanese invasion planned within the framework of the Baghdad Pact. After the beginning of Anglo-American intervention, the aggressors' troops and weapons were transported to Jordan through Israeli territory ("Istoriya vnesheiny politiki SSSR, 1945-1970" [The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970], Part 2, Moscow, 1971, pp 286-287).

10. Between June 1967 and February 1975, Israel committed 1,300 violations of Lebanese air space, more than 2,000 artillery and mortar shellings, 110 bombardments from the air, 205 violations of land borders and 450 raids far into Lebanese territory. As a result of all these actions, 330 Lebanese and Palestinians died, around 1,000 were wounded and more than 1,300 homes were destroyed or damaged (AL-NIDA!, 14 February 1975).
11. K. Salibi, Op. cit., p 89.
12. E. Khuri, "Crisis in Lebanon," Washington, 1976, p 79.
13. K. Salibi, Op. cit., p 90.
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 April 1978.

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BEFORE THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS: PARTIES, CANDIDATES, ISSUES

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[Article by V. P. Zolotukhin and V. A. Linnik]

[Text] The mid-term elections of 1978 are particularly significant for a number of reasons. The Democrats, after returning to the White House after an 8-year interval, will be facing the voters for the first time since the presidential campaign of 1976. For the Republican Party, which has been weakened by serious losses in 1974 and 1976, the present campaign will also prove a significant test.

The mid-term elections on 7 November 1978 will concern 34 of the 100 senators, all 435 members of the House of Representatives, 36 of the 50 state governors and the total membership of the legislative assemblies of many states. Some 58 of the legislators up for re-election have announced their intention to retire after the close of the current congressional session (this is a record number for recent years).

The traditional role of mid-term elections in the United States consists in the fact that they provide some idea of the voters' estimation of the activities of the administration, Congress and local government and make it possible to outline the particular group of issues that are characteristic of the political situation in the nation. They provide ruling circles with an opportunity to carefully adjust the mood of the voting public with the aid of their usual set of manipulative tools and, finally, they allow ruling circles to single out the most promising political figures prior to the next presidential campaign.

This year's elections will be held in an atmosphere with a number of distinctive features. The single-party regime, in which the Democrats hold the presidency, firmly control both houses of Congress and occupy the overwhelming majority of gubernatorial positions, has not produced the expected political unity and single-mindedness. The situation today is largely dependent on far more than just the mere relationship between the President and Congress or between federal and local government, and it is not only

subjective factors that are playing a part here. The complex political situation in the nation is primarily connected with an entire complex of objective economic, social and political factors.

The sluggish rates of economic growth, the resurgence of inflation and unemployment, which is still at the 6-percent level, the unstable position of the dollar, the energy crisis, rising taxes and other insoluble economic and social problems have given rise to the difficulties being encountered by the Americans. In this election year, heated debates over foreign policy issues are also going on in the nation--issues such as the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, the problem of strategic arms limitation and others.

Finally, when we discuss the background of the 1978 campaign, we must also consider the crises that have made themselves so apparent in recent years in the American political system. The most vivid examples were Watergate and the origination of the "credibility gap" atmosphere in which the public lost its faith in various government institutions.

According to a Harris poll (March 1976), public trust in the main institutions of authority was at a lower point then than at any other time since the Harris firm began to conduct these polls 10 years ago. Another influential public opinion research organization, Potomac Associates, calculated the following "trust index" on the basis of polls conducted for it by the Gallup Institute. With an ideal indicator of 100, the index for agencies of the executive branch was 67 in 1972, 45 in 1974 and 55 in 1976; the respective figures for Congress were 62, 59 and 55. Appraisals were only slightly higher for the activities of state governments (here the respective figures were 60, 64 and 61), local governments (57, 61 and 57) and politicians in general (58, 58 and 57).¹

Disillusionment and distrust in the American political system have given rise to mass nonparticipation by potential voters in elections--absenteeism which is tending to increase. Whereas only around 55 percent of the voters have cast their ballots in recent presidential elections, the number has not even reached 45 percent in mid-term elections.

Growing absenteeism, in turn, serves as an indicator of the diminished influence of the two-party system. This is also attested to by the constant increase in recent decades in the so-called independent electorate--voters who do not associate themselves with either of the two leading parties. In 1937, 48 percent of the voters were Democrats, 34 percent were Republicans and 17 percent were independent. In 1968 the respective figures were 41, 29 and 29 percent, and in the middle of 1977 they were 49, 20 and 31 percent.² In recent years, the Republican Party's relative share of the voting public has been particularly diminished.

Much is being said in our day about the declining influence of the two parties in the United States. Bourgeois experts have named various factors as the causes of this phenomenon: the spread of television, which has permitted candidates to appeal directly to the voters en masse, the rebirth of the system of primary elections, the smaller role played by political patronage, etc. Without denying the role played by these factors, we must say that they are not the deciding factors. The causes of the difficulties being experienced by both parties can be found in the peculiarities of the political system and the socioeconomic and class conflicts in contemporary state-monopolistic capitalism in the United States.

Although bourgeois analysts have tried to conceal the real reason for the crisis of the two-party system, their worries about its present and future are indicative. In the fall of 1977, the influential journal of the business community, FORTUNE, published a series of three articles on this subject by E. Ladd, prominent expert on the American two-party system. His onesided interpretation of the organizational reforms carried out in both parties in the 1960's and 1970's deserves criticism, but the uneasiness with which the author writes about the weakening of party influence is extremely symptomatic. Ladd concludes his series of articles with an appeal for reinforcement of the parties' role in the American political process.

Let us recall that the organizational structure of the bourgeois parties in the United States is quite distinctive: This is a decentralized structure with a large measure of autonomy in local and state organizations. The national committees of both leading parties do not have "strong authority" or unlimited financial resources. For this reason, during the preparations for the current mid-term elections, they are taking steps to coordinate efforts in this campaign and, above all, they are striving to assist their candidates in districts where the situation is more complex, to organize public appearances by party leaders and to give the candidates in these districts financial assistance. These measures are carried out on a much more modest scale in the more reliable districts.

Even in the role of coordinators of campaign measures, however, the national committees have no significant way of influencing the course of events and they cannot conduct local organizations like a well balanced orchestra. Success here depends largely on specific local conditions, on the financial resources of the candidates, on their ability to create support organizations, etc. Quite frequently, the politician who wins an elected office owes his victory not to the support of the national or even the state committee, but to his own personal wealth or to the assistance of influential local groups whose interests must then be given priority in his subsequent activity.

In terms of its number of supporters, the Democratic Party is now 2.5 times as large as the Republican Party. But this does not mean that the Democrats "have no problems." The party membership is an extremely mixed group, and this, in itself, gives rise to many conflicts. In addition to this, this party has the distinction of being the ruling party at the present time,

which gives it advantages but also makes it more vulnerable to criticism. Finally, complex relations are also taking shape in the upper Democratic echelon. We know, for example, that a fairly difficult relationship has come into being between President Carter and Congress, even though the President and the majority in Congress belong to the same party. In the 1976 election, J. Carter defeated G. Ford by an insignificant majority, and most of the Democratic candidates for the post of senator or congressman received more votes than the President in their own districts. According to a tradition of long standing, during a presidential election year the success of the presidential candidate is frequently the reason for the victory of many congressional candidates from the same party; this is the result, as they say in the United States, of the "presidential coat-tail effect." In 1976 this was not the case, and the members of Congress do not feel obligated to the President in this respect.

The nature of interrelations between the President and Congress is also affected by other factors: the legislators' attempts to consolidate their own positions in recent years, as well as the decentralization of authority in the Capitol as a result of recent reforms. In particular, J. Carter has encountered many difficulties in Congress when he has tried to promote both domestic political measures (the energy program and others) and foreign policy actions (the Panama Canal treaties, etc.).

Problems also exist in the interrelations between J. Carter and his closest associates on one side and the party leaders and power structure on the other. Party leaders have expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Carter paid little attention to party affairs during the first year of his administration. They say, however, that he is not an exception and that other presidents in the postwar period have also preferred to remain somewhat above the party struggle and keep a certain distance between them and the party officials. The fact has also been pointed out that J. Carter, who had no strong ties in the party leadership or its Washington machine prior to his election, created his own support organization during his campaign, and this organization still exists--to the dissatisfaction of the Democratic establishment.

J. Carter, as we know, owns a peanut farm, and his supporters are called "peanut brigaders." Reports have been circulated about friction between the members of this group and the party machine in a number of states and about the national committee's attempts to regulate the resulting tension. Besides this, the President's assistants have frequently been criticized for their failure to pay attention to party leaders.

Renowned political scientist A. Ranney, former president of the American Political Science Association, states: "Carter and his people have no interest in building up the Democratic Party. He is primarily a loner. He feels that he owes absolutely nothing to the Democratic Party."³ Circles close to the White House dispute statements of this kind, noting that, although J. Carter was not closely connected with the Washington party structure, he has been active in party affairs since the beginning

of his political career in his native state of Georgia. But the leaders of Democratic Party organizations on the state level agree that Carter did not pay enough attention to party problems during the first year of his administration, although they do not acknowledge that, as the President, he must give priority to the affairs of state. Now that preparations are being made for the 1978 elections, these leaders hope to receive more active support from the President and, in turn, are prepared to repay him for this with closer cooperation on their own part. J. Carter has promised to give campaign support to Democratic candidates and to take part in fund-raising events. One event of this kind, which took place in Atlanta in January 1978 and was attended by the President, raised around a million dollars for the Democrats. Another four such events have been planned for the campaign.

The financial situation of the Democrats, however, is a difficult one. At the beginning of 1978, the National Committee's debts totaled around 2 million dollars (part was left over from the 1968 campaign). The National Committee and the campaign committees of the Democratic congressional factions plan to spend a total of around 9 million dollars on this year's election race⁴ (the Republicans, as we will show below, have much greater funds at their disposal).

The Democrats' main objective in the mid-term elections is to consolidate their successes of 1974 and 1976. At present, the Democrats hold 61 of the 100 seats in the U.S. Senate, 288 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives, 37 gubernatorial posts out of 50 and 68 percent of the seats in state legislatures; besides this, in 29 states they control the gubernatorial post and the majority in the legislature.⁵

The matter, however, does not simply lie in a significant majority of Democrats in elected government positions, which is of great importance to the outcome of the elections. Many of the Democratic candidates have already occupied certain elected positions (they are called "incumbents"). The history of elections, particularly in the House of Representatives, testifies that this category of candidates has certain advantages for re-election: They are better known to the voters, they have political experience and connections, they have certain privileges in connection with transportation expenses, postage costs and assistants' salaries, etc. In monetary terms, the value of these privileges for the candidate running for a congressional seat is at least 200,000 dollars.

The Democrats' rival--the Republican Party--has just as urgent a need for unity, but is far from united. Within the party there is a constant struggle between moderate politicians (former President G. Ford, current party chairman W. Brock and others), who advocate the expansion of the party's mass base, the encouragement of black Americans, young voters and women to join the party and so forth, and right-wing politicians headed by R. Reagan, who occupy an ultra-conservative position. These differences always make themselves known during the course of political debates on major issues:

For example, while G. Ford favored the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, R. Reagan and his supporters were against them. The right wing is extremely active and often forces the moderates to make compromises. As a result of one such compromise, the head of the Republican National Committee's campaign division is C. Black, a close associate of R. Reagan and another extreme rightist, Senator J. Helms.

It is curious that the party controlling the presidency usually suffers losses in mid-term elections, particularly in the House of Representatives (this sometimes affects several dozen seats). Although historical experience in general confirms this possibility, however, the Republicans--at least at the beginning of the 1978 campaign--have refrained from making any excessively optimistic predictions. During the 1976 congressional elections, they reassessed their potential and hoped to defeat many Democrats who were new to the House of Representatives, arriving there in 1974. But these turned out to be more difficult rivals than the Republicans expected, and they retained their seats in the House. They will be difficult to beat in 1978 as well. Let us repeat that most of them, having won their elections in 1976 by a larger majority than President J. Carter, do not feel obligated to him for their victory, have remained independent and are relying primarily on their own influence in their 1978 campaigns; for this reason, it is difficult for the Republicans to blame them for any of the administration's failures.

The situation in the Senate is not a simple one for the Republicans either. After the 1976 elections there were 38 Republican senators. In 1978, 17 senators are up for re-election--that is, this will decide the fate of almost half of the present Republican faction. Besides this, five of the Republican senators have decided to retire and, consequently, will not run for re-election.

During the initial stage of the campaign, the Republicans had an obvious financial advantage. In 1977 the Republicans received 18.5 million dollars in donations, while the Democrats received 5.6 million. The National Committee of the Republican Party and the campaign committees of the Republican congressional factions plan to spend a total of 25 million dollars on this campaign. Moreover, the Republican National Committee, in contrast to the highest agency of its rivals, had no debts. The conservative Republicans are receiving a tremendous amount of financial support from the so-called "new right," headed by R. Vickery. With the aid of these financial levers, the latter are energetically striving for an even more dramatic rightward shift in the Republican Party.

The inter-party struggle is still going on over the premises regulating campaign practices and finances. This year the Democratic faction in Congress introduced a bill which would have far-reaching political consequences if passed. This bill would reduce the funds which party state and national committees could turn over to congressional candidates by 70 percent. This proposal, which will weaken the role of the parties in the financing of campaigns, will correspondingly increase the candidate's

dependence on monetary contributions from the business community and labor unions. The Democrats' interest in this bill becomes understandable if we recall that most of the financial contributions (66 percent) from monopolies and labor unions in 1976 were turned over to incumbents, congressmen who were up for re-election. The Democrats up for re-election spent an average of 73,495 dollars, while the Republicans running against them spent 51,815 dollars. The new bill of the Democratic faction in Congress (which is twice as large as the Republican faction) would strengthen its position even more. The bill can also be regarded as a unique reaction by the Democrats to the successful fund-raising campaign of the Republican Party.

The American press has been lively in its coverage of the actions of famous politicians in connection with the coming election.

Several prominent legislators will end their political careers this year. Alabama's J. Sparkman, 78-year-old senator, Democratic candidate for the vice-presidency in the 1952 election and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, will leave the Senate; he has occupied his seat in the Senate for 30 years. The only senator of Arab origins, 47-year-old J. Abourezk, liberal Democrat from South Dakota, is leaving; he has only served one term in the Senate, occupying a seat in its Budget Committee, Judiciary Committee and other committees. Republican C. Curtis from Nebraska has spent 40 years in Congress (the last 24 in the Senate), and is a member of the agriculture and finance committees.

Texas Democrat O. Teague, 67-year-old chairman of the House Science and Technology Committee, is leaving the House of Representatives for reasons of health; he has been a member of the House for 32 years. There will be a vacancy for chairman of the Appropriations Committee, a post which was occupied by Texas Democrat J. Mahon, 78-year-old legislator who has been in the House for 44 years. Texas Democrat W. Poage, 78-year-old senior member of the Committee on Agriculture, has been in the House for only 2 years less than Congressman Mahon. Another Texan, Democrat O. Burleson (71 years old), is leaving after 32 years in the House. Prominent representative of the Democratic Party's black Americans, Barbara Jordan from Texas, has announced her decision to leave the House. The decision of the 42-year-old Jordan, who was re-elected for a third term, came as a surprise; according to reports, she has had differences with the current administration in connection with her "personal political plans."

Several members of the House are running for the Senate: These are the following famous congressmen: Democrat D. Fraser from Minnesota, Republican L. Pressler from South Dakota, Republican W. Armstrong from Colorado, Democrat M. Baucus from Montana and Republican W. Cohen from Maine. Some congressmen are also running for governor: Republican L. Frey from Florida, Republican A. Quie from Minnesota, Republican R. Sarasin from Connecticut and Republican C. Thone from Nebraska. Other congressmen are also leaving the House for various reasons.⁶

A particularly fierce struggle is being waged for the vacancies in the House. Many belonged to Democrats, and it is precisely these seats that are being given special attention by the Republicans. In some districts the chances of candidates from both parties are almost equal, approximately half of these seats belonged to Democrats and another half to Republicans and, consequently, losses and gains are possible for both sides. The Democrats, for example, will have difficulties in keeping at least the three seats that have become available in Texas, but the Republicans will have similar difficulties with vacancies in Florida, Ohio, Kansas and other states. Some of the veteran Democrats running for re-election do not feel entirely confident, and the Republicans are expecting victory in these districts.

The Republicans are no longer cherishing any particular hope of unseating the new Democrats elected in 1974 (75 congressmen) and 1976 (47 congressmen). These new members are quite strong and quite determined to retain their seats. In general, they are demonstrating their independence not only of the administration, but also of congressional and party leaders, are stressing their services to their own electoral district and have a fairly good chance of victory even in those regions where particular aspects of the present administration's policy have evoked the dissatisfaction of the voters.

As we have already said, 34 senators are to be elected this year. In the present Congress, these seats are divided equally among Democrats and Republicans. It is quite striking that the Republicans will have to defend almost half of the 38 seats they now hold in the Senate. Besides this, five of the eight senators who are retiring are Republicans. As for these eight vacancies, election gains and losses are possible for both parties. In South Dakota a Republican congressman is leading the race for the senatorial seat left vacant by J. Abourezk, but in Nebraska and Oklahoma the Democrats have a definite chance of victory. In Nebraska, the governor of the state, Democrat J. Exon, is running for the senatorial post left vacant by Republican C. Curtis. In this agrarian state where the farmers are now experiencing severe difficulties, J. Exon is emphasizing agricultural problems in his campaign, sharply criticizing J. Carter's policy in this area. As for other vacancies in the Senate, the Republicans will apparently be able to retain their influence in Wyoming and the Democrats will keep their seats in Alabama and Arkansas.

In other areas of the campaign arena, the Republicans have thrown down an equally serious challenge to their rival Democrat senators. In Colorado, Congressman W. Armstrong is trying to take away Senator F. Haskell's seat and is blaming Haskell for impeding the state's economic development by supporting environmental protection measures. A contradictory situation has taken shape in Maine. Senator W. Hathaway supports a local hydraulic power project, maintaining that it will give the state new jobs and cheap electric power; Congressman W. Cohen is attacking him from the standpoint of a protector of the environment, asserting that this project could harm nature.

Among the Republican senators running for re-election, the chances of Senate minority leader H. Baker from Tennessee are considered to be good. Two representatives of the right wing, S. Thurmond from South Carolina and J. Helms from North Carolina, are waging an active campaign to retain their posts; both are opponents of the Panama Canal treaties and are making use of this issue in their campaigns. In Texas, another conservative, J. Tower, has encountered a serious challenge from Congressman R. Krueger, but Krueger has rivals in his own party as well.

Of the 36 governors up for re-election this year, 26 are Democrats, 9 are Republicans and 1 is independent--J. Longley in the state of Maine. Particularly great significance is being attached to gubernatorial elections in the more populated states, which have a corresponding greater number of presidential electors. These states play a key role in presidential elections. In such large states as New York, California, Texas and Massachusetts, Democratic governors will run for re-election; in Ohio, Michigan and Illinois the governors are Republican.

In California, Governor E. Brown, one of the contenders for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. presidency in 1976 and a possible candidate in the 1980 election, has a chance of re-election. The first term of Governor H. Carey of New York, however, has been marked by difficult problems and a financial crisis in New York State and New York City. Carey has many rivals, including Democrats, but he nonetheless holds a fairly strong position in the campaign. He is emphasizing the fact that he achieved a turn for the better in economic conditions in the state and has seized the initiative from his rival Republicans by proposing larger tax cuts than they have demanded. In Texas, Governor D. Briscoe has come up against a serious challenge within his own party from State Attorney J. Hill. By the beginning of 1978, the rivals were putting huge amounts of financial resources into action: more than 800,000 dollars for Briscoe and more than half a million for Hill. Republican contenders are also involved in this struggle. In Massachusetts, Governor M. Dukakis is running for re-election for a second term, citing the benefits of his budget economy policy. He has won the support of conservatives and is now advocating higher allocations for social programs in order to win liberal circles over to his side as well.

On the Republican flank, Governor J. Thompson of Illinois is running for re-election. He is one of the possible future contenders for the presidency. By balancing the state budget and instituting a number of crime prevention measures during his first term as governor, Thompson has guaranteed himself a strong position. In Michigan--for the first time, in accordance with legislation passed here--candidates for governor are receiving campaign subsidies from the state treasury. Here the Democratic contenders are putting forth a great deal of effort to take the gubernatorial post away from Republican W. Milliken; nonetheless, it is believed that the latter has much more chance of success. Prognoses are favorable for Ohio's governor, Republican J. Rhodes, as well.

The election campaign is an extremely costly undertaking. An investigation into the social status of the candidates involved in the 1978 campaign reaffirms the well-known fact that the campaign arena in the United States is reserved for the rich. Many of the candidates are wealthy individuals, including millionaires, professional politicians, high-level officials in state government, etc. Data have already been presented above on the extremely large sums mobilized by the beginning of the campaign by the two candidates in Texas. Many other examples could be added.

In the state of Alaska, millionaire Republican W. Hickel, formerly of Nixon's cabinet, is running for governor and expects to spend 400,000 dollars on his campaign. In Arkansas, Congressman R. Thornton, who is running for senator, intends to spend 400,000-500,000 dollars on the campaign (his relatives are prominent bankers and are among the state's wealthiest businessmen). A rich publisher from the state of Michigan, P. Power, is running for the Senate and has allotted a sum of half a million dollars for the primary election alone. The chairman of the Dayton Chamber of Commerce (Ohio), D. Kircher, has 200,000 to spend on his campaign for election to the House of Representatives. This list could be continued.

The absolute opposite of this can be seen in the situation of a politician with an extremely modest income--black American J. Hammond, member of the Columbus City Council (Ohio). The beginning of his campaign in the race for a seat in the House was successful, but he later faced a dilemma--if he wished to continue his campaign, he would have to leave his job in a local firm. In view of the fact that this job was his only means of subsistence, J. Hammond was forced to withdraw from the race.

During any campaign connected with congressional elections, many of the issues prevailing in the campaign dialog of candidates from both parties concern the activities of the administration. Some of the controversy is necessarily related to those programs and legislative initiatives of the President which are of nationwide significance and will affect the interests of the most diverse segments of the voting public. Each specific state or district, however, has its own socioeconomic, demographic, political and other peculiarities which must be taken into account by candidates. This is the reason for the more local tone of the problems arising during mid-term elections in comparison, for instance, to presidential elections. The mid-term elections are always less connected with foreign policy issues and ideological factors.

Economic problems are almost always the central issue of American campaigns, but there are extremely diverse variations depending on the nature of the district. A candidate running from the electoral district in which Harlem is located, where 87 percent of the young blacks have no jobs, will naturally run on platforms and slogans that are totally different from those of a contender for a congressional seat in the suburban district of Santa Fe, (California) with its wealthy population. Differences of this nature are the reason for the diverse, mosaic character of campaign slogans.

Unemployment is a crucial issue in a number of industrial districts, and the rate of unemployment will affect the outcome of elections. In agrarian regions, particularly in Nebraska, Kansas and other Midwestern states, where the farmers are experiencing hard times and have resorted to strikes several times in recent months, dissatisfaction with the administration's agricultural policy is widespread.

Aspects of the energy policy are the subject of lively debates. In Texas, Democrat R. Krueger, who is running for senator and represents the interests of oilmen, has based his campaign on the demand for so-called deregulation (the cancellation of government price control on oil and natural gas), which is in direct opposition to the administration's program. In West Virginia, Republican Senator J. Randolph, up for re-election, is criticizing Carter's energy policy for neglecting the interests of the coal industry. In many regions, candidates running on consumer protection slogans are raising another question connected with the energy crisis and inflation--the rising rates for electricity and public utilities.

It is striking that energy, employment and environmental protection problems have combined to make up an intricate knot of conflicts in many parts of the nation. Conservationists are quite active in many Western states and other areas. They are opposing the construction of a number of industrial and power production facilities (particularly nuclear power stations), new highways and so forth on the grounds that these projects will harm the environment. Their opponents, the advocates of accelerated economic development, are accusing them of blocking the stimulation of the economy, business, employment, the production of cheap energy, etc. Unique political combinations are springing up as a result of this. Influential business circles and the huge teamsters union have joined together as advocates of accelerated economic development in the disagreement of these issues in Alaska. In several Western regions, the question of states' rights is being raised in connection with the use of water and other resources, and dissatisfaction with the federal government's intervention in this sphere has been expressed.

Problems connected with taxes and with the steps taken by federal and state governments in this area are evoking interest everywhere. Many candidates are discussing matters that disturb consumers and are representing themselves as protectors of their interests. Questions connected with social security, public health and government policy in these spheres are mentioned frequently. Crime, as we know, is one of the most pressing problems in the United States, and many candidates are running on slogans calling for "law and order." At the same time, the opponents of gun control laws are also quite active.

In a number of cities, the problem of bussing--the transport of children to school on buses for the purpose of desegregating education--is still acute. In regions with a Catholic population and in some other areas, particularly the Midwest, an active campaign is being waged against the liberalization of abortion laws. As we know, some states have still not ratified the constitutional amendment on equal rights for women, and this issue is also part of the campaign controversy.

Many conservative candidates are openly taking an anti-labor stand. They are defending existing legislation on the so-called right to work, which actually envisages "open shop" practices and is of an overtly anti-union nature. These candidates are fighting against legislative measures supported by the unions--on the conditions governing picketing at construction sites and so forth.

Campaign discussions also touch upon problems connected with political practices and the activities of governmental and political officials. The latest scandal, connected with the bribery of several members of Congress by South Korean lobbyist and intelligence agent Tongsun Park, has had great repercussions. Accusations of political corruption are being heard. This issue has become a quite crucial one in Pennsylvania, where the administration of Governor M. Shapp has been marked by a number of scandals. Political corruption again attracted attention in this state when attorney D. Marston, who was investigating accusations made against Congressman J. Eilberg and other Democrats, was dismissed from his post by the attorney general. Pennsylvania Congressman D. Flood was one of the men who was being investigated; nonetheless, he is running for re-election. In several places, people are objecting to the practice of political patronage; the bureaucracy in federal and other government institutions is being criticized; dissatisfied voices can also be heard discussing the rise in congressional salaries; the limitation of congressional terms is being proposed; Carter's electoral reform proposals are being criticized.

Many candidates are emphasizing problems of strictly local significance in an attempt to win the affection of the voters. Sometimes this leads to unexpected situations. For example, candidates in North Carolina who represent the centers of the tobacco industry are attacking J. Califano and his Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the harm suffered by this industry as a result of the last, excessively energetic campaign against smoking.

Referendums on questions that have not been settled in the state legislative assemblies constitute an integral part of American campaigns. On the state level, around 300 referendums on the average are held during years of mid-term and presidential elections on various issues of purely local interest, from property taxes to the legal drinking age.

The growing interdependence of foreign policy and domestic political problems is reflected in the fact that U.S. initiatives of any significance in the area of domestic policy frequently have foreign political consequences and vice-versa. For example, the President's energy program, the subject of lively campaign debates, is directly connected with the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, the position of the American dollar and the state of the capitalist economy as a whole.

In the current campaign, foreign policy issues are more noticeable than usual for mid-term elections.

The Panama Canal treaties were the subject of heated debates during the initial stage of the campaign, particularly in the Southern and Western states. In Georgia, the home state of President J. Carter, N. Gingrich, candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives, made this one of the major issues in his campaign and headed an organization called "Citizens of Georgia Against the Panama Canal Treaties." According to political columnists, the attitude of some senators toward the treaties will be a deciding factor in their political fate in the elections. In a number of electoral districts, candidates from both parties are pointedly criticizing the President's policy in the Middle East, particularly the "package" sale of aircraft to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The problem of Soviet-American relations and, in particular, the ongoing strategic arms limitation talks, are still domestic political issues as well. Congressman L. Aspin, running for re-election in Wisconsin (he is renowned as one of the advocates of limitation of the arms race), has published data indicating that the cancellation of this agreement would increase U.S. spending by more than 20 billion dollars during the next 10 years. There is no need to talk about how heavy a burden these expenditures would be for the American economy.... The constant attacks made by right-wing politicians on the talks with the USSR attest to their attempt to turn an extremely important matter into an object of irresponsible campaign controversy. On the other hand, in some states the President is campaigning in support of congressional candidates who are known to support agreements with the Soviet Union.

The 1978 campaign has another extremely noteworthy feature.

The next population census in the United States will be taken in 1980. In accordance with its results, the boundaries of electoral districts will be revised. According to the American Constitution, the states have complete authority in determining the boundaries of the federal districts in which members of the U.S. House of Representatives are elected. The revision of districts is the immediate task of state legislative assemblies, which sometimes enlist the services of state judicial authorities, with direct participation by governors, who have the power to veto the directives of legislative assemblies. Naturally, state legislators set up the boundaries of electoral districts in such a way as to guarantee advantages for the party controlling the legislature--that is, the party having the majority in one or both chambers. This is why the revision of the boundaries of electoral districts after 1980 will largely determine the balance of power between the two bourgeois parties during the entire decade to follow.

Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's were intended to put an end to scandalous disproportions in the number of voters in electoral districts. The population of rural districts, which were mainly Republican,

were frequently only equal to one-third or one-fourth of the population of suburban districts.⁷ The decisions of the Supreme Court specify the need to observe the principle of "one man--one vote"; an excess of more than 3.1 percent in the number of voters in one district over the number of voters in another was declared unconstitutional.

Nonetheless, majority factions in legislatures still have significant opportunities for political manipulation in the setting of district boundaries. For example, in the large Northeastern cities, the Democrats generally are elected to Congress from urban districts while the Republicans are elected from the suburbs. If district boundaries are set at a radius from the city center, Democrats will prevail and there will be a corresponding decrease in the Republican representation in Congress. If district boundaries are set in concentric circles, the Republicans will be able to retain their influence in the suburbs. The last redistribution of district boundaries after the 1970 census, which was carried out at a time when Democrats prevailed somewhat in legislatures, had a definite effect on the congressional elections of 1976 as well. The Republican candidates received around 42 percent of the votes in all of the nation's 435 districts; in the House of Representatives, however, they were only able to win 143 seats out of 435, or less than 33 percent.⁸

This is why the Republicans, as the minority party, are paying special attention in this year's campaign to gubernatorial elections and elections to state legislatures, representing more than 7,500 legislators. After the 1976 elections, the representation of the Republican Party in these governmental subdivisions deteriorated: The Democrats now control the legislatures in 36 states and the Republicans only control them in 4. In the remaining states, with the exception of Nebraska where the legislature is elected on an extra-party basis, control in the upper and lower chambers is shared by the two parties.⁹

Last year's elections to the state legislative assemblies, however, demonstrated the growing competitive potential of this party. The Republicans won 20 seats in 43 electoral districts and increased their representation in the legislatures by 14 seats.¹⁰ It is assumed that the Republican Party has a good chance this year of winning the majority in at least one of the legislative chambers in such important states as Illinois and Michigan.

Only 12 of the 50 gubernatorial mansions are now occupied by Republicans. This party feels it is vitally important to at least retain the gubernatorial posts it already holds. The part that will be played by governors in the revision of district boundaries after 1980 has caused several Republican governors who are popular in their own states (Ray in Iowa and Milliken in Michigan), after consultations with party leaders, to cancel their decision to run for the U.S. Senate. Instead of this, they have again announced their candidacy for the gubernatorial post. Pennsylvania Senator R. Schweiker, who is popular in this state, seriously considered running for governor. In addition to all else, several politicians in both parties whose ambitions extend to the White House are striving to win a gubernatorial post because this will provide greater opportunity to influence state delegations during the party conventions in 1980.

Naturally, none of this diminishes the importance of congressional campaigns. The 1976 elections to the House of Representatives eloquently demonstrated once more the strong position of incumbents. Of the 385 congressmen running for re-election, 368 were victorious (or 95.6 percent). In this connection, the strategy of the Republicans, as the opposition party, has been focused on districts which have become, in American terminology, "open" as a result of the retirement of the congressmen representing them. Besides this, so-called marginal districts, where neither the Republicans nor the Democrats won an overwhelming majority of the vote during previous elections (where each won less than 55 percent of the vote), are usually an object of competition between the two parties.

Naturally, the Carter Administration is extremely interested in the outcome of the mid-term elections of 7 November 1978. A Republican victory will be considered evidence of dissatisfaction with the political policies of the Democrats. Besides this, it will mean that the President will acquire a stronger opposition faction in Congress. Incidentally, even if the Democrats are able to retain their influence in Congress, it is not likely that this will make them more "obedient" to the White House than they are now; the differences of opinion between the President and the Democratic section in Congress still exist. In any case, the administration is not likely to have an easier time in its dialog with Congress. Finally, the distribution of political forces in the nation, particularly in connection with the approaching presidential election of 1980, will largely depend on the results of gubernatorial elections and elections to state legislative assemblies.

The outcome of the 1978 elections, however, is also important from the standpoint of a number of long-range prospects. The campaign is significant because it will have a direct effect on political life in the 1980's and, therefore, will accomplish more than its usual function of clarifying relations between the two parties. In particular, the redistribution of electoral districts in 1980 and its dependence on the outcome of the present campaign will influence the future balance of power between Republicans and Democrats. As for purely political issues, the new post-election Senate will have to work on the resolution of problems that are of genuinely cardinal significance for the fate of the nation, as this will also affect the international climate in the 1980's.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. E. Rourke et al, "Trust and Confidence in the American System," Washington, 1976, pp 1, 11.
2. PUBLIC OPINION, March-April 1978, p 23.
3. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 14 January 1978, p 57.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 February 1978, p 26.

5. FORTUNE, September 1977, p 92.
6. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 25 February 1978, p 416.
7. Unproportional representation reached fantastic dimensions in the rural districts of states. In 1961, for example, the number of voters in California's most highly populated district was 420 times as high as the number of voters in the least populated district; in Vermont the difference was actually 870 times!
8. CONGRESS TODAY, The Magazine of the National Republican Congressional Committee, September 1977, p 4.
9. G. Pomper et al, "The Election of 1976. Reports and Interpretations," New York, 1977, p 106.
10. MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN NEWS, October 1977, p 7.

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THE NORTHERNMOST AMERICANS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 43-52

[Article by N. P. Moykin]

[Text] An international conference was held in Barrow in the summer of 1977. This conference was not entirely commonplace. It was held in the northernmost tip of Alaska, in a small town isolated from the closest populated point by a distance of 500 miles, and it was here that questions connected with the fate of the northernmost inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere were discussed in so thorough and representative a manner for the first time.

The people who have lived here, at the very end of the earth, since time immemorial were called "askkimi" or "eskimantskik," meaning "eaters of raw meat," by the Ojibwa and Abnaki Indian tribes. Gradually this name made its way into almost all modern languages. The Eskimos themselves, however, do not call themselves this because they feel that this name is insulting. They call themselves "Innuits," which means "real people" or simply "people" in the Eskimo language.

The first mention of this race is found in the Icelandic sagas of the 14th century which glorified the bravery of the Vikings. When they explored the coast of North America (in the 10th century), the Vikings saw "strange undersized people with slanted eyes." Later, Arabian philosopher and traveler Ibn-Battut, who visited the Arctic regions of Siberia in approximately 1332, wrote about the inhabitants of the bleak "land of darkness" in his memoirs.

Today's Eskimo tribes live in the boundless polar planes of Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Some of them live on the Chukotsk Peninsula in the USSR.¹

Modern science has confirmed that the ancient ancestors of the Eskimos, just as those of other North American natives--the Aleuts and Indians--came to the New World from remote regions in Asia. Ales Hrdlicka (1869-1943), American anthropologist and researcher of the ancient cultures of Alaska

and the Aleutian Islands, who visited archeological digs in Siberia in 1912 and 1939, even hypothesized that the native land of the "first Americans" was the Baykal area, the valleys of the Angara and Lena rivers. During the course of digs on the Aleutian Islands conducted by a joint Soviet-American expedition in 1974, serious arguments were discovered in support of the theory of the Pacific (and not only through the Bering Strait) route of New World settlement--along the Asian continent on the banks of the Sea of Okhotsk, through Japan, the Kurile Islands, Kamchatka and the Aleutian Islands.² Investigations also corroborated the idea that historical development in the North Pacific was extremely complex and that the ancient Eskimo culture was only one of the links in the general chain of still inadequately researched cultures of Polynesia, Melanesia and other island and littoral civilizations in the Pacific Basin.

Today's scientists are still not in complete agreement on the date when man first arrived on the American continent (nonetheless, most of them feel that this occurred 27,000-25,000 years ago). But they are unanimous in their belief that Alaska served the first Americans as a starting gate for further settlement of the New World.

Alaska is a truly amazing region. It is called "the last great frontier" on our planet. The very word "Alaska" means "great land" in Aleutian. This is a region of 3 million lakes, 10,000 rivers and channels, a region of boundless tundra expanses and forests. In terms of mineral reserves, the state of Alaska is considered to be one of the richest regions in the United States.

The only thing that Alaska does not have on a grand scale is population. It leads all of the other states in terms of area but is in last place in terms of population. At present, approximately 400,000 people live in Alaska. Of these, only around 70,000 are native inhabitants--Eskimos and Indians.³ According to data for 1972 the population of Alaska in a percentage breakdown was the following: 78.8 percent whites, 3 percent blacks and 18.2 percent others (signifying primarily native inhabitants of the state).⁴ Slightly more than 200 years ago, just before American independence was declared, there were more natives in Alaska--75,000 people. According to the logic of progress and the laws of demographic development, a population should constantly increase; this has not been the case with the Alaskan Eskimos.

It is not only geographic and demographic paradoxes, however, that can be seen in this boundless region. There is another deep line of demarcation here, which is even more noticeable than natural contrasts and which divides the population of this state into two sharply differing parts. This is the socioeconomic and political contrast, the contrast between the Americans who have come to Alaska and the natives of Alaska. "The gap between these two Alaskas is tremendous," NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, a journal published by the National Geographic Society of the United States, stressed in 1975. A federal task force for the planning of Alaskan development,

described the living conditions of the "Great Land's" native population in the following way in its report for 1968: "Frightfully low income and standard of living with an actual lack of opportunity.... Most of the local inhabitants live in poverty...in tiny and dilapidated shacks which do not meet elementary requirements.... They are frequently the victims of disease; their average life span is much shorter than that of other Alaskans."

This deep social demarcation in Alaska (this will be discussed in greater detail below) is not only the result of the policy being implemented today by the U.S. Government in this state. It is also a result of the historic "introduction" of the Eskimos, Aleuts and Indians to bourgeois civilization and the product of many years of activity in Alaska by missionaries, merchants and gold prospectors who zealously took fur and gold out of the "Great Land," leaving the native population truly worthless items of the material culture (sometimes simply useless trinkets) in exchange, as well as previously unknown diseases and vices.

The introduction of the Eskimos and the other native inhabitants of Alaska to modern civilization began with the arrival of the Russians. Although they derived sizeable profits for themselves from the natural resources of the "land of darkness," the Russian explorers, merchants, hunters and missionaries also did much for the socioeconomic and cultural development of the people in Alaska.

The Russians first reached the coast of North America in 1732. This date is considered to be the date Alaska was discovered. Famous English seafarer James Cook, who visited the Alaskan coast in 1778, learned from his envoy, American John Ledyard, that the Russian fur traders here were "friendly and hospitable."⁵ In 1784, Grigoriy Shelikhov, merchant from Irkutsk, reached Alaska with 130 Russian explorers and founded the first permanent Russian settlement on the island of Kodiak. In subsequent years, an entire colony made up of dozens of Russian trading posts grew quickly on the northwestern coast of America. Novo-Arkhangel'sk was built on Sitka Island. This was the capital of Russian America, as Alaska began to be called at that time.

In their settlement of the "Great Land" and the Pacific coastline of what is now California, the Russians developed the fishing and fur trades, as well as arable farming, livestock breeding, market-gardening, the potters' trade and foundry work, investigated and exploited mineral resources and tried to establish commercial ties with Japan, China, India, "the Philippines and other islands." It is not surprising that Canadian scientist R. Pierce, speaking in Anchorage at a conference on Alaskan history, noted: "Russia laid the foundations of the Alaskan economy."

An important role in the exploration of the North American regions, especially Alaska, was played by the first governor of Russian America, Aleksandr Baranov (1747-1819), an exceptionally energetic and enterprising Siberian. He was not only a resourceful merchant, but also a far-sighted politician, a just administrator and an erudite, intelligent and sympathetic

man. He quickly mastered the native dialects and, after marrying an 18-year-old Indian girl, the daughter of a local Tlingit chief, established healthy business relations with the aborigine population. Along with G. Shelikhov, missionary I. Veniaminov and other Russian educators, A. Baranov made an important contribution to the cultural and spiritual enrichment of the Northeners. With his support, schools were opened in Alaska, where the children of the native inhabitants were taught arithmetic, navigation, the fundamentals of astronomy, linguistics, botany and other sciences and trades. The good memory left behind by the outstanding Russian pioneer is attested to, for example, by the careful preservation of Baranov's house as a museum on Kodiak and the annual staging of a play about Baranov's life, written by Alaskan historian Frank Brink, in an open-air summer theater here.

A great deal of evidence of the Russians' stay in Alaska and their activities here still exists today. It can be found, for example, in the Russian names on the geographical map of America (the Veniaminof Volcano, Shelikhov Strait, Chirikof Island, Cape Lazaref and the Alexander Archipelago), in the Russian names of Eskimos and Aleuts (Sergey Suvorov, Daniil Kryukov, Ivan Plotnikov, Agrafena Dushkina and others) and in the language of the native inhabitants, which contains many words borrowed from the Russian (the Aleutian "klibakh" from "khleb" [bread], "chankikakh" from "chaynik" [teapot], "nusakh" from "nozhik" [knife] and so forth).

The Alaskan villages which are even now inhabited exclusively by Russians, where the old Russian customs and religious rites of medieval Rus' are still practiced, where the people wear old-fashioned pinafores and embroidered shirts and where children speak Russian in the home each day and play Russian games, are also living witnesses to the Russian era in the history of the "Great Land."

The "Great Land" was called Russian American for more than 100 years--until the tsarist government sold it to America for 7.2 million dollars. This happened in 1867. After this, the active Americanization of the "last great frontier" began.

At first, a military occupation was established in Alaska, but by 1877 the U.S. Government had to withdraw its troops from this region. Army units here were distinguished by brutal excesses and "extraordinary moral degradation." In the annals of Alaska, American historian C. Andrews wrote, never before or since has there been so much rebellion among the natives or "thievery, drunkenness and moral dissipation" on such a large scale. Moreover, in the second half of the 19th century, according to another American expert on Alaskan affairs, Sundborg, every kind of riff-raff began to gather in this new American possession, "and it fell into a disorderly and shameful state which lasted many years."

The influx of all kinds of adventurers, mercenary-minded people, proprietors of gambling dens and criminals became particularly strong at the end of the 1890's when gold was discovered in Northwest Canada--in the upper reaches of the Yukon. The Klondike gold fever moved to Alaska, where sizeable gold deposits were also found.

By that time, two companies were operating on a broad scale in the North of the American continent--the Alaska Commercial Company, which controlled the fur trade, and the Hudson Bay Company, specializing in the procurement of meat, especially venison. The uncontrolled and, at first, legally unregulated hunting for otter, whale, seal, walrus and, in particular, caribou led to the catastrophic extermination of the animals serving the Eskimos of Alaska, Canada and Greenland as their major means of a livelihood. The newly arrived merchants supplied the Eskimos with hunting rifles, and these no longer procured meat and skins for their own food and clothing, but began to sell them very cheaply to the white traders, who later sold the furs in the city at a huge profit.

The "civilizers" accustomed the local inhabitants to a new diet of flour and beans, selling them these products on credit. As a result, the Eskimo organism, which had become accustomed to eating meat (which contains the specific nutritive elements permitting man to survive in the rigorous conditions of the North), began to grow weak and to lose its natural immunity to harmful bacteria and microbes. The race which had survived the severe living conditions of the polar region for thousands of years fell victim to hunger and disease. The number of natives decreased catastrophically. Canadian writer, explorer and researcher of the Arctic regions Farley Mowat mournfully said at the beginning of the 1960's that tuberculosis annually carries "thousands of Indians and Eskimos" to the grave, and measles and smallpox epidemics "have killed more than one-tenth of all the Northern aborigines in the last 2 decades."⁶ According to official data, the death-rate from tuberculosis in Northern Canada between 1937 and 1941 was 761 for each 100,000 inhabitants as against 50 in the rest of the nation. At one time, more than 1,000 of the 1,100 Eskimos working in search parties in the northern regions of Alaska where oil was being prospected died of tuberculosis.

Other diseases brought in by the Europeans have also been a horrible scourge for the natives of the North--for example, venereal diseases.

The clash between the native inhabitants of the polar regions of Alaska, Canada and Greenland and the 20th century ended in genuine tragedy for them everywhere. According to data collected by Norwegian missionary Hans Egede (1686-1758), there were approximately 40,000 Eskimos in Greenland; approximately 200 years later, at the beginning of the 20th century, the number was less than half as high. For thousands of years, the large Ihalmute Eskimo tribe of caribou hunters lived in the expanses of Northern Canada. By 1926 there were only 300 people left in this tribe, by 1938 there were no more than 100 and in 1947 there were 46 in all. Today this

this tribe no longer exists. Fortunately, this was not the fate of most of the other Eskimo tribes inhabiting the American continent's far North. Finally, the governments of the United States, Canada and Denmark, as "protectors" of the Eskimo Arctic, took certain measures to prevent the native inhabitants from becoming extinct. The Innuits who were able to survive the initial onslaught of the "gussuk" (white men), managed to adapt somehow by using unfamiliar items of civilization for practical purposes. Today's Eskimos no longer doubt that aero-sleighs and motor-boats are superior to sledges and kayaks, or that the electric lamp is superior to the oil-lamp, and they are already aware enough to evaluate the informational potential of television.

Nonetheless, despite the pluses connected with the introduction of the Northerners to modern life, the situation of the Alaskan Eskimo leaves much to be desired.

"The native inhabitants of Alaska make up the poorest of the poor strata in the United States,"⁷ the newspaper of the American communists noted. This is also the view of Walter Hickel, former governor of Alaska and former U.S. secretary of the interior, who wrote the following about the Alaskan Eskimos: "From the economic standpoint, the native population is now living in many respects in conditions of extreme poverty and need."⁸

Here is what statistics tell us. In 1970, when the cost of living in Alaska was more than double the cost of living in the rest of the nation, the average income of the native family was only equal to 44.9 percent of the average income of white families in the nation. And if we consider the fact that the families of Eskimos, Aleuts or Indians are generally larger than white families, the difference is even greater. The life expectancy of the Eskimo is 35 years and the infant mortality rate is 54 percent (one of the highest indicators in the world); the death-rate among native Alaskans from tuberculosis was 20 percent higher than the national average.

The economic situation of the Eskimos is particularly strongly affected by the absence of work. In the same year of 1970, the rate of unemployment for the non-urban native population of Alaska ranged from 80 to 90 percent and, throughout the state as a whole, only 6,268 of the 16,803 non-white males 14 years of age or over (this group is chiefly made up of Eskimos, Aleuts and Indians) were employed--or only 46.2 percent of the potential native labor force in Alaska.⁹

The extensive network of military installations of various types in Alaska--airfields, bases, motorways, radar stations and so forth (the "Great Land" of the Innuits has become a large strategic beachhead for the Pentagon)--not only does not promote the employment of Northerners but, to the contrary, escalates unemployment either directly or indirectly. The large-scale military construction begun here in 1941 is absorbing huge amounts of resources allocated by the U.S. Congress, but it mainly employs the labor of newly arrived workers; these resources, however, could be used

for the development of civilian branches of the economy and could, in this way, provide the native inhabitants with jobs. The defense boom in the postwar period has begun to curtail operations in the main branches of the Alaskan economy--gold mining, the fish canning industry and the fur trade--which have provided a significant part of the local population with jobs. Besides this, the land allotted for defense facilities takes in huge territories which are frequently the most profitable from the standpoint of fishing and hunting. During the first postwar years alone, more than one-third of Alaskan territory was withdrawn from public use for the needs of the American Army. But, after all, for the Eskimo the geographic extent of land is of exceptional significance; for ages, he has survived the bleak natural conditions of the North only because of the huge expanses in which he could hunt and fish, which was the source of his livelihood.

When the active exploitation of oil deposits began in Alaska,¹⁰ many economists and sociologists in the United States began to promise the native inhabitants a land of milk and honey, asserting that the petroleum industry would aid in totally resolving their problems in finding work. Alas, the reality turned out to be quite different. A few years ago, special task forces conducted a comparative analysis of the staff rosters of local petroleum engineering facilities. The inspection showed that only 8 of the 800 names on the rosters were those of Eskimo workers residing here permanently.

Naturally, the "burning black lakes" of Alaska (this is what the Eskimos called the oil, which they first noticed on the earth's surface at the end of the last century) have, to some degree, assisted part of the native population (the few individuals who have been able to find a job) to solve a number of their economic, housing and personal problems. On the whole, however, the oil boom in the American North has made little change in the difficult situation of the Eskimos and, if we view this matter in perspective, it has even made it worse.

For example, the development of the petroleum industry in this state has encroached upon the legal rights of the Eskimos to the land. In September 1970, the Alaska State authorities sold 900 million dollars' worth of oil-land leases in the region of Prudhoe Bay--the richest oil-bearing zone (0.5 million acres) in the American North. This was done without the consent of the Eskimos to whom the Prudhoe land belonged, although the State Statute Act of 1958 stipulates that the state of Alaska "consents and declares that it will forever decline all rights and authority...to any land or other real estate (including fishing rights) to which the rights and authority of any Indians, Eskimos or Aleuts might extend."

As the scales of petroleum engineering facilities grew, transactions which were not in the interest of the local population began to take place in other regions of the state as well. This evoked widespread protest on the part of native inhabitants and the nation's progressive public. In 1971, the U.S. Congress had to pass a law on the settlement of the land disputes

of the Alaskan native population. According to this law, the natives were to receive perpetual use of approximately 40 million acres of land and 925 million dollars in cash.¹¹ In this connection, 12 regional corporations were created to control the use of the land stipulated in this law and the distribution of the funds received among 250 native villages and settlements.

But what do 40 million acres and 925 million dollars mean? This is not so much if we consider the fact that 97 percent of the state belongs to the federal government¹² and that the net profits of oil companies operating in Alaska now total 3-8 million dollars a day.¹³ And if we consider the literally incalculable resources which the monopolies will pump out of the Alaskan land in the future, we could conclude that this law has essentially robbed the Eskimos.

The inferior status of the Alaskan natives will unavoidably cause their economic situation to grow even worse when the total population of the state increases and the relative proportion accounted for by the Eskimos decreases, when construction will raise the cost of land, transportation, housing and food, when economic disproportions will grow and when the native Alaskan will be even more afraid of losing his job to a machine. The oil boom has resulted in a sharp drop in the quality of life of the native inhabitants, even more widespread alcoholism, gambling, crime and moral degradation in general, etc.

After an inspection tour of Alaska in October 1975, William Herrman, the U.S. Department of Justice's senior expert on organized crime, wrote an official memorandum for this department, noting that "almost every imaginable form of organized crime" can be found in Alaska and that this criminal activity is mainly concentrated around the 1,300-kilometer pipeline.¹⁴

According to reports in the press, the work schedule on this construction project was exceptionally intensive.¹⁵ For this difficult labor, the workers on the pipeline received big money, which was quickly spent in restaurants, night clubs and "massage parlors": As soon as construction work began on the pipeline, establishments of this kind began to spring up everywhere in Anchorage and Fairbanks--Alaska's chief cities.

Rumors about the "easy money" to be earned here spread through all of the continental states, and prostitutes from California, professional gamblers from Nevada, the Maffia and the big shots of the pornography business in New York went to Alaska "on tour."

Naturally, the murky and turbulent waves around the trans-Alaska pipeline also touched the handful of natives fortunate enough to find jobs on the Prudhoe-Valdez route.

Even the much larger group of Eskimos who do not have jobs and who live in remote villages and settlements, far from the pipeline and the modern urban centers, have been equally affected by the vices of bourgeois civilization. Crime, drug addiction and alcoholism are also flourishing here. According to federal and state authorities, the spread, for instance, of excessive drunkenness in the native settlements has been promoted by such "obvious factors as poverty, the destruction of culture, pitiful housing conditions and unemployment."¹⁶ Around 2 years ago, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC reported: "Twice as many native Alaskans are dying as a result of accidents, murder and suicide today as in 1950, and five times as many are dying of alcoholism."

Data on the size of the native population of Alaska today are extremely contradictory: In addition to the figure cited above--70,000 (1976)--there are others: For example, according to the Eskimo Brotherhood of Canada, there are now only 39,000 native Northeners living in Alaska;¹⁷ according to a third source, the native population here is increasing almost twice as fast as the total population of the United States.

At all events, despite the contradictory nature of this statistical information, American demographers believe that real possibilities now exist for the stabilization and subsequent growth of the native Alaskan population and that the physical extinction of the Eskimos, which was a real threat quite recently, is now impossible.

But how can the spiritual extinction and degradation of the traditional culture be stopped in this region of the world? How can the unique spiritual heritage of the Innuits, which they created in the most severe conditions on our planet over thousands of years, be preserved?

After all, the civilization of the Northern natives is not only of interest to science. Its values are extremely educative and appealing to anyone who has not lost his taste for the authenticity and poetry of folk culture. This has been the subject of many works by researchers of Eskimo life.

The now extinct Ihalmute Eskimo tribe lived for centuries according to a cardinal, inviolable commandment: The individual and his affairs are sacred and no one has the right to interfere with them except in those cases when actions might endanger the other members of the community. Their second commandment was that, as long as there was food and tools in even one hut, as long as there was at least one hunter capable of procuring food, no one in the camp was to suffer from hunger. This custom led to the collectivization of all material resources. These and other commandments constituted a code of behavior known as the law of life.

The Northeners did not know what crime was, they had never killed anyone for reasons of revenge, envy or anger and, until the arrival of the "gussuk," they did not even know the meaning of the words "robbery" and "deceit." The Eskimos had always considered anger and spite to be a sign of immaturity in the individual, a sign of wildness, and those who constantly displayed

contempt for the law of life were punished in the most severe way of all--they were ostracized by the rest of the society. In the uninhabited and boundless expanses of the "Great Land," there was no penalty more severe: Ostracism could easily be fatal.

The specific features of the region also left their imprint on Eskimo art. They did not paint on canvas, sculpt or draw on walls. These people, who constantly moved from one hunting ground to another, had no opportunity to create items with no utilitarian value. On the other hand, their nomadic way of life developed a splendid artistic taste and talent for oral forms of art--stories, songs and legends. French scientist Jean Malory, author of a book about the Eskimos of Greenland, "The Mysterious Tule," made a Soviet television appearance in June 1977 on the "Film Travelers' Club" program and said that Eskimo children already know 100-200 legends lasting 2 or 3 minutes each by the time they are 10 years old. The Eskimo custom of settling disputes by means of verbal contests rather than fist fights is an interesting one; the winner of the public duel is the one that comes up with the wittiest insults.

Some "experts" on the Eskimo culture maintain that the aborigines of the North "share their wives," and this, they say, is evidence of the sexual dissipation of the race. This interpretation of the style of Eskimo family life is oversimplified. It is true that the Eskimos have an ancient custom of entrusting their wives to others, but this has always been strictly voluntary. It has been practiced by blood-brothers and intimate friends when one man has gone on a long hunting trip and has requested the other man "to not leave his wife cold and lonely." Sometimes a husband would offer his wife to a particularly honored guest, but the wife always had the final word in this matter: If she did not wish to share another man's bed, no one forced her to.

For the Eskimos themselves, this custom was never any kind of dirty secret or "sin." Since time immemorial, they had seen this as a natural and sensible way of adapting to the bleak living conditions in the North. Mary Herbert, an Irish woman who spent a year living among the Eskimos of Greenland with her ethnographer husband, wrote a book in the form of a diary entitled "Snow People," in which she noted: "When a husband...goes away for several months to hunt, he may sometimes see to it that his wife is 'kept warm' by another--for example, a friend of the family.... When a man leaves home on a long hunting trip, he needs a woman to cook the food, scrape the skins and saw clothes. If his wife is pregnant or feels indisposed, he has to take another woman with him, usually the wife of a friend. The friend, in turn, must look after his wife.... This practice is really quite natural and sensible."

Characteristically, the senseless and arrogant accusations of "savagery" and "sexual dissipation" are made by people who see nothing bad in prostitution and other types of depravity that are flourishing in the civilized society.

Famous polar researcher Knut Rasmussen (1879-1933), the son of a Danish father and Eskimo mother who traveled around the Arctic for a quarter of a century and left behind 12 voluminous works containing the most valuable observations and impressions, believed that the Eskimo culture "had no equal." Contemporary Polish journalists Alina and Cheslav Tsentrkevich wrote the following about the character of the Northeners: "Darkness, cold, clouds swollen with snow, icy winds.... It would seem that people living in this exceptionally severe climate should be as unsociable, morose and silent as the gloomy sky above them. But this is absolutely not the case. On the contrary, they are happy and serene, probably even more so than the inhabitants of the Polynesian Islands, which are constantly bathed in the rays of the sun and bright colors."

"The Eskimos create the impression that they are the happiest people in the world"¹⁸--this is the conclusion drawn by many researchers who have spent several years or months among the native inhabitants of Alaska, Canada or Greenland. The Eskimo is extremely sociable. He is incapable of prolonged grief or inactive depression and melancholy. He does not torture himself with sad memories of an unsuccessful hunt or regrets about his spent youth, and he is not afraid of tomorrow's trials. The most important thing for him is the present day, the passing hour, the fleeting moment. From the cradle to the grave, his soul constantly gives birth to some kind of unexplainable and inexhaustible sources of spiritual strength, tranquility, kindness, humor and love for his fellow men, he always sees the world in bright colors, he is able to truly enjoy himself and he is sincerely overjoyed by everything life has to offer.¹⁹

Today the Eskimos are fighting for their human rights and for their native "place in the sun." The program of the Eskimos, which has many features in common with the program for struggle of today's American Indians, focuses on saving the northernmost people of the planet from extinction, guarding their ancient culture against catastrophe, preserving their historical and spiritual individuality and keeping them from being totally swallowed up by the wave of mercenary-minded "civilization" and being suffocated by the economic vise.

The struggle of the Northeners for their rights is becoming increasingly active and confident. The Eskimos are forming cooperatives (fishing and hunting) and various associations and are voicing pointed political criticism in the press and on radio and television. They want to feel that they are the masters of the "Great Land" and they want the world to hear them and understand them.

As we have already mentioned at the beginning of the article, the first international Eskimo conference was held last year in one of the northernmost cities in the world, Barrow. It was attended by around 200 representatives of the Eskimo communities in Alaska, Canada and Greenland²⁰--representatives of a single race with a common language, common culture and common traditions and customs. Two Western scientists were invited to the conference--the abovementioned Jean Malory, professor at the University of Paris, and Dr Jeremy Stone, chairman of the Federation of American Scientists.

During the week that the conference was in session, 17 resolutions were adopted on economic, cultural and ethnic problems, educational issues, maritime law in the Arctic, environmental pollution, the preservation of the Eskimo language, etc. One of the resolutions demanded a total ban on all military activity in the Arctic--the dismantling of all polar military bases, the cessation of nuclear tests in this region and the shipment of military surplus to this region.

A decision was made at the conference in Barrow to create a North Pole Eskimo Assembly, which would strive for UN recognition in the capacity of a non-governmental organization.

Summing up the results of the first international Eskimo conference, President Michael Amaruk of the Eskimo Brotherhood of Canada said: "Now we have come together and will have greater political potential."

Many scientists, social activists and progressive organizations in the United States and other countries are speaking out today in defense of the Alaskan Eskimos (as well as those in Canada and Greenland), their culture, customs, political rights and economic interests. The public in these nations is becoming more and more aware that any ethnic group, no matter how small, deserves respect and protection, and its culture is of universal value, which no one has the right to disparage.

FOOTNOTES

1. The reader can learn about the history, culture and life of the Soviet Eskimos from the following books in particular: G. A. Menovshchikov, "Eskimosy" [The Eskimos], Magadan, 1959; Ye. S. Rubtsova, "Materialy po yazyku i fol'kloru eskimosov" [Materials on the Eskimo Language and Folklore], Moscow-Leningrad, 1954.
2. A. P. Okladnikov and R. S. Vasil'yevskiy, "Po Alyaske i Aleutskim ostrovam" [Traveling in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands], Novosibirsk, 1976, p 32.
3. THE TIMES, 13 April 1976. The native population of Alaska also includes the Aleuts, who are few in number.
4. "The Official Associated Press Almanac 1975," Maplewood (New Jersey), 1974, p 335.
5. T. Snell, "The Wild Shores: America's Beginnings," Washington, 1974, p 182.
6. F. Mowat, "People of the Deer," translated from the English, Moscow, 1963, p 111.

7. DAILY WORLD, 12 December 1970.
8. W. Hickel, "Who Owns America?" New York, 1972, p 149.
9. DAILY WORLD, 4 March 1972.
10. As yet, the total oil reserves of Alaska and its continental shelf have not been precisely calculated. Even today, however, experts maintain that these reserves are large enough to influence power production in the United States for many years.
11. "The Official Associated Press Almanac 1975," p 333.
12. Ibid.
13. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, June 1975, p 734.
14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 31 December 1975. The Prudhoe-Valdez pipeline began operating in June 1977.
15. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, June 1975, p 747.
16. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 14 April 1971.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 June 1977.
18. See, for example, G. Carter, "Man and the Land. A Cultural Geography," New York, 1968, p 524.
19. The author of this article, who spent the early years of his life on Kamchatka, was able to directly observe how similar spiritual features and characteristics are displayed by the Kamchatka Koryaks--an ethnic group which is closely related to the Alaskan Eskimos by its historical and ethnic roots.
20. Attendance at the two previous international Eskimo conferences was much lower. The first was held in 1969 in Le Havre (France) and the second was held in 1974 in Copenhagen.

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U.S. DEBATE OVER DETENTE POLICY HINDERS ITS WORLD CAUSE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 53-61

[Article by P. T. Podlesnyy]

[Text] The questions of the further development of Soviet-American relations still remain the object of an exceptionally acute and intense struggle within the U.S. ruling circles. The key problems of detente are at the center of this struggle--detente's importance for U.S. vital interests, the scale and pace of its deepening and the interconnection between detente and the processes of social and national liberation underway in the world and other extremely important international issues. The active counteroffensive by rightwing forces striving in every possible way to drag out and complicate detente and primarily the elaboration of a new American-Soviet agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments acceptable to both sides has resulted in an intensification of the trend toward undermining detente and a returning to cold war. The advocates of new confrontations and unrestrained military rivalry have considerable influence in the U.S. Congress and in the American mass media. They are strenuously whipping up a clamorous anti-Soviet campaign: By accusing the Soviet Union of an imaginary violation of agreed "rules of detente," they are working strenuously toward developing new factors in the arms race designed to achieve military superiority and pursuing a "position of strength" policy vis-a-vis the USSR.

In particular, the declaration by the Republican minority in the Senate on contemporary military and foreign policy issues published last May in Washington is full of these sentiments. The declaration, which is essentially steeped in the spirit of cold war, depicts the USSR as the "main threat to global peace and stability" and contains a more than overt call for the buildup of American military might, the creation of a new weapons systems including the MX mobile ICBM and the neutron bomb and also the insuring of a "sufficiently impressive military presence" by the United States in friendly states.

Of course, it would be wrong to fail to see that even today a considerable number of politicians, scientists and public figures in the United States continue to advocate a quest for further ways of normalizing relations with the USSR and express justified concern with the fact that unless it is possible to achieve serious progress in the cause of detente, and primarily in the sphere of strategic arms limitation, in the near future, it will mean the emergence of additional complexities and difficulties in the way of the development of Soviet-American relations and will undermine the foundations of detente. Despite the counteroffensive by rightwing forces there remains broad support for detente among the majority of ordinary Americans, as the public opinion polls testify.

However, recent facts testify that pressure from rightwing forces is exerting a serious adverse influence on the general political atmosphere in the United States and on the questions of relations with the USSR. At present even those American politicians and specialists who operate from some position of detente often advocate a more "considered" and "cautious" approach to the development of American-Soviet relations and exertion of pressure on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, including in spheres which are the subject of talks between East and West.

Views of this kind are also having an effect on U.S. practical policy. The Democratic administration's time in office to date has demonstrated conclusively that the administration organizes its policy regarding the USSR very much with an eye to rightwing forces and fails to display a proper desire to seek out practical ways of achieving specific positive results in key directions of Soviet-American relations, despite the officially stated adherence to the policy of detente with the USSR.

As early as the mid-seventies certain American authors began to put forward various kinds of ideas for "retarding" detente in Soviet-American relations and downgrading its place in U.S. foreign policy priorities. Losing their sense of reality, some of them, for instance, G. Ball in his book "The Diplomacy of an Overpopulated World" began to call for a policy of so-called "polite disregard" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union--in other words, they denied the necessity of developing and deepening the process of the normalization of relations between the two countries.

A less extreme viewpoint was that it is expedient for the United States to proceed in its policy vis-a-vis the USSR from the necessity chiefly of "regulating the conflict and competition" between the two countries and assigning an extremely "limited" role to mutual cooperation between them. These conceptual lines permeated a major analysis of the problems of future U.S. policy vis-a-vis the USSR prepared under the leadership of Professor W. Griffith of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at the direction of the Commission for Critical Alternatives for Americans. A large group of authors (12 people) dealing with various aspects of Soviet-American relations participated in this analysis but the general conceptual questions connected with detente are set forth in the chapters written by W. Griffith himself.

In essence the central thesis of the analysis lay in a call to "lower the present level of importance of relations with the Soviet Union" and to focus U.S. efforts in foreign policy toward capitalist and also developing states. Among the arguments in favor of this course the authors cited, for instance, the fact of the "relative stability" of Soviet-American relations and what they see as the Soviet Union's greater interest in restricting the arms race. According to the authors' idea, the "reduction of importance" must be expressed by, for instance, exerting pressure on the Soviet Union with the aid of a number of levers, including the buildup of military might and also a consolidation of the capitalist world's forces buttressed by more active utilization of the "Chinese factor," in insuring the weakening of Soviet influence in key regimes of the world--primarily in the Near East--and the expansion of "freedom of information" in the socialist countries. The authors introduced the term "maximum detente," meaning by this obtaining one-sided advantages for the United States and Western countries.

During the last 2 years the concepts of "retarding" detente have become considerably more widespread. They show the obvious desire of their authors to belittle the importance of detente with the USSR for the United States as well as for the solution of important international problems, primarily--the prevention and total elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

Of course, the danger of a nuclear catastrophe cannot be eliminated through USSR and U.S. efforts alone. Moreover, it is obvious that it is only through the efforts of many countries of the world that it is possible to impart a historically irreversible character not only to the relaxation of international tension in itself but also to the real turn toward long-term, fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social systems. [paragraph continues]

However, this does not eliminate the paramount importance of cooperation between the USSR and the United States--the states with the biggest nuclear potentials--in the task of eliminating nuclear war. In this connection it is possible to cite the opinion expressed by President J. Carter in his 4 October 1977 UN speech that the "terrible realities" of the nuclear age place on the United States and the Soviet Union a "dreadful and special responsibility" which is entirely in line with the real state of affairs in the world.

Advocates of "retarding" detente like, for instance, W. Kinter, director of the University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Research Institute, also call for the intensification of ideological pressure on the USSR and the other socialist countries. Here they make no secret of their intentions, which are to attempt to achieve the so-called "liberalization" of the internal setup in the socialist states, to split the international communist movement into "nationalist factions" and thereby to weaken it and to attempt to sow seeds of doubt among the peoples where socialism creates the most favorable conditions for implementing mankind's desires and aspirations. A great place in the implementation of these subversive schemes is assigned to modern mass media, to the mountains of various kinds of anti-Soviet campaigns and to other means of ideological struggle.

Life has shown that the recommendations to "retard" detente have been and are at variance with the requirements and tasks of the progressive development of relations between the USSR and the United States. The retardation of the detente process in Soviet-American relations during the last 2 or 3 years--a retardation caused by American actions--has meant that the timetable agreed to by the sides for the talks on concluding an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments has been dragged out and that opportunities to find mutually acceptable solutions on other important, urgent problems affecting both states' interests have not been utilized.

During the past period of the seventies yet another concept whose essence consists in a call for a kind of temporary "respite" in the development of Soviet-American relations was put forward. This concept was set forth by S. Brown, leader of the program for the study of Soviet-American relations carried out by the Carnegie endowment "for international forces." In an article published in fall 1977 we advocated "reducing the intensity of Soviet-American relations and cooling them" at least for some time, justifying this by saying that the "excessive" expectations of detente at the beginning of the seventies supposedly prevented the discovery of a "real" basis for the development of stable Soviet-American relations. Characterizing these relations as "indirect competitive coexistence including significant interwoven but not coordinated participation by the two countries in international life, a certain participation in multilateral forums and only some bilateral steps in cases where this is dictated by security interests and (or) the possibility of mutual advantages," S. Brown resolutely opposed intensification of the arms race and military rivalry between the two states. However, despite this positive element, the approach he expressed regarding the USSR belittles the potential, importance and role of Soviet-American cooperation in various spheres.

A certain section of American scientists and politicians criticize the underestimation of the detente policy, stressing that under contemporary world conditions the threat of war has by no means been eliminated and that a new exacerbation of tension in Soviet-American relations would mean negative consequences and would impede solution of political and economic international problems which are of paramount importance for the United States itself. In particular, recent articles and books by S. Hoffmann, R. Barnet, G. Kennan and H. Sonnenfeldt have been written from these positions. Considering the diversity of both the global and functional spheres in which the sides mutually affect one another," H. Sonnenfeldt writes, for instance, "the policy regarding the USSR will probably remain the most active and broadest direction of our foreign policy."

Many of them highlight the important fact that underestimation of detente policy and especially unconvincing attempts to prove that it has had no positive results for the United States create an unfavorable psychological backdrop for its development and cause doubts about the advisability of implementing major new steps in this direction. "The danger of arguments that detente has failed to prove its worth," R. Barnet writes in his book "The Giants: Russia and America," "lies in strengthening pessimistic sentiments regarding the possibility of insuring peace." Such warnings are not bereft of common sense. R. Barnet's work also contains the sensible conclusions that the United States should not entertain too many illusions about its potential for virtually dictating to the USSR terms for further normalization of Soviet-American relations. The era of the "Pax Americana," as he rightly stresses, is past and the United States cannot expect to play the role of a kind of "manager" in the modern world.

Realistically minded authors in the United States urge that people not confine themselves to the level of normalization in Soviet-American relations that has been reached but make headway and make maximum use of the areas in which bilateral relations have already undergone or may undergo positive development in order to place these relations on a firm and stable footing. The idea developed, in particular, by G. Kennan, that further continuation of the bilateral dialog must be based on real spheres of mutual interest that are not defined once and for all but may expand and deepen as relations improve, seems extremely constructive. When the two sides made sensible efforts aimed at creating balanced, businesslike and realistic relations while displaying patience and persistence, the results, he noted, were encouraging. The experience of the development of Soviet-American relations throughout the first half of the seventies favors this judgement.

Corresponding, similar views on questions of Soviet-U.S. relations are voiced by M. Shulman, former director of Columbia University's Russian Institute and now special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state for Soviet affairs. For instance, on 26 October 1977 in a speech to a House subcommittee, he said: "Sanity demands that, while energetically defending our own interests, we strive to regulate those aspects of our mutual relations that are linked with rivalry so as to reduce the danger of war while simultaneously striving to expand the sphere of cooperation in which our interests do not clash."

The supporters of these views realize that one of the key preconditions today for the advance of detente is implementation of major new steps in the direction of restraining the stockpiling of armaments and of disarmament. They stress quite justifiably that an exceptionally important stage has now arrived in the development of Soviet-U.S. relations when we will either succeed in achieving considerable new steps in arms limitation that will promote stabilization of the military balance between the two countries or else let the arms race slip out of control.

A highly convincing assessment of the adverse consequences of the arms race for the cause of detente is quoted in an article by G. Kistiakowsky published in the New York TIMES MAGAZINE last October. The author stresses that the outbreak of any major international crisis in the atmosphere of a totally unrestricted strategic arms race between the USSR and the United States could disrupt the political mechanisms for preventing nuclear war elaborated by the efforts of the two sides in recent years. In addition such a race would promote acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries, which would develop into additional sources of a world nuclear conflict. It would also prompt the stockpiling of conventional weapons, many types of which could be used to deliver nuclear warheads. But this course of events, he stresses, is not inevitable if efforts are made to curb and then halt the arms race.

Some articles quote very convincing arguments in favor of limiting the arms race from the view point of saving U.S. material resources and manpower. A report published at the beginning of 1978 by L. Aspin, member of the House Armed Services Committee, points out that the attainment of a new Soviet-U.S. strategic offensive arms limitation agreement would make it possible not only to end the further buildup of these armaments but also to save the United States at least \$20 billion.

Those who favor the speediest conclusion of such an agreement note that it would be a major step not only in the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations but also in the overall world detente process, would promote the implementation of other important measures in the sphere of arms limitation and could lead to a real breakthrough on the path toward military detente. As Senator E. Kennedy stressed, such an agreement would help to put under control and gradually reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world.

Those in favor of bringing the Soviet-American SALT talks to a successful conclusion are expressing totally justified alarm over the activity by forces in the United States that are trying to obstruct the speediest conclusion of the agreement and discredit the very notion of talks with the Soviet Union on these matters. In a Washington POST article G. Kennan notes that the United States simply cannot allow these forces to undermine the detente policy and, above all, the quest for realistic solutions in the key sphere of Soviet-American relations connected with preventing a nuclear war and limiting the arms race. "The consequences of failure," he wrote, "would be even more serious than the prospect of an unlimited arms race. The disturbance of military relations would inevitably have an adverse effect on other areas. In that case we and the world as a whole would lose too much."

A similar assessment of the consequences of this kind of development of events is made by C. Yost. The real danger to the United States and to the cause of detente as a whole, he stresses, is not the Soviet Union's imaginary attempts to gain a military advantage over the United States but the probability that "the agreement on strategic arms limitation will not be concluded or, if it is concluded, that it will not be ratified by the Senate." This, he stresses, would merely serve as a spur to a further arms race and would complicate Soviet-American relations as a whole.

The supporters of positive development of Soviet-American relations, while favoring other arms limitation measures (the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the adoption of additional measures on nuclear nonproliferation and so on), also believe that the time has come to normalize trade and economic relations between the two countries and to make an effort to broaden them. [paragraph continues]

This could to some extent neutralize various complexities in Soviet-American relations insofar as the sphere of economic ties is, in their view, the main one, an aspect of mutual relations between the two great powers which is not connected with the establishment of arms control and which contributes to maintaining a permanent dialog between them. These realistic admissions appear, in particular, in the report on detente prepared at the beginning of 1978 by the well known U.S. Democratic party figure Senator G. McGovern.

Of course, the struggle in U.S. political circles on questions of the further development of Soviet-American relations is influencing the formation of the present U.S. administration's course with respect to the USSR. Although the formation of this course has not yet been completed and continues to be affected by many factors, the general contours of the administration's policy regarding further normalizing Soviet-American relations are nevertheless showing a tangible outline.

The official approach of J. Carter's administration to relations with the USSR is formulated in the concept "more mutual and broader detente," which was worked out by Z. Brzezinski, presidential national security assistance, before the President took up residence in the White House. A close examination of this concept shows that it is vastly contradictory, its various realistic aspects are combined with an unconcealed desire to seek unilateral advantages for the United States. Moreover, Z. Brzezinski actively and persistently calls for a switch to an "offensive strategy" in the process of the further development of relations with the USSR amounting essentially to the following: Having adopted extra measures on restoring and building up American strength, pressure on the USSR will be increased in many spheres with a view to a "more vigorous" struggle with it in the world arena and also to attempt to turn the development of events in favor of the United States and the West as a whole.

The administration's practical actions during its term of office to date are evidence primarily of the inconsistency of this policy and of the frequent departures in practical actions from the program statements. In Charleston President J. Carter admitted that the profound, fundamental differences of opinion between the USSR and the United States stem from the differences between their social systems, but he then went on to say: "...It is equally true that our two countries have many important overlapping interests. Our task is to study these interests and use them in order to broaden the sphere of cooperation between us on the basis of equality and mutual respect.... The entire history of Soviet-American relations teaches us that we would be making a mistake if we based our long-term policy on the mood of the moment." Secretary of State C. Vance was quite justified in saying that "the alternative to the current active dialog with the USSR would be a return to the tension and mutual estrangement of the cold war period."

There were certain positive pronouncements in the President's Annapolis speech on 7 June that had been advertized as a "policy" address to clarify U.S. policy toward the USSR. In particular, J. Carter said that detente between the United States and the USSR is of "central" significance for the preservation of peace and he also stressed the importance of the new agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation.

But there have been no tangible, specific results so far in real relations between the two powers in the course of the new administration's period of office. [paragraph continues]

At the talks in Washington and New York at the end of May between A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance a great deal of attention was devoted to matters relating to completing the elaboration of an agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation. These questions were also discussed at the meeting between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance in Geneva on 12-13 July. The talks enabled the sides to conduct a useful exchange of opinions and they provided a basis for the rapprochement of their positions on the remaining unresolved questions. Their discussion will be continued.

Of course, completion of and elaboration of an agreement taking into fair account the security interests of both sides will require fresh mutual efforts to find a reasonable and realistic compromise.

The present administration, regarding detente as a cycle of phases of rivalry and cooperation, is now bringing to the fore elements of rivalry, "linking" the broadening of the cooperation aspects of detente with the policy of the USSR, in particular with relations to the developing countries, and to a number of other problems. True, administration representatives deny that they intend to link the course of the SALT talks directly to events in Africa. However, the administration is not delivering a proper rebuff to agreement, is not defending it in Congress and in front of the American public, and is not making any effort to normalize other spheres of Soviet-American relations. Moreover, in July the administration prohibited the Sperry Rand company from selling computers to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the U.S. President canceled a trip to Moscow by an American delegation headed by his scientific adviser, which was to have participated in the work of a session of the Soviet-American Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, on a pretext which the Soviet side regarded as intolerable interference in the USSR's internal affairs.

Experience shows that attempts to use trade as a instrument of policy are hopeless and futile. They only undermine trade and economic ties and hit Soviet-American relations. Moreover, steps of that nature by the administration show that statements by J. Carter, like his words at the 21 July press conference, to the effect that he is in favor of improving Soviet-American relations, including "increasing" trade, remain mere rhetoric and are not backed up by real positive actions.

It is also becoming increasingly clear that Washington is setting a course toward, as official administration spokesmen have said, "offering a determined challenge" to the USSR in parts of the world which are of "decisive significance for the United States at the present time or may be decisively significant in 15-20 years." Moreover, economic, scientific and technical levers, political maneuvers and the use of reactionary regimes are allotted an important role in the activation of U.S. efforts to counteract the USSR in developing countries. This trend is most apparent in U.S. policy in the Near East and in Africa which is aimed at weakening the USSR's positions and influence, winning the countries and liberation movements in these areas over to the West and preventing any development of the political situation there which might run counter to the interests of American imperialism. Washington is making an active effort to build up "the powerful American military potential" as the basic condition allegedly essential to "stable and increasingly all-embracing and also mutual detente."

The military buildup means a real growth in military expenditure; the creation of new types of strategic weapons as "trump cards" at arms limitation talks and as a way of obtaining unilateral advantages; the strengthening of the NATO military bloc; deliveries of arms to other states and the buildup of conventional arms to provide for intervention in this or that part of the world if events there take a turn unfavorable to the United States.

This approach has a negative effect on the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and promotes activation of forces in the United States which are opposed to the policy of detente and the limitation of the arms race.

A characteristic feature of the concept adopted by Washington of "more comprehensive detente" is the strengthening of the ideological element in American foreign policy, caused primarily by the concern of U.S. ruling circles that the general direction of world development is coming into contradiction with the interests of American imperialism and its ideology. Through ideological, propagandist means Washington is trying to discredit the USSR and other socialist community countries and simultaneously to raise American prestige and authority in the world, which has been fundamentally damaged in recent years by Washington's foreign policy actions such as the war in Indochina, intervention in Angola, aid to the Pinochet clique in Chile, and support for racist regimes in southern Africa.

Attempts to intensify ideological pressure on the USSR are expressed in the participation of representatives of the administration in campaigns "in defense of human rights" which essentially constitute interference in the USSR's internal affairs and in the stepping up of political rhetoric distorting the nature of the USSR's foreign policy and its political system. The continuation of attempts on the part of the United States to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs, to wage "psychological warfare" and ideological sabotage and to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria threatens, as sensible Americans stress, to undermine the process of the relaxation of tension by creating a political climate which will make it impossible to adopt urgent measures to lessen the danger of nuclear war. Prof F. Neal, vice president of the American Committee for East-West Accord, notes that "detente is too delicate to withstand a period of neglect--whether polite or otherwise. It can be compared to a bicycle which must be kept constantly in motion to prevent it falling to the ground." Otherwise a period of "lukewarm war" could set in, which would soon be replaced by "cold war," which is not far to "hot" war. A recently published statement by this committee expresses "tremendous disappointment" at President J. Carter's speech in Annapolis, inasmuch as it turned out to be "incapable of clarifying the problems in relations between the USSR and the United States and issued a challenge to the Soviet Union--adopt American opinions or resort to confrontation."

Examination of questions of the struggle which is going on in the United States over detente shows that some American politicians and specialists are aware that the objective realities of the modern world dictate the only reasonable path of the further positive development of relations between the USSR and the United States. Any attempt, from their point of view, to return to a policy of "absolute hostility" with respect to the USSR would push Washington onto a path whose unsoundness was revealed quite clearly as early as the late sixties and early seventies. Nor can they ignore the fact that the policy of relaxation of international tension has become a real feature of the modern world and, despite all complications and obstacles, is continuing to take root.

As L.I. Brezhnev stressed, "detente today is not a theory, not a slogan, not a good wish. It has many good deeds to its credit, completely concrete and tangible deeds. In Europe it has formed the basis of mutual relations between states and embraced various facets of their life. Soviet-American relations too, despite all circumstantial oscillations, now look different, more favorable to the cause of peace. The path of detente is acknowledged and supported by the peoples as the sole reasonable path in our difficult times."

The proposals put forward by realistic people regarding extending the dialog and strengthening and stabilizing detente again indicate that the objective preconditions for the progressive development of Soviet-American relations exist. But it must be noted that the American side, in both theory and practice, is still not prepared to completely renounce instruments of force in the vain hope of delaying and complicating the further strengthening of the position of the opposing social system in the world. These ideas and opinions, as experience shows, have a direct effect in policy and are hindering the cause of detente and the restructuring of Soviet-American relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

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UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY'S MANEUVERS AROUND CYPRUS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 pp 62-67

[Article by V. A. Shmarov]

[Text] The most gloomy vocabulary is usually used when the Cyprus problem is being discussed in NATO circles. It is either called the "open wound on NATO's body," or the "West's headache" or some other name in this vein. To a certain degree, this kind of pessimism can be understood. All attempts by NATO leaders, particularly the United States, to "regulate" the Cyprus problem in the interest of "Atlantic solidarity" have been unsuccessful. This is a classic example of the implacable development of inter-imperialist conflicts within the North Atlantic Alliance, which it is incapable of preventing or resolving.

The latest attempt to "regulate" the Cyprus problem was made at the last session of the NATO Council. Although the Cyprus issue was not formally a part of the agenda, it, according to Western observers, was an important topic of discussion behind the scenes. On the initiative of U.S. President J. Carter, talks were held at that time by the heads of state of Greece and Turkey, the two NATO members fighting over Cyprus. The two sides promised to continue this summit dialogue, but were quite pessimistic in their appraisals of existing possibilities for reaching an agreement on the Cyprus problem and on other disputed aspects of their bilateral relations. Judging by all indications, the mechanism set in motion by NATO has again come to a standstill, as has been the case numerous times in the past. The initiators of the Washington session were unable to instill compatibility into the incompatible--the national interests of the East Mediterranean countries and the military strategic aims of NATO in general and the United States in particular.

The facts cogently testify that the interventionist policy of imperialism lies at the basis of the Cypriot tragedy.¹

1. The Zurich-London agreements imposed by the former English colonizers, according to the terms of which the Republic of Cyprus was granted independence in 1969, actually regularized outside intervention under the guise of "protection" of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country. On the basis of these agreements, England, Greece and Turkey, as guarantor powers, stationed their troops on the

The United States is seriously to blame for keeping the situation on Cyprus and around it dangerous. United States policy toward the Republic of Cyprus, which is based on U.S. strategic objectives in the Middle East and the East Mediterranean, has fluctuated substantially depending on conditions. Its engineering has been based on two principal factors: the geopolitical position of Cyprus, which is adjacent to the region of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the position occupied by the island in the system of international relations among states in this region. Cyprus is simultaneously regarded as a convenient and important beachhead for imperialism in the Middle East and as a kind of hook which can be used to keep Greece and Turkey in the NATO orbit and to broaden strategic positions on the bloc's southeastern flank.

The relative significance of all these factors has varied during different stages of the Cypriot crisis. Before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the desire to preserve an "equilibrium" in the East Mediterranean prevailed. This was the reason for the U.S. Government's negative reaction to the idea of Cyprus' annexation which was just being broached at that time in Greece. State Department officials believed that enosis would ultimately have a negative effect on Greece's relations with England and Turkey, with all of the resulting consequences of this for the North Atlantic bloc. Besides this, an unattached Cyprus, according to U.S. calculations, would leave the hands of diplomats and military men free for broad-scale maneuvering for the distant future. The growing national liberation struggle of the Cypriots and the reinforcement of Cyprus' status as a nonaligned state, however, ruined the plans of American strategists. Their subversive activity took the form of the appointment of CIA agents to sow mistrust and suspicion between the Cypriot Greeks and the Cypriot Turks and, after the conflicts between these communities in 1964, the proposal and imposition of interventionist "plans" for the resolution of the Cypriot problem. The "Ball plan," "Lemnitzer plan" and "Acheson plan," named after their authors--prominent American politicians and generals--had the aim of eradicating the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus either through the occupation of the island by NATO troops or as a result of the division of its territory among NATO countries into spheres of influence.

This phase of American policy could be described as an all-out frontal attack on the sovereign rights of Cyprus. After experiencing definite opposition on the part of the Cypriots and encountering the confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, which undermined the foundations of "Atlantic solidarity" and destroyed the efficacy of NATO's southeastern flank, American President L. Johnson had to make certain adjustments in this course. Head-on attacks were replaced by the United States' attempts to set itself up as the only "friendly" arbitrator acting in the interests of both sides involved in the Cyprus conflict. The declaration of this role became a convenient screen for undercover diplomatic activity.

island, and England secured the use of so-called "sovereign" bases in Akrotiri, Dhekelia and Episkopi. As a result of this policy, dramatic and bloody events took place on the island in 1964, 1967 and 1974. These events involved Cypriot Greeks and Turks, called the very existence of the Cypriot State in question and gave rise to a seat of tension in the East Mediterranean.

As for Washington's policy in direct relations with Cyprus, it clearly indicates two lines of strategic activity, which makes the American approach to Cyprus deliberately ambiguous. The "Atlantic" factor and the desire to strengthen NATO's southeastern flank have motivated Washington to "strike a balance" between the two ethnic groups in the Cypriot population, between the nationalist doctrines of Hellenism and Pan-Turkism and the countries behind them--Greece and Turkey. By "watching over" its battling NATO allies, the United States has an opportunity for direct and immediate participation in the interventionist actions taken against the Cypriot State.

The second, "Middle Eastern" factor is not as vulnerable to emotional influence on the part of external forces. Proceeding from this factor, Washington has begun to turn Cyprus into one of the major beachheads of imperialist strategy in the Middle East. For this purpose, the American military presence on the island is being expanded. The United States is making increasingly active use of English military bases located there, as well as its own three large radio stations employing around 2,000 American specialists. These plans call for a certain degree of stability in the situation on Cyprus.

Both of these policy lines are involving American imperialism more and more in the Cypriot crisis and are causing it to take clearly explosive forms. The main object of underhand plotting was the nonalignment policy of the Republic of Cyprus and of President Makarios personally, who rejected the imperialist forces' bids for power. According to the BALTIMORE SUN newspaper of 7 August 1977, 16 plots were organized against Makarios during the years of Cyprus' independent development.

American secret services were also involved behind the scenes in the events of 1974. They planned the so-called "controlled skid" operation. This "operation," which was essentially a plot against the Republic of Cyprus, basically consisted in using the long-apparent aggressive ambitions of the military junta then in power in Greece as an instrument for "settling" the Cyprus issue on NATO's conditions. From a LE MONDE report of 15 August 1974, we know that on 27 June a CIA agent in Athens met with one of the heads of the junta, General Ioannidis, to discuss a planned attack on Cyprus. The Swiss newspaper, NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, printed a report from Washington on 23 August 1974, discussing the "direct accusations" which were being addressed at American diplomacy in congressional circles for its willingness to establish official contacts with self-appointed Cypriot "president" Sampson and thereby give his regime the appearance of legitimacy." Immediately after the revolt, the "minister of foreign affairs" in Sampson's "government" was received by U.S. Ambassador Davies.

Some bourgeois researchers who have examined the United States' stand on the Cyprus question have oversimplified the matter and boiled it down to the mere support (as, for example, G. Harris, the author of "Troubled Alliance," published in 1972) of the "primitive-minded" Greek ranking officers solely for the purpose of keeping Greece in NATO at any political price. A number

of later studies, however, particularly "The Wrong Emphasis: The Interventionist Policy and Failure of American Diplomacy," published in New York in 1977, note that the United States put NATO interests and the need to strengthen its southern flank above all else, sacrificing the interests of the Greeks and Cypriots to these objectives. The author of the book, L. Shern, frankly writes that "the American Government contributed to the tragedy of Cyprus, although it also suffered a failure" in the realization of its own, as he puts it, "conflicting plans."

Sampson's dictatorship unleashed bloody civil strife on the island. Thousands of Cypriots who had been loyal to the government of President Makarios welcomed the arrival of the Turkish troops that landed on Cyprus on 20 July 1974, regarding them as allies in the struggle against the Greeks and local fascist junta; soon afterward, however, it became obvious to the Cypriots that they had been disappointed in their expectations and that the Turkish troops had come to stay on the island.

One other quantity was taken into account in American imperialism's political calculations: To what length could Turkey's independent actions go? To avoid losing control over the course of events, Washington, as foreign sources covering the development of Turkish military actions on Cyprus maintain, insisted on reinforcing these troops with American officers who would determine both the speed of the offensive and the final limits of the invasion. According to Greek researcher I. Yannakakis, historians of international relations will regard the "Cyprus affair of 1974" as a classic example of American diplomacy's tendency to act according to the principle of "strike while the iron is hot," in which case an attempt is made to resolve conflicts which appear to be unconnected but spring up in the same geopolitical area simultaneously on behalf of global policy.

The plans for "coordination" consisted in deriving maximum benefits from the local conflict and reducing political outlays and losses to a minimum. At first, it seemed to Washington officials that these goals had been attained to some degree, although they soon learned that the revolt against the government in Cyprus and the Turkish invasion constituted a two-edged weapon. Soon afterward, Greece's decision to withdraw from the NATO military organization and Turkey's decision to temporarily close down American bases threatened imperialism's entire military and political system in the East Mediterranean zone.

Since 1974 the Greek lobby in the U.S. Congress has been playing an active role in American policy-making on the Cyprus question. Although there are only 435,000 first- and second-generation Greek immigrants in the United States, during the crisis on Cyprus they were able to win the support of the Greek Orthodox Church, which unites around 2 million believers in the United States, as well as the traditionally anti-Turkish Armenians and part of the Jewish population.

Largely under the influence of this lobby, the U.S. Congress passed a seemingly effective resolution in 1975--to impose an embargo on deliveries of weapons to Turkey--and made the lifting of this embargo conditional on progress in the settlement of the Cyprus issue. In actuality, however, this resolution gave Washington an additional means of continuing its active intervention in the conflict over Cyprus, and Turkey, despite the embargo, continued to buy weapons on a commercial basis from American companies, naturally not without the knowledge of Washington officials. Besides this, it has received weapons through other NATO channels.

American diplomacy engaged in subtle maneuvers: While it was attempting to convince the world of its "sincere interest" in a just settlement on Cyprus, it was actually striving to settle the issue on its own terms--within the NATO framework and bypassing the UN resolution that was supposed to be the basis of true political settlement. All of this gave rise to the notorious "Brussels formula." This formula, which was adopted by Greece and Turkey in 1975 at a session of the NATO Council in Brussels, had the aim of direct negotiations involving the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus without any preliminary conditions. Despite all of the shouting about the United States' willingness to promote the process of negotiations between the communities on the basis of the "Brussels formula," American diplomacy was incapable of escaping the vicious circle created by the imperialist NATO aims coloring all of its practical actions in connection with the Cyprus question.

American strategists were also afraid that increasing the pressure on Turkey would motivate it to withdraw from NATO, and this, in their opinion, would be a catastrophe of much greater dimensions. The situation was supposed to be corrected by the identical agreements on military assistance concluded with Turkey and Greece by Washington in March and April of 1976 (for 1 billion dollars and 700 million respectively). These agreements were intended, as then President G. Ford stressed, to demonstrate Washington's "equal concern" for the security of both allies. When the Carter Administration took office, the United States made even more active efforts to "impose the necessary order" on NATO's southern flank. The new administration's approach to the Cyprus problem was called "quiet" diplomacy by American observers, although it could be more aptly called "secret."

The veil of secrecy with which Washington deliberately covers all of its actions connected with practical steps in the Cyprus issue allows it to conceal its views on such important questions as the withdrawal of foreign troops and the constitutional and territorial aspects of the problem. At the same time, the Cypriots are gradually being convinced that "quiet" diplomacy signifies a virtual "reorientation" of policy and a sign that the fundamental interests of the Cypriot people are "understood."

This change in American political tactics is not fooling anyone. When AKEL Secretary-General E. Papaioannu was interviewed for the newspaper of the Turkish community HALKIN SESI on the mission of C. Clifford, special

representative of the American President to Ankara, Nicosia and Athens, in March 1977, he said that the party was not fostering any illusions in regard to the "statements about a cardinal change in U.S. policy." The leader of the Turkish community, R. Denktash, said the following on 3 April 1977 when he was interviewed for the Austrian newspaper NEUES VOLKSBLETT: "The Americans should follow a course of neutral and friendly relations with Cyprus on the basis of nonintervention in its domestic affairs. The Americans' slogan of 'we know precisely what is best for everyone' is only harming the United States' positions throughout the world."

At the same time, "quiet" diplomacy, which does not involve any official documents, makes it possible to maintain the appearance of U.S. diplomatic activity over problems in settling the Cyprus question. Profoundly considered innuendoes, widely publicized arguments with nothing to back them up and heightened concern for secondary details--this is the arsenal of means used by the engineers of this diplomacy for the purpose of diverting the attention of the world public from the essence of the matter.

Regardless of how American diplomacy may masquerade in a costume of "objectivity," the "Atlantic" factor is obviously having an increasing effect on the development of Washington's official course in the Cyprus question. At the end of April 1978, the administration proposed to Congress that the embargo on deliveries of weapons to Turkey be lifted without waiting for any concrete steps on Turkey's part in the direction of a settlement in Cyprus. After prolonged and tense debates, the Senate on 26 July voted in favor of the administration's proposal to lift the embargo (57 for, 42 against). On 1 August this proposal was also approved by the House of Representatives of the American Congress by an insignificant majority (208 for, 205 against).

Washington's persistent attempt to cancel this discriminatory measure against a NATO country reaffirmed that its primary concern is the state of affairs in the North Atlantic Alliance, particularly on its southern flank, and not the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Moreover, the United States is still trying to make this an "intra-NATO" resolution. For this reason, American diplomacy's attempts to "isolate" the United Nations from participation in the settlement of the Cyprus issue are continuing. In a statement presented at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly, the U.S. representative said that the role of the United Nations and Security Council "should not be overestimated." His speech implied that Washington intends to use the tactic of partial measures in the Cyprus issue, similar in many ways to the maneuvers over problems in the Middle East. This approach is consistent with the NATO policy of the "fait accompli," blocking any constructive initiatives within the framework of the well-known UN resolutions. It is aimed at selfish and obstructive goals and does not take the actual state of affairs in the East Mediterranean into account, as it is build on obviously false premises and, for this reason, is devoid of any kind of positive prospects.

Nonetheless, a basis for the political settlement of the Cyprus problem does exist. It consists of the resolution of the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The point of departure in the search for a mutually acceptable solution is the first resolution of the Security Council, No 353 (1974), which called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and demanded the immediate cessation of foreign military intervention and the curtailment of hostilities. It proposed the immediate withdrawal of foreign military personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, with the exception of personnel stationed there in accordance with international agreements. The resolution called upon the parties concerned to begin negotiations for the purpose of settling the crisis in the spirit of constructive cooperation. The subsequent 17 resolutions confirmed its importance, sometimes repeating points of its instructive portion in their entirety.

Not one of the provisions in these documents, however, has been fulfilled as yet because of the obstructionist stand taken by the NATO countries.

The Soviet Union, firmly adhering to a principled and consistent policy aimed at the support of the national liberation struggle, resolutely condemns any kind of outside intervention in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, demands the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island and favors the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot State. The position of the USSR on the Cyprus issue, set forth in the Soviet Government's announcements of 18, 21 and 29 July and 22 August 1974, has promoted the politicization of the conflict and the constructive discussion of problems in the Security Council.

The principled policy of the USSR in regard to the Cyprus question has met with widespread approval. The government of the Republic of Cyprus supports the well-known Soviet proposal that a representative international conference on Cyprus be convened under the auspices of the United Nations--a conference which could contribute much to the settlement of the international aspects of the crisis. Official representatives of Greece have also expressed agreement with the Soviet initiative.

A healthy exchange of views on the Cyprus issue took place during Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit's official visit to the Soviet Union in June 1978. "The two sides," the joint Soviet-Turkish communique states, "advocated the quickest possible resolution of the Cyprus issue by peaceful means through positive and constructive negotiations involving both Cypriot communities on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its policy of nonalignment, with observance of the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish and Greek communities of Cyprus and the guarantee of a peaceful life for them in an atmosphere of total security."

The only viable solution to the Cyprus problem will be one which takes the interests of the entire Cypriot population and its sovereignty and independence totally into account. This would answer the requirements of the process of international detente.

UNITED STATES-JAPAN: RAW MATERIALS AND FOODSTUFFS

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[Article by A. B. Parkanskiy]

[Text] Economic relations between the partner-rivals of the United States and Japan at the end of the 1970's are characterized, on the one hand, by deeper economic ties due to the emphasis on Washington in Tokyo's military policy and, on the other, by the further intensification of conflicts in bilateral ties and over international issues.

Just recently, statesmen on both sides of the ocean were reiterating at every opportunity that the most important sources of conflict "on the pattern of the 1960's and early 1970's" had been eradicated by the considerable concessions made by Japan. (I will remind the reader that in the first half of the 1970's, Japan was forced by U.S. pressure to agree to limit its exports of textiles and ferrous metals to this nation, to liberalize foreign capital investments, to reevaluate the yen twice and then institute a "floating exchange rate," and to institute special measures concerning additional imports of American goods worth 1.1 billion dollars.)

The trade war of 1977 and early 1978 dispelled the contented tone of these statements. In connection with the unprecedented growth of the U.S. deficit in trade with Japan (5.3 billion dollars in 1976 and 8.1 billion in 1977), which now represents an extremely large part of the total American foreign trade deficit (9.3 billion and 31.4 billion dollars respectively), as well as other growing problems, Washington is insisting that its "junior partner" comply with what is already an entire complex of demands, touching upon bilateral trade, Japan's foreign economic policy in general and even aspects of the state-monopolistic regulation of its economy. The United States is simultaneously threatening Japan with new restrictive measures against Japanese exports. With a reference to official circles, NEWSWEEK magazine reported on 21 November 1977: "If Japan does not start buying American goods, Draconian measures will be taken against Japanese exports." Japan, in turn, has put forth a number of counterdemands.

The United States' tough stand on Japanese commercial expansion, supported by the Western European Common Market, and the fear of restrictions in the major American sales markets forced Tokyo to make serious concessions in January 1978. An agreement was signed, in accordance with which Japan "voluntarily" promised to take measures to eradicate its large positive balance in bilateral trade and, for this purpose, reduce the customs duties on a number of goods, cancel the quantitative import quotas for 12 types of commodities, buy three times as many oranges and four times as much citrus juice from the United States, etc. According to official Japanese estimates, all of these measures could, within the next few years, reduce Japan's positive balance in trade with the United States to one-fourth of the present figure--that is, to approximately 2 billion dollars. Besides this, the communique recorded the Japanese Government's agreement to intensify government stimulation of economic competition--that is, to create the necessary conditions for increasing the Japanese economy's demand for import goods, especially American imports.¹ In reference to the results of these negotiations, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, the business newspaper reported: "The United States gained more than it expected and Japan gave up more than it wished." Nonetheless, it appears that the American side does not intend to limit itself to these achievements. As R. Straus, the U.S. President's special representative at trade negotiations (under GATT auspices), was already saying in March 1978, the agreement "is only...the first chapter in a thick book that remains to be written."

This extremely significant statement was partially confirmed within a few weeks, at the beginning of May 1978, at the time of Prime Minister T. Fukuda's Washington visit. The NEW YORK TIMES newspaper reported on 5 May that "economic issues were the main topic of conversation." During the course of the negotiations, the two sides announced the common interest of ruling circles in both countries in overcoming capitalism's economic difficulties and in extending its economic, military and political influence in the Pacific region. This was followed by another set of concessions made by Japan. It is true that T. Fukuda did not specifically promised to reduce the positive balance in trade with the United States to 6 billion dollars by the end of 1978, as the Americans wished, and expressed dissatisfaction with their policy, which was actually stimulating a drop in the exchange rate of the dollar in world markets and encouraging tremendous petroleum imports. He did promise, however, to reduce 1978 Japanese exports of steel (by 10-20 percent) and color television sets (by 30 percent in comparison to 1976) to the United States, to keep vehicle sales "on the 1977 level or lower," to increase imports of American goods and "to do everything possible to achieve a 7-percent rate of economic growth," which corresponds to the American demands with the ultimate aim of expanding Japan's demand for imported American industrial products.

As we know, Tokyo's pliancy is mainly due to the military and political dependence of Japanese ruling circles on Washington, as well as to a number of economic factors (the reciprocal movement of direct private capital investments, Japan's intention to purchase a larger share of the licenses

and know-how in the international capitalist market, where the United States occupies the leading position, etc.). Other problems connected with the economic ties and interrelations between the two powers, particularly those related to the trade and raw materials and foodstuffs, are less well-known and have not been elucidated to any great extent in literature. It is precisely here, however, that we find perhaps the main reason for Japan's economic dependence on the United States. Since the mid-1970's, particularly during the last trade war, this trade has played an increasingly important role in the conflicts between these states.

In this connection, it is interesting to read what R. Christopher--correspondent of the famous American magazine, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, wrote in January of this year. The United States, he noted, has begun to accuse Japan, saying that its positive foreign trade balance is "destroying" the world capitalist economy. At the same time, it has not even made the slightest demands on Saudi Arabia, whose positive balance was one and a half times as great as the Japanese balance in 1977, and only "mildly reprimanded" West Germany, whose trade balance was also greater than Japan's. Christopher frankly stated the main reason for Japan's choice as the "sole target": "Japan is more sensitive to American pressure than the Saudis or even the West Germans. Considering the fact that almost 25 percent of their export sales are concentrated in the United States and the fact that they have nothing to offer in the way of strategic raw materials, the Japanese have almost no choice but to give up."²

The aggravation of capitalism's fuel and raw material problems has given rise to deep-seated conflicts between the imperialist states that are the main consumers of raw materials, particularly between the United States, Japan and the Western European countries, and between the developed capitalist countries and the developing states. As events during the period of the Arab oil embargo (autumn 1973-spring 1974) indicated, these problems have played an important part in motivating the United States' ally-rivals to implement policies that are not completely in the American interest. For example, in November 1973 Japan officially supported the political demands of the Arab nations, and they classified it as one of the "friendly states" to which oil was shipped without any restrictions.

On the other hand, the energy crisis is providing American imperialism with an opportunity for the relative strengthening of its positions in its competition with the other capitalist countries, particularly Japan, since, in comparison to most of these countries, the United States occupies a more favorable position in the area of industrial raw materials in general.

The United States has relatively abundant resources of many types of mineral raw materials and a developed mining industry, it is still the leading producer of many types of raw materials and is a large net-exporter of some important types--coal, molybdenum, magnesium, phosphates, feldspar, talc and boron-containing materials. In the case of a number of strategic non-energy mineral raw materials,³ the proportion accounted for imports in

U.S. consumption is many times smaller than in Japan. At the same time, Japan holds second place, after the United States, in the capitalist world in the consumption of petroleum, copper, zinc, aluminum, nickel and other materials. It depends more on imports of mineral industrial raw materials and fuel than the other major capitalist countries. Its degree of import dependence is at least 53 percent for all of the major types and, as a rule, ranges between 90 and 100 percent.

By 1985, according to official Japanese forecasts, despite active measures to alleviate its dependence on imported oil, these imports will still prevail in the nation's energy balance--accounting for 63.3 percent, and imports of coal will account for 11.2 percent. Imports of gas will play a much more important role: Their share of this balance will rise from a negligible figure in the mid-1970's to 7.9 percent.

At a time when the raw material problem is becoming more acute in the non-socialist world, Japan's rising level of import dependence is strengthening its ties to the United States. Above all, direct deliveries of American raw materials are extremely important to its economy. Japan is the United States' largest overseas trade partner: It now accounts for more than one-tenth of total U.S. foreign trade turnover.⁴ Besides this, Japan receives one-third of all American exports of mineral fuel (including around 35 percent of all coal exports) and one-fourth of non-energy raw material exports. In 1976 total exports of non-energy raw materials amounted to approximately 3 billion dollars, including more than 1 billion in products of the lumber, pulp and paper industry, 850 million in chemicals, 260 million in cotton and 220 million in nonferrous metallic ores and ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal. Mineral fuel exports that same year exceeded 1.2 billion dollars, including 1 billion in coal and more than 90 million in natural gas. American deliveries account for three-fifths of all Japanese imports of coking coal, more than two-thirds of all phosphates and scrap metal, over one-third of all chemicals, one-third of lumber, wood and raw cotton, up to 90 percent of all raw hides, etc.⁵

At the same time, the decisive role played by American monopolistic capital in raw material supplies in the Japanese economy is connected not so much with the great significance of U.S. exports of raw materials as with the fact that American monopolies still control many sources of raw materials in other developed capitalist countries and in the developing states. A number of Soviet studies have noted that the mining, primary processing and sale of raw materials are concentrated in the hands of a few international corporations which, as a rule, are united in secret cartels. By the beginning of the 1970's, seven of the largest international corporations controlled 61 percent of all petroleum production and refining in the capitalist world (including the United States), ten corporations controlled 70.9 percent of copper smelting, six controlled 82.8 percent of aluminum production and four controlled 98 percent of nickel production.⁶ Of these 28 monopolies, 15 were American. In recent years, the scales of the monopolies' control over petroleum production in the

developing countries have been reduced significantly, but they still largely control the exploratory drilling, refining, shipment and sale of petroleum and petroleum products. The foreign branches and affiliates of American transnational monopolies in the raw material branches are being increasingly oriented toward exports, are satisfying the rising demands of the capitalist countries at a huge profit and are trying to retain and extend their control over raw material supplies and their processing and sale in these countries.

Non-Japanese international corporations have monopolized most of the raw materials used in the Japanese economy. Japanese capital controls only one-tenth of petroleum imports, 10-13 percent of coking coal and nickel imports, 5-8 percent of bauxite imports, 4 percent of lead and zinc imports and 22-25 percent of copper imports. Overseas purchases that are not controlled by Japanese capital, however, satisfy the entire national demand for uranium, almost 90 percent of the demand for petroleum and approximately the same percentage of the demand for bauxite, 94 percent of the demand for nickel, etc.⁷ A significant part of the Australian mining industry is controlled by American capital, which receives huge profits from the sale of Australian minerals to Japan. A recently published Soviet monograph notes the following: "In essence, Japan's growing dependence on Australian sources of raw materials signifies an increase in its raw material dependence on American monopolies."⁸ For example, American capital has a controlling interest in the Mount Isa company, which mines 70 percent of all Australian copper, 15 percent of its lead and one-third of its silver. Around 90 percent of the products of the mining industry, a large share of which is controlled by overseas companies, are exported, including 85 percent to Japan, as well as other nations.⁹ The situation is the same in many other capitalist countries and developing states which supply Japan with raw materials. For example, American corporations now control approximately half of all crude oil deliveries to Japan from the Middle East and almost all deliveries from Indonesia, where they have a monopoly on most of the petroleum industry.

American monopolistic capital has also gained an important position in oil refining and sales of petroleum products in Japan. Although Japan does not have substantial petroleum reserves, it does have a huge oil refining industry which is second only to the United States (in the capitalist world) in terms of production volume. From the very start of direct investments in Japan, however, American corporations have paid special attention to this branch, which has made it more dependent on American capital. At present, U.S. capital controls around two-fifths of the total production and sales of petroleum products in Japan. The position of the American oil monopolies has been made even stronger by the fact that they are simultaneously suppliers of crude oil, creditors and sellers of the latest technology. By the beginning of 1977, direct private U.S. capital investments in the Japanese oil refining industry amounted to around 1.6 billion dollars (an almost five-fold increase over 1966), or more than 41 percent of all American direct capital investments in this nation. The total sales figure of branches and affiliates of American oil monopolies in 1976 was almost 12.3 billion dollars (around 61 percent of the total sales figure of companies controlled by American capital).¹⁰

Since the beginning of the 1960's Japanese monopolistic capital has been fighting against the domination of the local petroleum refining industry by its American rivals. They plan to gradually establish state-monopolistic control and, in particular, to organize government regulation of capital investments, petroleum production, sales and import volumes, and prices. Energetic action is being taken to unite the independent Japanese oil refineries, whose activities are being supported by the state. As a result, Japanese capital has been able to slightly dislodge American corporations from their previous position, reducing their share of sales in the petroleum refining industry from two-thirds in the beginning of the 1960's to two-fifths in the mid-1970's.

The Japanese monopolies are also attempting to reduce their dependence on the American monopolies' raw material supplies from abroad. They are trying to expand their control in the area of the working of raw material resources in a number of foreign countries. The intensification of energy and ecological problems is impelling them to organize the primary processing of raw materials abroad.

During the first half of the 1970's, Japan--without any kind of consultations with America--began to establish direct ties with the oil-producing states in the Middle East (the main source of petroleum for Japan). The Ministry of International Trade and Industry set the objective of increasing the proportion accounted for in Japanese oil imports by direct deliveries from these nations without mediation by international monopolies. At the beginning of the decade, this proportion was only equal to 2 percent and, according to the estimates of the same agency, should rise to 40 percent by 1980. During the course of the series of visits by Japanese leaders to the Arab countries in 1973 and 1974, which evoked serious dissatisfaction on the part of Washington, the Arabs were offered an extensive program of economic and technological assistance in exchange for long-term guarantees of stable direct deliveries of petroleum. As a result of these visits, as well as the trips made to Tokyo by the heads of a number of Arab states, bilateral agreements to this effect were concluded.

The government-stimulated expansion of Japanese companies in the oil-producing Arab countries is simultaneously being accomplished on a broader scale; besides this, the process is extremely intensive and has also displeased the United States. Since the 1960's, small companies have operated in these countries with the participation of Japanese capital. In the future, several industrial facilities will be built. In the mid-1970's, Japanese companies were already working on the plans for around 30 industrial facilities in ten Arab countries. Japanese commodity exports to these nations have also increased dramatically. Japanese firms are gaining greater influence in Indonesia and Malaysia. In all, more than 35 percent of all Japanese private direct overseas investments are already concentrated in the mining and primary processing of raw materials, and most of these investments are in the Middle East, where American capital has always held a dominant position. Japanese companies are striving to seize control over raw material

sources in the developed capitalist countries as well--in Australia, Canada and the United States itself. In the mid-1970's, for example, almost 85 percent of all foreign capital invested in Alaskan industrial enterprises belonged to Japanese firms. Total Japanese capital investments in this state had already risen to 250 million dollars by the beginning of the decade. Japanese private capital controls 75-90 percent of all Alaskan exports.¹¹ Japan is placing great hopes on supplies of petroleum and a number of other raw materials from China.

By increasing foreign investments and concluding long-term agreements on commercial and economic cooperation, Japanese companies have already gained control over a large share of its imports of several types of minerals. In the beginning of the 1970's, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry published a special program for covering the nation's needs for mineral resources through Japanese participation in their working overseas. According to this document, the total share of deliveries from overseas enterprises controlled by Japanese companies should increase to approximately 30 percent of all raw material imports.¹²

All of this testifies that Japan, in an attempt to reduce its dependence on U.S. international monopolies for raw materials and fuel, has been more active in the inter-imperialist struggle for sources of raw material and spheres for the investment of capital. By 31 March 1977, Japan's direct private overseas investments alone totaled around 19.4 billion dollars. These tendencies are leading to increasingly sharp conflict between Japan and other leaders in the export of capital and goods, primarily its senior partner and ally--the United States.

The food problem occupies an important place in U.S.-Japan relations.

The domestic production of agricultural products in Japan is lagging further and further behind growing demand. This nation completely satisfies its own demand for its traditional food product--rice. In recent decades, however, the diet of the average Japanese has changed; in particular, meat and dairy products now account for a much larger share of the diet. In terms of their per capita consumption, however, Japan is still far behind a number of other developed capitalist countries, and this, combined with the tendency toward an increase in the demand for meat and dairy products, provides Western experts with grounds for concluding that they may play an even greater role in the Japanese diet in the future. In turn, this necessitates rapid expansion of the fodder base. But the output of fodder grain is constantly growing smaller. The nation's degree of self-sufficiency (53 percent in the early 1970's) is the lowest among the developed capitalist countries, and there is virtually no possibility of a significant rise in this indicator. Under these conditions, the only possible objective is to prevent a further increase in the dependence on foreign markets and to stabilize it.

Seafood consumption--meat's chief rival--is also growing, but there have been serious problems in increasing the catch. The possibility of augmenting Japan's seafood supplies has been particularly limited by the United States' decision to establish a 200-mile maritime economic zone, which will reduce the annual Japanese catch in this zone, according to estimates, to less than one-third of the present catch. In September 1977 the United States again lowered the Japanese fishing for 1978 in its zone. In October, negotiations between Japan, the United States and Canada on fishing problems ended without producing any results: In an atmosphere of sharp differences of opinion, the sides could not agree on the revision of the fishing agreement which ceased to be in effect in March 1978.

According to official Japanese forecasts, by 1985 the nation will already only be able to cover its own needs for rice, vegetables and eggs through domestic production.¹³ Supplies of wheat, barley, soybeans, sugar, seafood and some other products, however, will consist mainly of imports. Japan's imports of agricultural goods are already only exceeded by those of the FRG and the United States. Total imports of foodstuffs (excluding soybeans) amounted to around 10 billion dollars in 1977 (12.6 percent of all imports). The major items in agricultural imports are grain (corn, wheat, sorghum and barley), soy, sugar and pork.

At the same time, the United States is the largest capitalist producer and exporter of foodstuffs. The scientific and technical revolution has been one of the main factors contributing to the high level of efficiency in American agriculture, which is characterized by a high power-labor ratio, a high level of mechanization and the extensive use of irrigation equipment, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. The United States accounts for one-sixth of world agricultural exports, including almost one-half of wheat exports, more than one-half of fodder grain exports and one-fourth of rice exports. In 1976 the sales volume in foreign markets was almost 23 billion dollars, and the positive balance in foreign trade in agricultural products exceeded 12.1 billion.¹⁴ Now that food problems are growing more acute in the capitalist world, Washington is attaching great political significance to exports of agricultural goods, particularly fodder grain, regarding its deliveries as an important means of exerting pressure on the importing countries.

The world capitalist grain trade is controlled by a few large international monopolies. In particular, five corporations--three American, one French and one Argentine--control 90 percent of American exports of food grain and 70 percent of world exports of this commodity. The largest of these--Cargill (the United States), with an annual sales volume of around 5 billion dollars--owns 133 elevators, 2,000 railway cars, 5 grain freighters, etc.

Japan is the largest foreign sales market for American agricultural products: In 1976, 15 percent of all American agricultural exports entered this market. In the case of some commodities, the significance of the Japanese market is even greater; it absorbs approximately one-third of the meat exported by the

United States, two-fifths of the sorghum, more than one-fourth of the fish, one-fifth of the soybeans, 16 percent of the fruit, 13 percent of the wheat and 14 percent of the corn.

During fiscal years 1970-1977, American exports of agricultural goods to Japan increased almost four-fold--reaching 3.9 billion dollars (more than one-third of all U.S. exports to Japan). Since American imports of agricultural products from Japan are negligible (80 million dollars in the 1977 fiscal year), this trade item represents a huge part of the Japanese currency entering the United States: The American positive balance for this item amounted to more than 3.8 billion dollars in the 1977 fiscal year.¹⁵

The United States is the main supplier of agricultural goods to Japan. That same year, they supplied more than 83 percent of all the corn imported by Japan, almost 56 percent of the wheat, over 47 percent of the sorghum, 95 percent of the soybeans, 63 percent of the poultry, approximately 25 percent of the pork and 17 percent of the beef.¹⁶ Moreover, Japan is rapidly becoming more dependent on the United States for foodstuffs, particularly in recent years, and this vulnerability is regarded by ruling circles in Tokyo as a "national security" threat on an equal level with the dependence on imported petroleum.

The stability of American deliveries of foodstuffs is not in any sense guaranteed. The embargo on soybean deliveries announced by the U.S. Government in 1973, confirmed, despite the temporary nature of this measure, Japan's misgivings on this score. For this reason, its agricultural import policy now places primary emphasis on the search for stable food sources outside the United States. Under these conditions, agricultural trade with Canada and Australia, as well as with a number of other Pacific nations, is being expanded rapidly. By fiscal year 1977, Australia already accounted for 17.9 percent of the wheat imported by Japan, 42.8 percent of the barley and 12.2 percent of the sorghum. Australia occupies third, second and third place, respectively, in deliveries of these commodities to Japan and is also a large supplier of sugar (38.1 percent). Canada already accounts for 26.5 percent of the wheat imported by Japan (in second place after the United States) and 52 percent of the barley.¹⁷

A special place in Tokyo's attempts to reduce its dependence on the United States for foodstuffs is occupied by the plans to create a stable system for supplying the nation with food by organizing the specialized production, under Japanese control, of a number of major foodstuffs in the Pacific countries and other regions of the world. Japanese companies have already invested large amounts of capital in the production of soybeans, corn and beef in Brazil, and investments are either being planned or have already been made in the production of soybeans, corn, sorghum and beef in Mexico, corn and sorghum in Argentina, corn in Thailand and the Philippines and beef in Madagascar. By 1974, the Japanese Government was already financing 111 agricultural projects in the Asian countries to develop the production of fodder grain for export. By 1976, Japanese companies had organized 173 fishing and fish-processing firms overseas, particularly in the United States.¹⁸

At the same time, Japan has quite painstakingly guarded the branches of national agricultural production, in which it is specializing more and more, from foreign competition. The import restrictions on the products of these branches are a source of intense displeasure in the United States. During the trade war of 1977 and 1978, the Americans demanded that these restrictions be lifted, particularly the limits on meat and citrus fruits. The Japanese side had to make concessions. Washington also had to take Tokyo's interests into account to some extent.

Raw material and food supplies represent an important channel for Japanese economic dependence on the United States and an area of growing conflicts between the two countries. The aggravation of raw material and food problems has exposed the vulnerability of the Japanese economy and the roots of the "flexibility" of its foreign economic policy and its willingness to make concessions under the pressure exerted by American rivals. It was reaffirmed that the "economic interdependence" of the two leading imperialist powers, which is spoken of so frequently on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, is still not deep enough to guarantee the partner-rivals' equal dependence in the area of economic relations.

It is not very likely that there will be any fundamental change in the scales, structure and areas of Japan's economic dependence during the next few years. Recognition of this reality, in combination with the common class interest in the regulation of capitalism's current global economic problems, has forced Japan to, on the one hand, make more active attempts to gain control over many foreign sources of raw materials and foodstuffs and, on the other, temporarily reconcile itself to the United States' desire to retain its role as the leader of the imperialist states in their struggle to solve the problems in the world capitalist economy.

Now that Japan is becoming the second-greatest economic power in the capitalist world and Japanese monopolies are making greater inroads in the world markets, the United States has had to "politicize" its economic conflicts with this nation in recent years. By implementing this course, the Americans are striving to make more effective use of Japan's dependence, particularly in the area of raw materials and foodstuffs, for the increasingly overt exertion of pressure on their partner-rival.

FOOTNOTES

1. FINANCIAL TIMES, 14 January 1978.
2. NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 22 January 1978, p 28.
3. Mineral raw materials are divided into five groups depending on their areas of industrial application: 1) fuel and energy raw materials (oil, natural gas, coal, bituminous shale, peat and uranium ore); 2) metallic ore (the ores of iron, nonferrous metals and precious metals) 3) mining-chemical (phosphates, apatites, salts, sulfur,

barium oxide, boracic ores, bromine and others); 4) natural building materials, non-metallic mineral raw materials, mineral, technical and precious stones (marble, granite, rock crystal, diamonds and others); 5) hydromineral raw materials (subterranean, fresh and mineral water).

4. "Economic Report of the President 1978," Washington, 1978, p 371.
5. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, March 1976, OBR 76-21, p 3.
6. "SShA: vneshneekonomiceskaya strategiya" [The United States: Foreign Economic Strategy], Ed.-in-chief M. I. Zakhmatov, Moscow, 1976, p 207.
7. "International Economic Report of the President 1975," p 28; JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW, 1977, No 1, p 64.
8. "Yaponiya v sisteme mirovykh khozyaystvennykh svyazey" [Japan in the System of World Economic Ties], Moscow, 1977, p 177.
9. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, March 1978, p 37-40.
10. Ibid., August 1977, p 45; March 1978, p 37. A. M. Sharkov, "Yaponiya i SShA. Analiz sovremennoykh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy" [Japan and the United States. An Analysis of Contemporary Economic Relations], Moscow, 1971, pp 255, 258; "Yaponiya v sisteme morovykh khozyaystvennykh svyazey," p 141.
11. N. R. Pierce, "The Pacific States of America," New York, 1972, p 287; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 March 1975, p 57.
12. JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 4 October 1972.
13. THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, December 1976, p 421.
14. "U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, Calendar Year 1976," p 1.
15. FATUS, December 1977, pp 7-10.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp 8-10.
18. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 6 September 1977.

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CSO: 1803

TWO-THIRDS PLUS ONE VOTE IN FAVOR OF COMMON SENSE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 pp 76-82

[Article by Yu. A. Ivanov]

[Text] On 17 June U.S. President J. Carter and General O. Torrijos, head of the Panamanian Government, exchanged the texts of new treaties on the Panama Canal and simultaneously signed a protocol on their ratification. The treaties are to go into effect on 1 October. The protocol signed by J. Carter and O. Torrijos confirms Panama's consent to the amendments, provisions, suggestions and remarks (around ten in all) added to the treaties by the U.S. Senate during the process of their approval.

The talks between the United States and Panama on the replacement of a new treaty for the enslaving treaty of 1903, which gave the United States unrestricted control over the Panama Canal Zone "in perpetuity," lasted for around 13 years and only came to an end in 1977. It is true that the first texts of the new treaties were drawn up as early as 1967, but they evoked such strong opposition that they had to be rejected. The talks were resumed in 1971. In February 1974, during Secretary of State H. Kissinger's visit to Panama, an American-Panamanian statement was signed on the coordinated principles which were to serve as the basis for future documents. These principles included renunciation of the 1903 treaty and the elaboration of a new long-term treaty which would stipulate increasing participation by Panama in the operation of the canal and its attainment of certain economic advantages and would set the exact date for transferring total sovereignty over the canal and its zone to Panama.

The signing of the statement on principles gave rise to a storm of protests in Congress, where many members of both houses had extremely negative feelings about any concessions, any new treaties in general and the transfer of sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama even in the distant future. In the Senate, S. Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina) introduced the draft of a resolution opposing U.S. renunciation of any of "its rights" whatsoever, which was co-authored by one-third of the senators. Many resolutions against any change in the canal's status were also introduced in the House of

Representatives. Only one bold step was taken in Congress in favor of the new approach: G. McGee (Democrat, Wyoming), who was then chairman of the subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed a resolution, co-authored with H. Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania), H. Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) and J. Javits (Republican, New York), which commended the principles that had been agreed upon, but it received no support and was not even formally introduced in the Senate. Nonetheless, by the end of 1974, when the 93d Congress concluded its session, not one bill or resolution on the Panama Canal issue had been approved, and all of them were consequently buried in the congressional archives.

In the Senate, the revision of the Panama Canal treaty was actively opposed by conservatives of both parties headed by S. Thurmond, J. Helms (Republican, North Carolina) and J. McClellan (Democrat from Arkansas who died in December 1977). In the House of Representatives, the opposition rallied round the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal of the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries. The opponents of the new treaties in Congress were backed up by the Panama Canal lobby, which united various groups on a platform of struggle for the preservation of its colonial status. The revision of the 1903 treaty was also opposed by such influential conservative organizations as the American Legion, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign Wars and others. The Panama Canal lobby's influence in the nation was made much stronger by the fact that it had been supported for many years by the Pentagon, which had an interest in keeping its military bases in the Canal Zone. An important role in the activities of the Panama Canal lobby was played by shipping companies and corporations with investments in the Canal Zone; it was supported by approximately 40,000 Americans, permanent residents of the Canal Zone who did not wish to lose the considerable privileges they enjoyed. Local branches of the labor unions making up the AFL-CIO and the Canal Pilots' Association were particularly active.

In the middle of 1975 the Pentagon's insistence on the retention of bases in the Canal Zone for another 50 years with the possible extension of this time limit gave rise to differences of opinion within the administration, and the talks in Panama were temporarily broken off. The opponents of a change in the canal's status in the Capitol immediately took advantage of this situation. Congressmen G. Snyder (Republican, Kentucky) introduced an amendment to the bill on State Department allocations that was being discussed at that time. The purpose of this amendment was to prohibit the use of allocated funds for negotiations with Panama, since this, as he said, was "a total waste of the taxpayers' money." The House of Representatives voted in favor of the Snyder amendment twice, but it did not pass in the Senate. Work in a conciliatory committee resulted in the drafting and adoption of a compromise amendment, which stated that any new agreement would have to protect U.S. interests in the Canal Zone.¹

In 1976 the problem of concluding new treaties with Panama became one of the major issues in the presidential campaign. The candidate of the Republican Party's right wing, R. Reagan, rehashed the familiar phrases of the campaign that had been going on for several years and accused the Ford Administration of preparing to "give" the Panamanians "our" canal. The Democrat camp against the new treaties was also joined by G. Wallace, the reactionary former governor of Alabama.

The disputes in Congress did not abate either. Snyder again introduced his amendment, but it was again replaced by a compromise text, like the one adopted in 1975. To some degree, the supporters of a new treaty with Panama also became more active. Senator R. Clark (Democrat, Iowa) published a report compiled at his request by the State Department and Department of Defense, the conclusions of which boiled down to a statement that "the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone can be defended even in hostile surroundings," but "its prolonged functioning in such surroundings cannot be guaranteed."² Democratic Congressmen L. Hamilton (Indiana) and D. Obey (Wisconsin) visited Panama and then submitted a report in which they underscored the fact that the conclusion of new treaties was absolutely essential for the preservation of "friendly relations" with Panama and all of Latin America. In general, however, the position of the opponents of new treaty relations with Panama was extremely strong in the 94th Congress, which retained its authority until 1976. During this session, more than 40 resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives against U.S. renunciation of its "rights" in the Canal Zone; they were co-authored by 167 congressmen. While Thurmond's resolution in the previous Congress had collected 34 co-authors, a similar resolution introduced by him in 1975 already had 38 co-authors.

This was the situation when the new administration took office. When J. Sparkman (Democrat, Alabama), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made a policy-planning speech in the Senate soon after this, he reminded the new administration of the need to take congressional directives into account, which "state that any new treaty or agreement on the Panama Canal... must protect the vitally important interests of the United States in the Canal Zone, as well as in using this canal, in keeping its equipment and property and in guaranteeing the defense of the canal."³

Recognizing the tremendous significance of the resolution of this problem not only for American-Panamanian relations, but also for the entire intricate complex of U.S. relations with the Latin American countries, the Carter Administration intensified the talks with Panama. By the end of summer 1977, the texts of two new U.S.-Panama treaties had been agreed upon: The first--on the status of the canal--envisioned the gradual transfer of sovereignty over part of the Canal Zone to Panama, defined the principles of canal administration with participation by the Panamanian side and the status of U.S. military bases and regulated a number of other issues for the period up to "noon, Panama time, 31 December 1999," when total sovereignty over the canal would pass to Panama; the second--on the neutrality of the canal--guaranteed neutral status for the canal after this date.⁴

Those who advocated preservation of the colonial status of the canal were incensed by the news of the new treaty. Their leaders in the Senate, J. Helms and S. Thurmond, threatened to block ratification of the treaties. Not one of the members of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was in complete agreement with the conclusions of the heads of the U.S. delegation at the talks, E. Bunker and S. Linowitz, who presented an explanation of the premises that had been agreed upon. The treaties' opponents in Congress, backed up by conservative forces in the United States, were gambling on chauvinistic feelings. Thurmond, for example, voiced the following appeal: "The Americans must defend their rights.... We own this property and we should not have to give it up just because we are being blackmailed." Demagogic appeals of this kind apparently had some success: In the White House mail in the beginning of September, there were eight letters opposing the new treaties to every one letter supporting them. Senator H. Humphrey,⁵ who supported the new treaties, acknowledged that their advocates in Congress were in a difficult position.⁶

The new treaties were signed in Washington on 7 September 1977 in an exceptionally ceremonial atmosphere: Two thousand people were invited to OAS headquarters, including representatives from all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere, with the exclusion of Cuba; among those present were 19 heads of state from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as a group of senators, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many others. In a speech presented immediately after the signing, J. Carter did not neglect to request his "dear friends in the Senate" to support the treaties. The solemn ceremony in Washington, attended by many heads of state and government, was, according to the administration's plans, supposed to show Congress and American public opinion the great significance attached to the new treaties by the Latin American countries and simultaneously put the Senate in an ambiguous position, in which the refusal to approve the treaties signed in this kind of atmosphere would look like an attempt to overtly undermine the President's authority.

When all of the fanfare of the ceremonies had died down in Washington, the Carter Administration had to take political realities into account. The noisy campaign launched by right-wing organizations to stir up jingoist feelings over the canal issue affected the mood in the nation. In the middle of October, for example, 58 percent of the respondents in a Harris poll did not approve of the new treaties, and only 23 percent supported them. In January 1978 the results of a poll sponsored by the NEW YORK TIMES newspaper and CBS Television indicated that 51 percent were against the treaties and 29 percent were for them. The alignment of forces was also unfavorable in Congress. According to the calculations of the administration itself, in September it could count on the support of 58 senators, but ratification of the treaty would call for a two-thirds vote in the Senate--that is, 67 senators. Many influential senators, such as J. Stennis, H. Jackson, H. Baker and others, declined to take a definite stand in the fall of 1977. The opponents of the new treaties, Senators J. Helms, S. Thurmond, O. Hatch and J. McClure and Congressman D. Flood, supported by the states of Idaho,

Iowa, Louisiana and Nebraska, took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court for the purpose of delaying or preventing the ratification of the treaties.

Under these conditions, the Carter Administration sent the new treaties to the Senate in September but did not press for a quick decision, hoping to work on the senators in such a way as to collect the necessary majority. The leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, R. Byrd (West Virginia), who, for tactical reasons, did not publicly announced his feelings about the treaties until the end of the year but then began to actively promote their ratification, said in mid-September that the heavy workload in the Senate and the "excessively emotional character" of the Panama Canal issue would make it unlikely that a vote would be held in the Senate before early 1978.

In September and October 1977, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted 3 weeks of hearings on the new Panama Canal treaties. E. Bunker and S. Linowitz, who spoke at the beginning of the hearings, pointedly insisted that the rejection of the treaties by the Senate could seriously harm U.S. positions in Latin America and endanger the security of the canal, which would have to be "defended" against the Panamanians themselves, who would have all of the other countries in this region and world public opinion on their side.

In general, the committee was well-disposed toward the administration's conclusions. It was interesting, however, that senators of liberal leanings, who are the prevailing influence in this committee, carefully avoided making any statements about the Panama Canal issue, apparently in the fear that this might have a negative effect on their political careers.

During the course of the hearings, some influential senators mentioned that the American and Panamanian sides were interpreting the texts of the documents in different ways, particularly the statements about U.S. participation in the defense of the canal after the year 2000 and about the "quick passage" of American naval ships through the canal. Secretary of State C. Vance declared that "the United States' freedom of action in guaranteeing the neutrality of the canal on a permanent basis will be totally unrestricted," and Secretary of Defense H. Brown and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in the House of Representatives that the treaties would give the United States the right to "defend" the canal even against Panama itself.⁷ At the same time, R. Betancourt, head of the Panamanian delegation at the talks, noted that the treaties would not give the United States the right to intervene unilaterally after 1999 for the purpose of defending the canal. One of the chief opponents of the treaties, Senator R. Dole (Republican, Kansas), informed the public of a secret telegram sent by the American Embassy in Panama to the State Department, which, in his opinion, proved the existence of great differences in the interpretation of basic questions by the two sides. The debate took on such great scales that, in the opinion of the majority of newsmen and many senators, the future of the treaties would depend on the clarification of the issue. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the administration for elucidation.

On 14 October 1977 J. Carter met with General O. Torrijos, head of the Panamanian Government, in Washington. As a result of this meeting, a joint statement concerning the interpretation of the treaty on canal neutrality was published. It noted that "each of the two sides will...protect the canal against anything that might endanger the policy of neutrality and, consequently, will have the right to counteract any kind of aggression or threats directed against the canal or against the peaceful passage of ships through it." The fact was also stressed that "this does not signify U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Panama and will not be interpreted as the right to engage in this kind of intervention." The statement also clarified the premises in the treaty concerning the accelerated passage of naval ships through the canal, explaining that this kind of crossing should take place "at maximum speed, with no interruptions, with quicker service and--in the event of necessity or emergency--out of turn." The publication of this statement put an end to the disputes over differences in the interpretation of the treaties, depriving their opponents of one of their most effective arguments. Even R. Dole called the statement "a step in the right direction," and Majority Leader R. Byrd described it as "an extremely important political achievement."

In the fall of 1977 and the beginning of 1978, Panama was visited by almost 40 senators, many of whom met with General Torrijos. A special place among the visits was occupied by the trips of Democratic Majority Leader R. Byrd and Republican Minority Leader H. Baker. In January, R. Byrd and H. Baker said that they would support the treaties on the condition that they include the premises of the joint statement and, on this basis, won the opportunity to introduce the appropriate amendments. The speeches made by the leaders of both party factions in the Senate in favor of the treaties, which were still being examined by the Foreign Relations Committee, considerably strengthened the position of their supporters. In a meeting with the heads of the committee, Byrd and Baker arranged for the transmission of the treaties to the Senate, so that all amendments would be considered only once, in the Senate itself. On 30 January the Foreign Relations Committee approved both treaties (14 in favor and 1 against, Republican R. Griffin from Michigan) and sent its recommendations to the Senate.

The discussion of the treaties in the Senate began on 8 February and went on until 18 April. This was one of the longest discussions on the ratification of the treaties and the first discussion in the history of the Senate that was broadcasted live over more than 100 radio stations. There is no question that both the opponents and the supporters of the treaties gave consideration to the fact that their words would not only be heard by their colleagues in the Senate, but also by a huge radio audience, and they accordingly tried to present their arguments as cogently as possible.

The first of the two treaties to be examined in the Senate was the one concerning the neutrality of the canal after the year 2000. Even before the beginning of this discussion, R. Byrd, on behalf of the leaders of both party factions, introduced two amendments to the treaty which essentially reiterated the statement by Carter and Torrijos in regard to the right to "defend the canal" and the priority crossing of U.S. naval ships in the event of "emergency situations." They were adopted, but other amendments,

which were intended to restrict Panama's sovereignty, were rejected by the Senate. The administration and the leaders of the Senate decisively objected to the introduction of any new amendments, fearing that this would prolong and complicate the proceedings. Nonetheless, some provisions were included in the resolution of approval, which won a few more votes in favor of the treaties.

The provision of Senator S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) stipulates that even after 1999 the United States will be able to station its armed forces in Panama in the event of circumstances which, in the opinion of the governments of both states, makes this "necessary and imperative." Another provision, proposed by Senator D. DeConcini (Democrat, Arizona), declared the right of the United States to use armed force in the next century if the canal is closed for any reason.

With these two provisions and the two amendments noted above, a resolution containing the constitutionally specified formula about the "advice and consent" of the Senate on the treaty on canal neutrality was passed by the Senate on 16 March 1978 by a vote of 68 for and 32 against. In other words, the administration was able to win one vote more than the two-thirds majority needed for the adoption of this kind of resolution.

The second treaty, regulating the gradual transfer of the zone and the canal to Panamanian jurisdiction, was passed with the same ratio of votes (68 in favor and 32 against) on 18 April with a few provisions and technical amendment. By the time the discussion of this treaty began, its opponents in the Senate had proposed around 50 amendments and provisions in the hope of blocking its ratification. During the examination of the second treaty, however, it was the same DeConcini provision that was the center of attention. In early April the Government of Panama unofficially informed the U.S. Government that this provision was unacceptable, even though Panama declined to officially comment on the Senate's activity until the two treaties had been approved. Besides this, Panama sent a letter to the United Nations and more than 100 states, underscoring the fact that the "right" proclaimed by the Senate to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country was inconsistent with the charters of the United Nations and OAS, as well as with the elementary norms of international law. The adoption of the DeConcini provision also evoked dissatisfaction and worries in most of the other Latin American governments, which justifiably saw this as a declaration of the United States' intention to continue its interventionist policy in the region.

This created a situation in which the treaties ratified by the Senate could have been rejected by Panama. The leaders of the Senate and administration were aware that this would not only create exceptionally unstable conditions around the canal and have extremely negative consequences for the relations between the United States and all of Latin America, but, what is more, would present the United States to the entire world in the unattractive role of a colonizer flouting the sovereignty of a small country and hanging on to the most odious remnants of the past. The search for a solution began.

During this stage the leading role was played by the heads of the Democratic faction in the Senate. By the end of the week preceding the ratification of the treaties, the text of a new provision was compiled, which, according to its authors' plans, was to alleviate the fears of the Panamanians. It "simply stated," as R. Byrd said, that "any actions taken by the United States in accordance with the treaties and the decisions on ratification to ensure the functioning and security of the canal and access to it should not be interpreted as intervention in Panama's domestic affairs, and they will not be directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of Panama."⁸ The new provision was introduced jointly by Senator F. Church (Democrat, Idaho), Minority Leader H. Baker (Republican, Tennessee) and R. Byrd. The text was approved by Deputy Secretary of State W. Christopher and many groups in the Senate, including the liberals, who had threatened to vote against the treaty if nothing was done to solve the problem of the DeConcini provision. After this, the provision was adopted.

The administration did a great deal to ensure the ratification of the treaties in the Senate. "This kind of intensive campaign to influence public opinion has only been launched by the President in extremely rare cases in recent times,"⁹ TIME magazine reported. For several months, his closest assistants and cabinet members addressed the public, explaining the need for new treaties.

By last August, the President had already sent personal messages to the legislators, requesting them to support the new treaties in Congress. "I need your help," he wrote. Statements in support of the treaties were made by former President G. Ford and former Secretaries of State H. Kissinger, W. Rogers and D. Rusk. The administration was also able to somewhat weaken the positions of the powerful Panama Canal lobby: By ensuring that the new treaty would include certain guarantees for Americans servicing the canal, it won the support of G. Meany, leader of the AFL-CIO; the Pentagon also changed its stand. The secretary of defense actively favored the treaties, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a meeting with 75 retired generals and admirals to "obtain their help." The new treaties were also supported by former Secretaries of Defense M. Laird, J. Schlesinger and E. Richardson.

Carter held dozens of briefings in the White House for influential figures from 35 states, for small town newspaper publishers and representatives of "pressure groups." As soon as Senator E. Zorinsky (Democrat, Nebraska) told the President that his vote would depend on the mood of his constituency, the President asked him to draw up a list of 250 residents of his state so that they could be invited to the White House. A week later, 190 influential people from Nebraska arrived in Washington, each was greeted by the First Lady upon entering the White House, and then they were all addressed by J. Carter himself and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department.

The effort put forth by the administration and its supporters produced results. By spring, according to polls, public opinion began to lean toward support of the new treaties with Panama. The situation was more complex in the Senate. When the discussion of the treaties began in February, the administration still did not have enough support in the Senate to guarantee their ratification, although estimates of the correlation of forces varied greatly. In this "highest consultative body," as the Senate is commonly called in the United States, the liberals and most of the centrists of both parties were speaking out in favor of the treaty, while the conservatives had decisively objected to them. In the final analysis, the fate of the treaties depended on the side that would be taken by approximately 12 senators, who were mainly slightly right of center. These were Senators H. Talmadge and S. Nunn (Democrats, Georgia), R. Schweiker and H. J. Heinz (Republicans, Pennsylvania), W. Roth (Republican, Delaware), E. Zorinsky (Democrat, Nebraska), E. Brooke (Republican, Massachusetts), H. Bellmon (Republican, Oklahoma), R. Long (Democrat, Louisiana), D. DeConcini and M. Hatfield (Democrats, Montana [sic]) and J. Danforth (Republican, Missouri).

Pressure was exerted on these undecided senators by all means possible, from "arm-twisting" to concessions by the administration on foreign policy issues in exchange for votes in favor of the treaties. Those who took part in convincing the senators included President J. Carter, Vice-President W. Mondale, the President's assistants H. Jordan and Z. Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, Secretary of the Treasury M. Blumenthal, prominent Democratic Party figure R. Straus, high-level representatives of the State Department W. Christopher and S. Linowitz, and White House staff personnel. They were also backed up by some prominent Republicans. From California, former President G. Ford telephoned Republican senators through the White House switchboard, while another prominent Republican and former secretary of state, H. Kissinger, met with them in Washington.

As a result of all this effort, only 3 of the 12 undecided senators voted against the treaties--W. Roth, R. Schweiker and E. Zorinsky. One of the leaders of the group of senators opposing the treaties, P. Laxalt (Republican, Nevada) complained that his side did not have any "bait" that could compete with that of the administration.

The administration had to fight for each vote before the second vote in April as well. Senators J. Abourezk (Democrat, South Dakota) and S. Hayakawa (Republican, California) had declared their intention to vote against the treaties. Senator H. Cannon (Democrat, Nevada) was undecided.

Two days before the vote, R. Byrd asked the President to "work on them." Carter telephoned both. He invited Hayakawa to the White House, where he and Z. Brzezinski talked with him about the Rhodesian problem for 30 minutes. Later, when the senator was leaving, Carter said, as if the matter were incidental, "I hope you will be able to support the treaty."¹⁰ On the eve of the balloting, Carter telephoned all three of them again.¹⁰

The conclusion of new treaties on the Panama Canal by the United States and their ratification by the Senate were the result of the courageous struggle of the Panamanian people for their sovereignty and independence. Speaking at a mass-meeting in Panama in 17 June on the occasion of the signing of the protocol on their ratification, the head of the Panamanian Government, O. Torrijos, said that this was a great victory for the Panamanian people, but he also stressed that the struggle was not over and that much remained to be done to achieve total political independence and self-sufficient economic development.

According to the majority of American commentators, the Senate's ratification of the new treaties on the Panama Canal represents an "important victory" for the Carter Administration. Moreover, this victory was won at a time when the President, whose popularity, according to public opinion polls, was hovering on a relatively low level, and his administration needed very much to demonstrate success in the area of foreign policy to the nation and to prove their ability to deal with Congress and attain the necessary decisions from it.

The discussion of the Panama Canal treaties in the Senate proved that individuals who will not accept the facts of contemporary international life and hang on to remnants of the colonial past still hold an extremely strong position in such an important link of the U.S. machinery of state as Congress. In essence, the balloting on the treaties was a kind of test of the Senate's ability to take a responsible approach to complex foreign policy issues. In the final analysis, even though the Senate passed this "test," as the results of the voting on the Panama treaties testify, it was only able to collect one vote more than the necessary two-thirds in favor of common sense and a realistic approach to contemporary events.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Congress and Foreign Policy--1975," Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 1976, p 171.
2. "Congress and Foreign Policy--1976," Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 1977, p 198.
3. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 24 February, p S3042.
4. For a more detailed discussion of the negotiations and the content of the new U.S.-Panama treaties, see: P. G. Litavrin, "United States-Panama Talks," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1977; Yu. V. Romantsov, "The Treaty Has Been Signed But the Problems Remain," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1977--Editor's note.

5. H. Humphrey, prominent and influential senator associated with the liberal wing and formerly U.S. vice-president (1965-1969), died in January 1978. The widow of the late senator--M. Humphrey--was appointed by the governor to take his place in the Senate.
6. TIME, 22 August 1977, p 21.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 September 1977.
8. Ibid., 14 April 1978.
9. TIME, 27 March 1978, p 33.
10. Ibid., 1 May 1978, p 27, 28.

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CSO: 1803

TECHNICAL AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 83-91

[Article by I. G. Morozov, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Utilization of Atomic Energy]

[Text] Starting with this issue of the journal, we will be publishing a translation of some chapters from the report "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," prepared by the American Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (S. Keeny, Chairman), sponsored by the Ford Foundation and published in the United States in book form. The chapters we are printing are abridged versions of A. I. Zhuravskaya's translation.

The introductory article by I. G. Morozov, deputy chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, provides some idea of the contents of the report as a whole and the significance of the issues it elucidates.

This book, or, more precisely, this report compiled by a group of American experts discusses the basic problems connected with the use of nuclear power production as an alternative source of energy and its role in the satisfaction of energy needs in the near and distant future.¹ The authors of the report, which consists of more than 400 pages, examine such issues as uranium reserves, the economics of nuclear power production, the safety of nuclear power stations and other installations involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, the effect of nuclear energy on nature and human health and others.

1. The author of this article uses the term "nuclear energy production," believing it to be more technically accurate than the term "atomic energy production" which is widely used in our popular science literature.

The analysis is conducted in the form of a comparison to analogous indicators for the traditional sources of energy which operate on natural fuel. Thermal stations operating on coal are regarded as this kind of source. The authors also judge the possibility and prospect of replacing traditional and nuclear energy sources with alternative sources--solar energy, geothermal energy and the energy produced by controlled thermonuclear synthesis.

Particular attention is devoted to the effect of the development of nuclear power production and technology on the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

To a certain and, apparently, substantial degree, the conclusions and recommendations in the report served as the basis of the "new energy policy" announced by U.S. President J. Carter in April 1977.

The report is based primarily on American references and examines all issues primarily in relation to the United States. In some cases, the authors nonetheless extend their conclusions and recommendations to other countries without sufficient grounds. In the case of such questions as, for example, the possibility of satisfying world energy requirements exclusively by means of mined fuel, the comparative economic indicators of the cost of energy from various sources and other questions, conclusions which may be correct for the United States cannot be applied to other nations, regardless of what the authors say.

On the other hand, such issues as environmental protection, the safety of nuclear power stations, the treatment of plutonium and radioactive waste and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons are largely common to all countries and, in connection with this, we feel that some chapters of the report will be of definite interest to the Soviet reader.

The authors of the report repeatedly stress the objectivity of their judgments and appear to have examined all of the "pros" and "cons" objectively in all stages of their research project. They must be given credit for this. They cite many facts and employ the results of studies conducted by other authors.

The report contains an essentially accurate account of the development of nuclear power production and the difficulties and problems requiring resolution. When the report is read more attentively, however, a definite purpose is quite apparent: To do everything possible to secure the United States' monopoly on nuclear power production in the Western world in the future. Upon verification, the "objectivity" turns out to be not all that objective.

All of the many issues connected with nuclear energy and its role in the near and distant future, which are the subject of both the report being reviewed and of recent quite intense debates in a number of countries, can conditionally be combined into three major issues.

The first is connected with resources of nuclear raw materials and the technically and economic capability of nuclear power engineering to satisfy energy needs. The second concerns the safety of nuclear enterprises (particularly the energy reactors) and their effect on the environment and on human health. The third is related to the estimation of the consequences of the development of nuclear energy production and its fuel cycle in light of the heightened potential danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives.

In respect to the first issue, studies conducted in many countries have conclusively proved, in spite of the authors' statements, that nuclear energy production has already reached a stage in which it can not only compete with, but also surpass, other types of energy in terms of the total group of factors including economy, reliability, safety and environmental effect, and that within the next 30-50 years, no alternative source of energy will be able to compete with nuclear power.

We completely share the authors' pessimistic view of the possible use of solar and geothermal energy in this century. The large-scale development and institution of solar energy production will require huge investments in the research and engineering of utilization methods and, what is even more important, according to the most optimistic estimates, solar and geothermal energy can only satisfy a negligible percentage of the need for energy, even in the distant future. As for cosmic solar energy production, this is too far off in the future to consider.

Controlled thermonuclear fusion (CTF), which will probably be scientifically demonstrated within the coming decade, is capable of satisfying world energy needs for a virtually unlimited period of time. It must be borne in mind, however, that, as the authors of the report correctly stress, it would not be realistic to expect industry to master CTF any earlier than the twenties of the next century, and the cost of this will, according to the authors' estimates, come to at least 20 billion dollars in the United States.

It should be added that a comparative technical and economic analysis of thermonuclear reactors and fast neutron breeders produces extremely close indicators for the two main characteristics of these energy sources: equivalent reserves of raw material (fuel) and environmental effects. At the same time, breeders have already reached a level of industrial readiness, and known and projected reserves of uranium and thorium can satisfy world energy needs for a century.

According to the authors of the report, there is still one alternative to nuclear energy production--the investment of sizeable amounts in the development of natural energy sources, mainly coal, to fill energy needs. It is the promising nature of this strategy that the authors of the report are trying to substantiate. They are assuming that coal will be able to compete with nuclear energy sources in terms of reserves and economic indicators

for an unlimited period of time and can be used as the basis for the new types of synthetic fuel that are supposed to replace oil and gas.

In principle, the maximum use of coal as a source of energy should be commended (on the condition that a satisfactory solution be found for ecological problems) and, naturally, it would be senseless to try to replace all traditional sources of energy with nuclear sources in the near future.

We cannot agree, however, with the authors' statements about the adequacy of world coal reserves and about the lower cost of completely solving world energy problems with the aid of coal. Estimates of known and projected reserves of bituminous coal and lignite vary noticeably, and these reserves are extremely unevenly distributed among different countries. According to the authors' data, 70-90 percent of all coal reserves are located in only three countries, including the United States.

Most of the countries in the world will have to develop nuclear energy production on a perceptible scale by the end of this century to maintain their power production on the necessary level.

The almost 25 years of experience in the operation of nuclear power stations has conclusively proved their economic and ecological superiority to coal thermoelectric stations. In fact, nuclear power engineering already accounts for a noticeable share of total energy production in a number of countries. For example, this share amounts to around 20 percent in Switzerland, 15 percent in England, 12 percent in the FRG and around 10 percent in the United States; the figure is close to 10 percent for the nations of the Common Market as a whole. Approximately the same indicators are characteristic of the GDR, Bulgaria, Japan, India and other countries.

Naturally, it must be borne in mind that when nuclear power engineering is developed on a large scale, its economy will depend largely on the organization of fuel recycling on the necessary scale and the industrial mastery of fast neutron breeders.

The authors of the report try to prove the direct opposite: the economic inexpediency of instituting fuel recycling and fast neutron breeders on an industrial scale in this century and even in the first decades of the next century.

Conclusions about the alleged economic futility of fuel recycling and breeders are based on the assumption that the prices of natural uranium and the cost of uranium enrichment will remain stable or even decrease by the end of this century, and that the virtually unlimited market of cheap uranium raw material, as well as the significant differences in capital expenditures on the construction of breeders and light water reactors in favor of the latter, will remain in existence throughout the period in question.

Current tendencies in the market for uranium raw materials and the service of uranium enrichment, however, are pointing to a significant rise in prices. As for the high cost of building breeders, we must admit that, in relation to the United States, it would be difficult to dispute this fact. But this situation arose as a result of the errors that were committed and the incorrect approach that was taken when certain technical problems in the breeders were being solved, particularly as a result of the underestimation of the importance of such factors as the "doubling time" and the creation of experimental industrial models of fast reactors.

The effectiveness and economy of breeders are directly related to the so-called doubling time--that is, the amount of time required for the plutonium in the reactor to reach double the amount of the original load. Breeders and a fuel cycle with a doubling time of around 8-10 years are being developed in the Soviet Union and a number of other countries. This will provide for the expanded development of nuclear energy production at a fairly rapid rate and without any significant external fuel make-up.

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that breeders and fuel recycling are costly undertakings with extremely complex technological processes and equipment, which can only be mastered by nations with extremely great technological and industrial potential. For this reason, undertakings of this kind are only economically justified if a definite, relatively high level of development is achieved in nuclear power engineering, and their industrial incorporation can evidently only be expediently accomplished on a joint international basis in strict accordance with the requirements of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In view of these circumstances, as well as the fact that corroboration of the technical justification for, and economic expediency of, the direct use of nuclear power in industrial technological processes can be expected quite soon, it would be difficult to agree with the authors' statements about the insignificant role that will be played by nuclear energy production in the economic and social life of society during the next few decades.

The role and place of nuclear energy production must be determined, in our opinion, with a view to its capabilities as a source of energy. The authors of the report restrict their examination to only one of its capabilities--the production of energy. But nuclear power engineering can serve as a primary source of energy for technological processes, such as the direct use of the heat of nuclear reactors to reduce iron, convert coal into gas and complete thermochemical and plasmochemical processes (to produce hydrogen and synthetic methanol).²

Nuclear power engineering can play an important role in heating and distilling sea water, particularly in those nations where a significant percentage of all energy is used for this purpose. Finally, the promising nature of the use of nuclear energy in shipping (atomic ice-breakers) has been established.

2. Methanol is a man-made fuel.

Considering the fact that the total energy used in the production of electric power and in technological processes in industry now accounts for 55-60 percent of all energy consumption in most countries, the expansion of the technical capabilities and spheres of application of nuclear energy production will obviously make significant adjustments in the conclusions in the report in regard to the economic assessment of the roles of nuclear energy and traditional sources of energy, in favor of the former.

Finally, it should be added that the shortage of energy sources will cause economic considerations to play a lesser role than the guarantee of energy supplies. Self-sufficiency in the area of energy constitutes an important element of the national policy of any country, and this must be taken into account when the role of nuclear energy production is being assessed.

The authors' recommendations are also made for a definite purpose: to attempt, by means of "U.S. authority," to impede the industrial mastery of, in particular, fast neutron reactors in other countries and to gain enough time in the competitive struggle against the other industrially developed countries to correct the United States' miscalculations in this area and to make up for its failure to keep up with the world level of development in this field.

These suppositions are also reinforced by the fact that although the United States announced the postponement of the industrial incorporation of breeders and rejected its plans to process irradiated fuel, virtually no change was made in the allocations, and they are quite sizeable (500-600 million dollars a year) for research and engineering work on breeders alone. Considerable amounts are also envisaged in the budget for the development of fuel processing technology and equipment. It should be added that the authors of the report prefer that nuclear energy production be developed on the basis of light water reactors--that is, the same reactors of which the United States is the world's biggest exporter.

Let us consider the second issue, which takes in all of the questions connected with the safety of operating nuclear installations and the ecological aspects of nuclear energy production and its fuel cycle. Various aspects of this problem are investigated quite thoroughly in the report: the safety of the nuclear power station and the radiation unit during the course of normal operations; the consequences of accidents; plutonium's effect on human health; questions connected with the processing and "burial" of radioactive waste, including the danger of environmental pollution, etc.

The political and social aspects of nuclear energy production are now so important that they necessitate objective comparison of all available data on the possible consequences of the operation of nuclear stations with analogous data for alternative energy sources, including coal, and require that the public be informed in detail of the results.

The population must take part in the discussion of the social aspects of nuclear energy production, but it should be stressed that qualified decisions, which take all sides and aspects of the problem into account, can only be obtained with the participation of specialists--physicists, technologists and workers in the nuclear industry.

This was the conclusion drawn by, in particular, the delegates to the international conference on nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, which was held in Salzburg (Austria) in 1977. A special discussion group on the acceptance of nuclear energy by the public widely debated the technical and social aspects of the problem. They were also debated at plenary sessions of the conference and a round table discussion. Different views were expressed on various issues, but the overwhelming majority of statements conclusively proved that nuclear power is the safest, most reliable and "cleanest" source of energy.

Unfortunately, the mass media in the West have done nuclear power and the population a disservice by publicizing information on nuclear energy that has been doubtful, erroneous and sometimes even deliberately distorted in the interest of certain circles.

The report contains a multitude of comparative statistical data and predictions about the harmful effects of the fuel cycles of nuclear and coal power stations of equal capacity on the human organism and on nature. The authors of the report underscore the insufficiency of factual data and the largely indefinite nature of the predictions. In some cases, they arbitrarily take the estimates of the harmful consequences of nuclear energy production cited in different scientific publications and multiply them by ten or a hundred, but even with this kind of biased approach, nuclear energy is almost invariably safer and "cleaner" than coal.

According to various estimates, the expected average frequency of fatalities among operational personnel and the population caused by a nuclear power station of 1 million kilovolts and all of its supporting fuel cycle enterprises will range from 0.6 to 1 case a year in comparison to 2-25 cases for a coal power station of the same capacity. Here it is important to point out the fact that the processing of fuel and the handling of plutonium only account for an insignificant share of this figure. The debates over plutonium in this connection are more emotional than rational.

The thermal effect of nuclear and coal power stations on nature is approximately the same. A system of strict sanitary norms and rules to regulate the decontamination and disposal of radioactive waste excludes virtually any possibility of its harmful effect on nature, whereas just the "hothouse effect" of coal power stations alone can cause irreversible climatic changes in the world with consequences that cannot even be estimated.

The following question may quite naturally come to the reader's mind: How has nuclear energy production, which only has a history spanning a quarter-century, turned out to be safer and "cleaner" than traditional power engineering. In our opinion, there are at least two reasons for this.

First of all, from the very beginning nuclear power engineering has been under public control to a degree unprecedented in the history of any other kind of technology. It is precisely for this reason that the biological effects of radioactivity have been thoroughly investigated and are now much more well known than the effects of the majority of other technological processes. Coal has been used for several hundred years as a source of energy, but accumulated experience did not produce quantitative data for an understanding of the consequences of the effect of combustion gases on the human organism and the environment. The situation is no better in the petrochemical industry and other branches.

Secondly, the atomic industry is one of the most automated branches, it has exceptionally highly qualified personnel and its work is strictly regulated by state law.

Nuclear power production is of minimal danger to human health and nature in comparison to other industrial energy sources, but it should be stressed that many complex and difficult problems remain unsolved to the present day. Nuclear energy must be handled "respectfully" as carelessness or any kind of negligence can have extremely severe consequences.

In connection with this, we would like to underscore the fact that the increase in the number of nuclear enterprises in the world will increase the danger of accidents and uncontrollable environment pollution. Solutions have not been found for all of the problems connected with the industrial processing, packing and disposal of the waste products of nuclear power stations and fuel cycle enterprises. For this reason, one of the essential conditions for the large-scale development of nuclear energy production should be the compulsory resolution of all issues connected with nuclear and radiation safety.

Finally, we must consider the third problem in nuclear power production, which is connected with the danger of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This, the most alarming aspect of the matter in recent years, has become even more crucial in connection with the increase in international terrorism.

The report contains a special section entitled "Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism." Issues involved in the development of nuclear energy production in connection with the problem of nonproliferation are also examined in the section entitled "Unsolved Problems."

The authors quite justifiably include units for the isotope separation of uranium, the processing of irradiated fuel and the release and recycling of plutonium among the more "sensitive" elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, from the standpoint of the possibility of creating a nuclear weapon.

As we have already pointed out, the authors' arguments about the economic inexpediency of the industrial development of these stages of the fuel cycle are unconvincing. It is much more complex and "crucial" to establish reliable limits on the uncontrollable spread of nuclear materials if the closed fuel cycle and breeder-reactors should be industrially incorporated in nuclear energy production.

The discovery of uranium fission and the possibility of making practical use of intranuclear energy was the greatest event of our age. But the energy of the atom, this grand achievement of human thought, can also be used and, unfortunately, is already being used as a weapon of destruction.

In principle, there is no direct connection between the development of nuclear energy production and the creation and proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is a well-known fact that the creation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives was unrelated to nuclear energy production. Moreover, we are deeply convinced that the problem of nonproliferation cannot be solved by stopping or restricting the development of nuclear power engineering.

It would be extremely dangerous, however, to close our eyes to the fact that the development of nuclear energy production at increasingly rapid rates, the significant increase in the quantity of fissionable materials and the number of countries having these materials in their possession, and the desire of many countries, even those that are not very developed in the industrial sense, to create enterprises of "sensitive technology" are increasing the potential danger that accumulated nuclear materials will be used to create a nuclear weapon.

Under present conditions, the problem of nuclear nonproliferation is of a universal, international nature, and its resolution will depend primarily on the political sphere.

We feel that a harmonious system of technical, organizational and political decisions should be worked out to not only make the further proliferation of nuclear weapons difficult, but also to reliably block all of the avenues of this proliferation, without impeding the development of nuclear energy production.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which applies to all states without exception, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency's effective system of safeguards, should serve as the basic universal instrument for the attainment of this vitally important objective. Unfortunately, not all of the countries possessing nuclear weapons, or

even countries with significant nuclear potential, have signed the treaty, and some of them have actually opposed it.

The stand taken by the non-nuclear countries of EURATOM, delaying the implementation of control agreements with the IAEA, has not contributed to the reinforcement of nonproliferation regulations or faith in nuclear energy. The latest dates agreed upon with the IAEA for working out the procedures and methods of control have passed, but the agency is still unable to practice this control effectively. And this is not due to differences of opinion on technical details in the organization of control, but to the serious political issue of trust and security in relations between states. International cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot develop without effective control by the IAEA.

Although the authors of the report correctly point out the dangers connected with the development of nuclear energy production, they shyly say nothing about the fact that the race for nuclear arms presents the greatest threat to peace and security. It is difficult to convince a country of the need for restraint in nuclear energy production while simultaneously announcing the creation of the neutron bomb. It is difficult to combine discussions about the danger of nuclear energy with stubborn reluctance to cooperate with the Soviet Union in its efforts to curb the nuclear arms race.

The system of political agreements must be reinforced by organizational and technical decisions which will reduce the risk of the uncontrolled diversion of nuclear materials to pursue goals that are incompatible with peace and security. The international program for appraising the nuclear fuel cycle, which now involves more than 40 nations and international organizations, should aid in working these decisions.

The inclusion of such technically attainable processes in the nuclear fuel cycle, such as, for example, deeper fuel burnup in light water reactors (for the purpose of accumulating large quantities of even isotops of plutonium), the processing of irradiated fuel without the separation of uranium and plutonium, the in-plant preliminary irradiation of fresh fuel and other processes, in conjunction with a number of organizational measures (the elaboration and institution of an international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, equipment and shipments, a coordinated export policy in regard to nuclear materials), will contribute to the successful resolution of the problem of nonproliferation.

Nuclear exports might turn out to be one of the possible channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, for this reason, they are now transcending the boundaries of pure commerce and are becoming an important political issue.

As we know, the group of nations exporting nuclear materials, equipment and technology has worked out a set of guiding principles for nuclear exports, stipulating that export services can only be offered to non-nuclear

countries on the absolute condition of official assurance by the government of the importing nation that imported materials, equipment and technology specified in the so-called basic list will not be used for the creation or production of nuclear explosives. In our opinion, these guiding principles should logically conclude with the acceptance by all exporting nations of the principle of control over all of the importing nation's peaceful nuclear activity as a condition for the delivery of any materials, equipment and technology included in this list.

The current significance of an international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials is connected with, in addition to all else, the need to block all channels for their utilization for the purpose of blackmail and terrorism.

Although the creation and use of nuclear explosives by terrorist forces constitute an exceptionally complex technical task, the possibility of this danger cannot be excluded. We also cannot forget such incidents as the "disappearance" of a ship carrying 200 tons of uranium in 1968, the secret shipment of approximately 50 kilograms of enriched uranium to Israel by the American Apollo firm (in Pennsylvania), etc. All of this testifies to the exceptional importance of administrative and technical measures to dramatically reduce the risk of the theft of fissionable materials or acts of sabotage at atomic industry enterprises and during shipment.

Multinational regional fuel cycle centers under the effective control of the IAEA might serve as one of the factors contributing to the resolution of the problem of nonproliferation during the development of nuclear energy production. The plans worked out by the agency for these centers provide for the satisfaction of the energy needs of a large group of nations and for the simultaneous localization and reliable monitoring of the more dangerous consequences of nuclear energy production.

In summation, it should be noted once again that the authors of the report have performed a great deal of important work in the analysis of the contemporary state of nuclear energy production and have underscored the more crucial problems requiring resolution. Many of the authors' conclusions apply to other nations as well as the United States, but we cannot agree with some conclusions and recommendations.

The main difference of opinion concerns the ways and means of reliably closing off all channels for the further spread of nuclear weapons. We believe that the development of nuclear energy production in the world should be combined to the fullest extent with the reinforcement of non-proliferation regulations. This is more important today than ever before and is directly connected with preserving peace and security and reducing the danger of nuclear war.

In a congratulatory message to the 21st anniversary session of the General Conference of the IAEA, L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "Supporting the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy, the Soviet Union is filled with firm determination to work with other states in the thorough reinforcement of the international regulations for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.... The issue of establishing reliable deterrents to the spread of nuclear weapons and preventing the danger of nuclear war is more crucial now than ever before."

It is precisely in this direction that the Soviet Union is concentrating its efforts.

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CSO: 1803

NUCLEAR POWER: ISSUES AND CHOICES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 91-100

[First installment of Russian translation of chapters from "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices. Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group," sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY (DIVISION OF SCIENTIFIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 101-110

[Article by V. R. Gyul'misarov]

[Text] The results of many studies have shown that the managers of research subdivisions of large firms spend a great deal of their working day (up to 40-60 percent) on administrative organizational work. At the same time, one of the bottlenecks in management in many cases is the low level of fundamental research management, the inadequate quality of forecasts, analytical decisions and so forth.

American theoreticians and practical workers concerned with the organization of scientific research are trying to find organizational forms that will go a long way toward partially solving these problems. The greatest interest in this, naturally, has been displayed by American firms with large research centers. In these firms the search is going on for organizational forms that will relieve scientific supervisors of the functions of administrative management and the organization of economic and technical services.

An analysis of the practice of research and development management in American industrial corporations proves that the corporate managerial staff must constantly search for new ways of utilizing and encouraging research personnel for the purpose of keeping research and development at a high level of efficiency. Above all, this involves the creation of the necessary conditions (organizational, in particular) for the full and effective utilization of specialists; secondly, it calls for material incentives and, thirdly, it involves the investigation and consideration of various motivation factors.

In connection with this, two tendencies in the practice of research and development management would seem to be significant: On the one hand, particularly on the higher and middle levels, responsibility and authority are shared by scientific supervisors and administrators, while on the other--on the middle and lower levels, attempts are being made to create the necessary organizational conditions for the effective utilization of scientists and engineers without transferring them to administrative jobs. The first of these tendencies will be examined in this article.¹

Industrial Research and Development as an Object of Management

Until a relatively short time ago, three basic phases were traditionally seen in the production cycle in American business: production, sales and finances. Under the influence of the technological revolution, however, the scales and role of intrafirm research and development have grown to such a degree that they have become one of the principal factors contributing to the development of a firm equal in significance to other corporate functions. Suffice it to say that industrial firms allocated around 17.2 billion dollars in 1977 for research and development.² Besides this, there has been a noticeable rise in the percentage accounted for by research and development in total production expenditures.

As a result, the firm has a new object of management of exceptional complexity and clearly defined distinguishing features. This largely determines the goals, duties and functions of managerial bodies and is the reason for the origination of independent organizational forms, within the framework of which research and development are carried out.

Experience has shown that the main factor affecting the volume of research and development financing on the level of corporations and firms is the desire to obtain high day-to-day profits and to retain competitive ability in the market. An important role is also played by market demand.³ These factors determine the strategy and tactics of corporations, the ultimate goals of their research subdivisions and the procedures for distributing research and development funds and choosing the subject matter and purpose of research projects.

In view of the fact that the primary objective of private corporations has been and is a high profit level, the main strategic goal of their research centers and laboratories is also the maximization of profits. This goal, as an analysis of the activities of many research organizations in industrial firms has shown,⁴ is attained mainly through the improvement of existing products, technological processes and materials and the development of new types of commodities, methods, materials, equipment and technological processes. In addition to this, the activities of corporate centers and laboratories are aimed at the acquisition and augmentation of knowledge (inventions, discoveries, patents, laws and theories); the discovery of new methods and areas for the use of existing products, processes or equipment; the creation of opportunities for the use of by-products or waste-products created during the modern production process; the improvement of product quality and the reduction of overhead costs; the performance of technological services for the functional departments of corporations or the consumer; and the study and analysis of competitors' products.

According to the data of the economic division of the McGraw-Hill Publications Company, in 1975, expenditures on the improvement of existing products amounted to 48 percent of all expenditures on research and development in industry, the development and manufacture of new types of commodities accounted for 37 percent, and the development of new technological processes

accounted for 15 percent.⁵ In 1977 there was an even greater increase in the proportional share of expenditures on the improvement of existing commodities--59 percent of total research and development costs in the private sector (which came to 27.8 billion dollars in allocations from the firm's funds and the federal budget).⁶ At the same time, the proportion allocated for the development of new products was 28 percent and only 13 percent of this sum was allocated for the development of new technological processes.⁷ These data attest to a marked tendency toward increase in allocations for the improvement of previously developed products, and not for the development of new items, as was the case before the beginning of the 1970's. Capitalist firms are displaying obvious reluctance to risk and spend funds on long-range programs and the development of new types of commodities.⁸ This testifies to the pragmatism of the commercial policy of industrial monopolies, which is largely aimed directly at the market. As a rule, the majority of firms are only interested in research and development projects which promise fairly quick results.

It is important, however, to note that, at a time when allocations for research and development are constantly increasing, only the large corporations with a strong material and technical base, tremendous financial resources, large research and development staffs and the potential to acquire costly equipment and computers can conduct research and engineering projects on a significant scale. The huge numbers of small and medium-sized firms, however, depend totally in most cases on monopolistic associations; they fill the orders of the latter and their independence is purely formal.

The following data can be used to illustrate this tendency toward the concentration of research and development in the larger corporations. In 1976, 33 percent of all expenditures in this area were made by ten firms. That same year, two firms spent more than 1 billion dollars on research and development for the first time (1.01 billion in the case of IBM and 1.25 billion in the case of General Motors).⁹ In January 1977, RESEARCH MANAGEMENT published data which indicated that 31 companies were responsible for more than 60 percent of all expenditures on research and development in industry. Besides this, while most of the major innovations of the 1953-1966 period were to the credit of small firms with a staff of less than 1,000, the main discoveries of the 1967-1973 period belonged to large corporations (employing 10,000 or more).¹⁰

In recent years there has been an increasingly distinct tendency toward more rigid conditions for the financing of research programs and the efficient and more intensive use of available technological potential. For this reason, private industrial corporations are giving more and more serious attention to the study and improvement of the organization of the very process by which new technical equipment is developed and put in operation and the management of this process. It is precisely the management of the entire process of scientific research that is among the major management objectives of the firm of the 1970's.

At present, due to the increasing complexity and rising cost of research and development projects, their impact depends largely on the selection, evaluation and dynamic, flexible control of these projects. The firm's success is already being decided during the stage of competition in research and development, preceding competition in production. The constantly rising expenditures on research and development, the growing complexity of the technological problems being solved and the use of costly equipment require that research projects be carefully planned and organized and effectively controlled with a view to maximum productivity. Besides this, the need for management in this sphere is also dictated by the presence of large staffs of scientists and engineers, whose work must be supervised.

The effective utilization of scientific personnel, however, is an extremely complex matter. For this reason, high-level administrators in U.S. firms and corporations have always devoted attention to the search for new efficient ways of solving this problem. In particular, this has been the reason for the growing interest during the last few years in the study of "human factors" and the interrelations between management and scientific research personnel. The rapid development and growing complexity of science and technology have led to a situation in which the effective resolution of technological problems is no longer within the power of a single individual and calls for the concerted efforts of groups of specialists. It is therefore not surprising that questions of personnel and personnel policy in this sphere have invariably been a matter of particular concern to U.S. capital from the very moment the first industrial laboratories came into being.

A comprehensive legal-organizational system for the training, screening and employment of scientific personnel has been developed and is functioning in the United States. At the same time, "the growth of the army of hired scientific labor is causing laboratories and experimental production units to evolve into a field for conflicts between intellectual labor and capital. The irrevocable process of the class differentiation of the technical intelligentsia is occurring."¹¹

As V. I. Lenin wrote, "capitalism is taking away more and more of the intellectual's independence and is turning him into a dependent hireling."¹² At any time, capital can quite "legally" throw him out of the laboratory. This was the case at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. A survey involving 242 companies in various branches of industry established the fact that 113 firms (47 percent) reduced the size of their research and development staffs between 1968 and 1971.¹³ In general, during the 1970-1975 period the number of scientists and engineers working in the laboratories of private American industrial firms decreased, as RESEARCH MANAGEMENT noted, by approximately 12 percent.¹⁴

The scientific personnel of American industrial companies can be divided into three main categories depending on the role they play in the process of research and development and the functions they perform: supervisors,

professional researchers and developers, and technical employees, including all auxiliary personnel from technicians and laboratory assistants to typists. Of all the scientists and engineers engaged in research in the United States, 30 percent are administrators.¹⁵

Administration is one of the elements of research and development management. This type of work has acquired increasing significance in recent years, and by the beginning of the 1970's many companies had begun to open separate administrative departments or subdepartments. For example, a "department of administrative services" was created in the research laboratory of General Motors, an "administration department" was opened by Standard Oil of Indiana, and in the Rameau Wooldridge branch of the TRW Corporation these functions are performed by an "administrative finance department."¹⁶ Sometimes these departments are camouflaged behind a sign saying "auxiliary technical subdivision." Nonetheless, the appearance of administrative subdivisions in the capacity of independent structural units testifies to the growing role they are playing in the process of research and development management.

The significance of administrative activity cannot be underestimated in large organizations. Although it may seem auxiliary at first glance in relation to the basic content of scientific research, it nonetheless represents a vitally important mechanism which promotes efficient work by specialists dealing with complex technological problems. The main objective of administrators is to guarantee effective management at a minimum cost. Dean D. Karger of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute's School of Business Administration and Professor R. Murdick of the University of Florida stress that the basic principle underlying administrative activity in scientific laboratories should be "the facilitation of the work of scientists and engineers in the area of administrative problems, even if this means more work for the staff of the administrative department."¹⁷

Opportunities for Specialization

An examination of all the problems actually dealt with by the managers of research subdivisions allows us to single out two large groups of functions--scientific procedural supervision (including direct participation in the research process) and organizational administrative activity connected with the provision of scientific subdivisions with supplies and services. In turn, the entire group of administrative functions can be represented as two basic types of activity: administrative control and the supervision of organizational and technical services (see Table).¹⁸

Basic Functions of Administration

- a) Administrative control
- 1. General administrative supervision
 - Long-range planning for major fields of research and development
 - Compilation of new research programs
 - Short-range planning (selection and approval of individual projects, distribution of assignments, review of completed projects)
 - Coordination of plans and projects with organizational objectives and policy and sources of financing


- Creation and maintenance of normal creative atmosphere and businesslike interrelations
2. Personnel matters
 3. Policy-planning budgets and reports (on projects)
 - Compilation of budget for projects
 - Monthly reports on expenditures
 - Special analysis and reports for project supervisors
 4. Coordination of reports
 5. Contracts and bids
 - Control over price and cost bids
 - Coordination of demand for specialists with more interesting bids
 - Organization of meetings with preparatory and department directors during concluding stages of programs to establish demand for resources, draw up final reports, set dates for subsequent projects, etc.
- b) Services and material and technical maintenance
1. Office buildings and equipment
 2. Property
 3. Clerical services (secretaries, stenographers, etc.)
 4. Informational services
 5. Control over supply system (warehousing, supply operations, overhead cost budgets)
 6. Transportation
 7. Guard services
 8. Computer-aided data processing
 9. Drafting and graphic services
 10. Services connected with copying, duplicating and filling out technical documents
 11. Public relations

Compiled according to: J. Walters, Op. cit., p 218; C. Heyel, Op. cit., p 275; W. Mayhall, "Corporate Research and Development Administration," AMA, 1970, pp 58-59; "The Science of Managing Organized Technology," New York, 1970, p 1313; RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, July 1972, pp 38-39; January 1974, pp 35-36; May 1975, p 36.

Naturally, the distribution of these groups of functions of scientific and administrative management varies in different organizations. This is understandable since, just as other objects of management, scientific research projects are affected by the environment and the organizational conditions under which they are carried out. When a decision is being made on the distribution of functions, consideration must be given, for example, to the dimensions and structure of corporations, the types of commodities they produce, the scales of research and development, the type of corporate management and the effectiveness of intrafirm communication and coordination. Besides this, consideration must also be given to such characteristics as the unique nature of the research process, its importance to industrial production and the connection between research and profits.

The duties of the supervisor of a single project or a relatively small number of projects differ greatly from the duties of the administration of any large laboratory in which it is necessary to organize and coordinate the activities of many different subdivisions. The type of management frequently depends on the composition of the group. For example, when fundamental or applied studies are being conducted, the group consists of prominent scientists and specialists representing various scientific fields; this kind of group also includes a smaller group of auxiliary personnel. A supervisor with a scientific specialty is obviously called for in this case. Conversely, in an extremely structured organization (for example, during the stage of experimental design projects, when the number of "routine" operations increases), where an administrative system of accounting and reporting with procedural supervisors is the norm, an administrative supervisor is also needed to effectively control the fulfillment of requirements by research personnel or to solve various administrative problems for the personnel.

There are no ready-made recipes for the best division of technological supervision and administrative duties. The general premise is that the administrative duties of the organization manager take up more and more of his time as the organization grows in size. The supervisor of a group, for example, can concentrate almost totally on the resolution of scientific and technical problems. The supervisor of a sector is also mainly engaged in the resolution of scientific problems, but part of his time must be spent on coordinating the work of his sector with that of other sectors; he may also have minor administrative duties. The supervisor of a department spends a great deal of his time coordinating its work with the programs of other departments of the laboratory or company. He must see to it that the research conducted in his department corresponds to the general goals of the laboratory and, in addition, must perform several extremely diverse administrative functions. The director of the research service spends almost all of his time on managerial activity and has very little to do with purely scientific or technical matters. The differences in the time expenditures of supervisors on various levels are shown in the diagram.



Working Time Expenditures of Supervisors on Various Levels

The Need for Specialization

The increasing volume and growing complexity of industrial research and development projects have contributed much to the rising number of jobs for supervisors of research subdivisions. They must devote most of their attention to the supervision of all research programs, the selection of projects, the compilation of plans and proposals, the evaluation of research findings and the coordination of research activity. In view of the heavy workload of the supervisors of large research subdivisions in connection with their major function (scientific procedural supervision), they have little time to deal with problems of an organizational administrative nature, even if they have the necessary qualifications and the desire to concern themselves with these matters. For this reason, corporations are transferring (delegating) a significant part of all directorial work to other supervisors who are capable of assuming responsibility for administrative or commercial aspects. This is the situation in which types of managerial activity are divided with the gradual emergence of a new and separate function--the function of scientific administrative specialists who have attained a certain level of training and qualifications.

"Current tendencies in the organization of industrial research," writes W. Mayhall, administrative director of the missile system division of the Atlantic Research Corporation, "indicate that there will be a constant increase in the demand for specialized administrative mastery."¹⁹ The growing complexity of scientific problems will be accompanied by increasingly complex administrative duties.

Administrative activity is becoming a more clearly separate function in the corporate research centers which conduct most of their research projects at the request of other companies or government agencies. In most cases, projects in these centers are conducted by quite sizeable groups of scientists and engineers (hundreds or even thousands of researchers). Under these conditions, the demand for administrative specialists is quite clear.

A study conducted by the American Management Association (AMA) established the fact that the directors of research services were greatly aided in their work by administrative subdivisions in 58 percent of the companies involved in the study. Many of the remaining 42 percent of directors, however, were concerned with administrative matters as well as scientific and technical problems. The most conflicting views were expressed in regard to the need to divide these functions.

Moreover, American experts stress the fact that this kind of organizational change will require thorough preliminary study of the responsibility and authority of the directors and administrators of research and development services.²⁰ Many managers of research subdivisions, however, believe that "administrative and scientific procedural supervision should be more or less separate if the company is large enough to allow for this."²¹

A more specific comment was made on this subject by E. Reeves, famous American expert on research and development management: "If the scientific group is relatively small and is not made up of more than, for example, 50 specialists, it can be managed without further decentralization. The matter is completely different in the case of large groups, for which decentralization and the introduction of an administrative position are essential."²²

At the same time, administration is not only essential when large projects are being conducted. The entire matter depends on the specific situation. For example, W. Mayhall points out: "Whether a supervisor is responsible for a laboratory with a staff of 10 or a scientific center with up to 1,000 specialists, his most important function is the organization of scientific research. Even in those cases when the director of a small laboratory is capable of independently dealing with all minor administrative matters, he would probably be able to perform research work more effectively if he had an administrative assistant to aid him in this work."²³

Nonetheless, despite the attempts being made by some managers to ignore the difference between managerial activity and purely administrative functions (this is particularly seen in smaller organizations), it is clear that this difference not only exists, but also, according to a number of American experts, "can (if it is not taken into account) become a permanent cause of complications of all types."²⁴

The planning of scientific and technical activity, its supervision and its coordination with corporate goals call for maximal attention, energy and mastery on the part of the directors of research organizations. In this kind of situation, every hour spent on other goals reduces operational efficiency.

The creation of the job of administrative assistant or aide only confirms the fact that the management of many companies is quite aware of the need for this kind of division of spheres of influence between the director and the administrator. But it should also be noted that the economic side of the matter has always been the main reason for this decision in most cases. The fact is that the director of the research service generally earns approximately twice as much each year as the administrator. Consequently, each hour of work performed by the administrator instead of the director costs only half as much. The actual gain in terms of efficiency, however, is much greater, since every hour of administrative work that is removed from the director's schedule can be used by him for scientific work.

Therefore, singling out administrative functions as a separate element is necessitated by a number of objective causes, of which the primary ones are the growing complexity of scientific research and the resulting higher demands made on the work of the supervisors of research subdivisions, as well as the desire of companies to make more efficient use of scientific personnel and thereby increase the return on each dollar spent on research.

Decentralization of the supervision of day-to-day work, however, does not signify the total independence of administrators. The director of research services, who makes decisions on all major questions of research and development management, not only supervises the activity of administrators, but also assigns them certain tasks (mostly of an accounting nature). But this does not mean that the scientific supervisor usurps part of the authority of the administrator; he does not give him detailed instructions on how he should perform his work, but only evaluates the results of this work.

Division of Functions

The delineation of the separate administrative function in research and development management is also reflected in the organizational structure of research and development services. Various organizational forms for the division of scientific and administrative supervision are possible, depending on the size of research subdivisions, the type of research conducted, the position of the subdivisions in the organizational hierarchy of the company and a number of other factors. In some cases, specialized administrative subdivisions are created; in others, administrative functions are combined with, for example, technical services; and in still others, administrative affairs are made the responsibility of one or two researchers.

The organizational structure of administrative services is usually relatively rigid and precise, while rigid structures are more often the exception to the rule in research subdivisions.

For example, in the research laboratory of General Motors, one of the largest American concerns, the organizational structure of which is typical of many large industrial laboratories, the entire service complex is divided into four groups: fundamental research, applied studies, development, and technical and administrative services. The supervisors of these groups are subordinate to a manager responsible for the organization of laboratory research. He, in turn, is accountable to the vice president in charge of research and development. The organizational structure of this laboratory is characterized by linear administrative ties, while scientific ties are not delineated. This is made particularly apparent by the somewhat separate position of the director in charge of scientific affairs, who must perform advisory functions and coordinate research activity within the corporate framework, but is not directly involved in the supervision of research.

The major role in structures of this kind is played by researchers and developers, who conduct fundamental and applied studies as well as experimental design projects. These specialists are hired and promoted in strict accordance with their academic titles and job qualifications.

Similar managerial systems are used by other companies. As an example, we could cite the system of research organization in the Upjohn pharmaceutical firm, in which administrative functions are clearly separate from research activity and, accordingly, a "research and development planning and

"administration" department has been created in addition to functional research subdivisions. Questions which must be decided by the director (supervisor) of this department include personnel hiring and placement, financial accounts and control, the rendering of services to research personnel, and the processing and analysis of operational information on the activities of the entire pharmaceutical research and development division of the firm. The supervisor of the department is under the direct jurisdiction of the vice president in charge of research and development.²⁵

An analysis of the mechanism governing the division of responsibilities among scientific and administrative supervisors of research subdivisions indicates two basic methods used by American industrial corporations for this division: a) the maximal concentration of administrative functions on one of the higher levels; b) their distribution among the main subdivisions.

In the first case (which is less typical), the job of vice president in charge of scientific affairs is created in companies. He is assigned some of the functions of the research laboratory director. In this case, the vice president is responsible for the status of all laboratory projects and for the maintenance of satisfactory ties between the laboratory and other company departments. He, in turn, assigns responsibility for the supervision of scientific activity in the laboratory to its director. The division of functions between these managers might be different, but the vice president generally concentrates on matters concerning the activities of the company as a whole, while the laboratory director concentrates on the fulfillment of research and development plans in the laboratory.

In the last 10 years, however, corporations have more frequently solved this problem by another method, which has become more widespread: They create the position of an administrative assistant (with any job title, which mainly depends on the size of the organization--in the larger companies, the administrators have a more important title and more practical experience).²⁶ This assistant assumes the responsibility of dealing with procedural and clerical problems and controls the fulfillment of the plan and the performance of informational services by technical personnel.

The supervisor of a laboratory can have one or several assistants who are not assigned permanent administrative or scientific duties and who serve as the director's advisers and representatives. These assistants might concern themselves with scientific and technical problems, perform some of the tasks involved in coordinating the activities of the laboratory and other company subdivisions or assist the laboratory supervisor in the resolution of various administrative problems.

By relieving the supervisor of administrative problems, the assistants serve as a kind of "filter" of incoming information in any form (written correspondence or verbal statements).

Another extremely important duty of the assistant is to reduce the number of "critical" situations to a minimum. These are usually connected with interrelations with personnel in other subdivisions. Typical recurring situations include requests for financial support, clients' questions, job applications, offers of services, request to tour the laboratory, invitations to speak at functions, proposals of collaboration, etc.

When we study the activities of administrators of research subdivisions, we can single out the three most important functions in their work. The first is budgeting and the supervision of financial affairs, representing one of the major duties of administrators; they must know what money is being spent on, where it is coming from and how much is available on hand. The second is a group of functions consisting of office work and the supervision of accounting procedures, as well as the acquisition of materials and the supplementation of warehouse stocks. The third is the creation of a corporate system of reports on large projects, which permits daily operational control over financial expenditures and the fulfillment of research programs, as well as timely response to unforeseen deviations from financial plans.

Besides this, from time to time administrators must convince "emotional" employees to fulfill plans and adhere to set budgets. In addition, the administrator in a research organization must be able to maintain control without all of the restricting formalities and instructions used by the administration of production subdivisions.

Some researchers have also mentioned the desire of many laboratories to concentrate administrative work as much as possible in the hands of a special group, headed by the laboratory supervisor's assistant in charge of administrative affairs. Department heads must monitor the observance of rules which have been set by the supervisor or his assistant for the entire laboratory. This system has proved to be effective, and for large laboratories it is probably the only acceptable way of making the fullest use of the scientific abilities and experience of supervisory personnel.

Administrative Subdivisions

While the director's assistant in charge of administrative affairs relieves the supervisor of the responsibility of dealing with day-to-day operational matters and permits him to give more attention to strategic problems, the activities of administrative subdivisions are intended to serve scientists and engineers and to establish the kind of creative atmosphere that will heighten the impact of the labor of research personnel.

In large scientific centers and laboratories, each of the basic types of administrative activities can require one employee (or, possibly, even more), while in the smaller organization, each can be responsible for a group of functions (for example, one person can be responsible for operations, personnel, equipment and auxiliary services; a second can assist the administrator in scheduling functions; a third can manage technical publication services). Naturally, other combinations are also possible. In turn,

each of the basic types of activity listed above can be divided into elements which will be characteristic of a specific field of activity or type of service.

The most typical auxiliary services supervised by the administrator in research subdivisions are: centralized experimental stations (or laboratories), computer centers, technical publication offices, drafting offices, duplicating laboratories and informational subdivisions (technical libraries, technical information recovery groups, document libraries).

In certain cases, it would probably be wise to transfer some research and development functions to other subdivisions. In these cases, the role of the administration of the research and development service would consist in ensuring the rapid transmission of the necessary information to these subdivisions. Computer-based data systems would be widely used in this system.

In summation, we can conclude that the desire of firms to heighten the impact of research and development is reflected to a significant degree precisely in the personnel policy of research services.

FOOTNOTES

1. Questions connected with the use of scientists and engineers without transferring them to administrative positions are examined, in particular, in the article entitled "Scientific Research Management: Scientists or Managers?" (EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIIA PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTVA, No 1, 1977, pp 112-121)--Editor's note.
2. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, September 1977, p 3.
3. For example, quoting from the journal SCIENCE, J. Lewis, director of the program for evaluating experimental technology in the U.S. National Bureau of Standards, says that market factors are of tremendous significance for innovations, since "around 60-80 percent of the major innovations in the most varied branches of industry were a response to market requirements and demands" (RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, January 1977, p 14).
4. J. Walters, "Research Management: Principles and Practice," Washington, 1965, pp 42, 44; D. Roman, "Research and Development Management: The Economics and Administration of Technology," New York, 1968, p 18; RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, September 1973, p 10; July 1975, pp 2-3, 24.
5. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, July 1975, p 2.
6. Ibid., September 1977, p 3.
7. BUSINESS WEEK, 27 June 1977, p 63.

8. This has also been pointed out by American experts. In particular, R. Heckert, senior vice president of the duPont Corporation, reported in November 1976 that while 10 years ago the corporation was working on 34 new items, on which 25 percent of the entire research and development budget was being spent, now the number of new projects has decreased sharply and their cost does not exceed 10 percent of all research and development allocations. Moreover, in the future the improvement of products in fields already mastered by the firm will call for more than three-fourths of the entire research and development budget, and not two-thirds as in the past (CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, 1977, vol 55, No 3, pp 12-15).
9. The first "ten," in order of absolute research and development expenditures, are General Motors, IBM, Ford, American Telephone and Telegraph, General Electric, duPont, United Technologies, Eastman Kodak, Chrysler and International Telephone and Telegraph. It is interesting to note that Gulf Oil, which is the last company on the list of the 50 firms with the largest expenditures on research and development, annually spends around 64 million dollars (SCIENCE NEWS, 1977, vol III, No 25, p 392).
10. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, January 1977, p 17.
11. "SShA: promyshlennyye korporatsii i nauchnyye issledovaniya" [The United States: Industrial Corporations and Scientific Research], Moscow, 1975, p 141.
12. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 209.
13. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, March 1973, p 10.
14. Ibid., September 1977, p 5.
15. Ibid., January 1974, p 4.
16. J. Walters, Op. cit., p 217.
17. D. Karger and R. Murdick, "Managing Engineering and Research," 1969, p 384.
18. C. Heyel, "Handbook of Industrial Research Management," 1968, p 275; "The Science of Managing Organized Technology," 1970, p 1313; RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, July 1972, pp 38-39; May 1975, p 36.
19. W. Mayhall, Op. cit., p 15.

20. In view of the fact that the dividing line between scientific and technical supervision and administrative control is most clearly seen on the highest level of the administrative staff of research subdivisions, more attention is given in this article to the examination and analysis of the activities of the director (supervisor) and administrator (assistant in charge of administrative affairs) of the research and development service.
21. W. Mayhall, Op. cit., p 28.
22. E. Reeves, "Management of Industrial Research," New York, 1967, p 84.
23. W. Mayhall, Op. cit., p 15.
24. Ibid., p 16.
25. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, January 1974, p 36.
26. W. Mayhall, Op. cit., p 27; RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, January 1974, p 35; May 1975, p 33.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Election Campaigns and Voter Registration

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 111-113

[Review by I. A. Kedrenovskaya of the books "Regulation of Political Campaigns--How Successful?" Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, 60 pages; "Participation in American Presidential Nominations, 1976" by A. Ranney, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, 37 pages; and "Election Day Registration. The Minnesota and Wisconsin Experience in 1976" by R. G. Smolka, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, 69 pages]

[Text] Widespread debates have begun in the United States over the need to revise the nation's present electoral system. This has been due to the yearly decline in the activity of American voters, who have ceased to believe that their vote will have any influence on the course of political life in the United States. The Watergate scandal and the subsequent series of revelations involving incidents of corruption during all stages of the electoral process demonstrated the gross violation of democratic principles in elections. It is not surprising that this undermined the Americans' faith in the moral qualities of politicians occupying high-level government posts. These revelations have led to much more pointed criticism of the electoral system as a whole by public representatives, political scientists and even government officials themselves. President Carter, whose main campaign slogan concerned the restoration of public trust in authority, sent Congress proposals on electoral reform within 2 months after his inauguration. Now these proposals are being widely discussed in the United States' highest legislative body and are naturally the center of attention for national mass media.

The three brochures being reviewed have been compiled and published by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and represent analyses of various aspects of the electoral process: campaign financing, the role and organization of primary elections and the voter registration procedure.

More than 2 years ago the U.S. Congress passed a law on federal campaign financing and later adopted a number of amendments to this law. This new legislation was supposed to limit the funds received by candidates from private sources and thereby somewhat diminish the influence of the wallet on the outcome of elections and curb the rise in campaign spending. According to the new law, partial federal financing of the presidential campaigns was instituted for the first time in American history. The efficacy of the legislation during the campaign of 1976 is the topic of the first brochure. It is a transcript of a round table discussion involving authoritative experts on election law: former Senator Eugene McCarthy, Republican Congressman John Anderson, a member of the House of Representatives since 1960, Yale law Professor Ralph Winter and Vice-Chairman Fred Wertheimer of the famous public organization "Common Cause."

"We had reached a point at which the presidency was being auctioned off to the highest bidder, when the question of ambassadorial appointments was a question of money rather than professional skill, when political decisions depended just as much on the ability to invest funds in a campaign to buy influence as on other factors," stated Wertheimer, who had been fighting for a law on federal campaign financing for a long time (p 5).

The conversation is in the form of a heated debate because the participants have different opinions of the value of the law itself and its efficacy during the course of the campaign. Eugene McCarthy, who was against the law even when he was in the Senate, pointedly criticized it mainly for the obvious advantages it offers to the candidates of the two major parties. The rules stipulated in the new law for federal Treasury financing virtually deprive any other candidate of an equal chance at the nomination. And this is occurring in a nation where "one-third of the population does not register Republican or Democrat," he said (p 34). McCarthy is basing this on his own experience. He, as we know, was an independent candidate for the presidency in the 1976 election and was not given any kind of federal funds whatsoever. As for the main purpose of the law--to combat corruption--McCarthy is certain that it is not doing anything to solve this problem because the campaign contributions of pressure groups demanding certain types of policy in exchange represent an even more dangerous form of corruption than private contributions.

Professor Winter also discussed the much greater role played by pressure groups in recent elections. He cited an extremely eloquent fact: In recent campaigns, the nation's largest labor organization, the AFL-CIO, has sent out 75 million pieces of mail, made 10 million telephone calls, carried out 2 million computer operations and made a multitude of other expenditures of this type which were not regarded as a monetary contribution or donation.

The question of congressional campaigns was given special attention during the course of the debate. Participants sharply criticized the present state of affairs. They noted that the outcome of these elections depends totally on private contributions, which increased significantly in 1976. Documented proof was provided for the fact that, after restrictions had been imposed on

private financing of presidential campaigns, the funds offered by "interest groups" were diverted to congressional campaigns (p 6). In connection with this, the need to extend the law to elections to the House and Senate was discussed. This also gave rise to heated arguments, which did not, however, keep the participants from reaching a common stand on the matter. In brief, it was the following: Although this legislation has contributed to some progress in reducing the influence of money on intraparty politics, it nonetheless has not attained the specified objective, as it has left a number of loopholes open for getting around the restrictions it has imposed. Besides this, the conditions for the federal subsidization of candidates hamper political activity outside the framework of the two-party system and turn the legislation into an instrument of government support for this bourgeois system.

The two other brochures have been published as part of the same series and are works by separate authors. The author of the first analyzes the differing views of American writers and politicians on the participants and procedures of the presidential nomination process in the two major parties. The nomination process, as the author stresses, plays a focal role in the election of the government leader, since "it is precisely at this stage that the type of individual who will move into the White House for the next 4 years is determined." For this reason, it is not surprising that the debates over the organization of the electoral process and the role of political parties have focused mainly on the nomination of candidates.

The author of this work, A. Ranney, is now a member of the Democratic National Committee's study group on the role and future of presidential elections. He pursues two ends in this work: to analyze the possibility of mass public participation in the nominations and to determine the degree to which each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia achieved this kind of mass participation through their primary elections or party caucuses during the 1976 campaign.

The author notes that the once-prevalent opinion that only party activists should take part in the nomination of candidates has become less and less popular in recent years. Some representatives of the Republic and Democratic parties feel that the group of party activists must be expanded, but the idea of involving as many average voters as possible in the election process is being supported even more. In the first case, open party caucuses and conventions would be held on the state and local level for all voters actively supporting a candidate and wishing to take part in the nomination procedure. In the second, primary elections, geared toward millions of average voters instead of thousands of activists, would be held.

The author's analysis indicates that the advocates of these two different ways of increasing the number of participants involved in the nomination process have been quite successful during the period since 1968. According to data for 1976, 7,000 activists attended Democratic caucuses in 21 states where primary elections are not held. But, after all, this figure is quite

low and represents only 2 percent of the gainfully employed population of these states (p 35).

As for the states which did hold primaries, much greater success is noted here by the author. In these states, over two-thirds of the delegates from both parties were elected or dismissed in primary elections, participated in by more than 29 million voters. Even they, however, accounted for only 20 percent of the entire voting public.

The author concludes that the number of voters in the primaries will always be significantly lower than the number of voters in general elections and leaves the question open of whether there are ways of promoting more representative party conventions and ensuring a more judicious nomination procedure and broader public support for the existing political system. In any case, his analysis of the results of the 1976 campaign testify that these goals have not been attained as yet.

The author of the third brochure is Richard Smolka, American university professor of political science and renowned expert on election law; he describes voter registration methods in the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin, where this registration could take place at any time, including election day.

Analyzing the practice and goals of voter registration in the United States, he concludes that the rules instituted in Minnesota and Wisconsin have had a certain degree of influence on the activity of the electorate of these states.

The opponents of this registration system state, however, that it aids in the juggling of ballots. The author presents examples of actual cases of intrigue and bribery and points out the extremely limited possibilities for uncovering and putting an end to incidents of this kind. They can only be discovered a long time after the fact, after the votes have been cast. Experience has shown, however, that no barriers to voter registration have created safeguards against the shuffling of ballots as yet.

These works set forth the opinions of leading experts in the United States on the present state of the electoral process in the nation. They are of topical importance, not only in light of the debates taking place in the United States over this painful issue, but also because they have been published on the eve of the interim elections. But their main significance probably consists in something else: The authors present a vast number of facts attesting to the isolation of average American citizens from the electoral process. The specific proposals made by participants in the discussion on ways of improving the rules for the nomination of candidates to executive and legislative office, their election and their campaign financing, as well as other issues, indicate the degree to which this is essentially an insoluble problem and reaffirm the undemocratic nature of the entire American electoral system and the insurmountability of its defects.

Maritime Policy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 113-114

[Review by A. A. Kokoshin of the book "SShA i Mirovoy okean. Ekonomiko-politicheskiye tendentsii osvoyeniya" (The United States and the World Ocean. Economic and Political Tendencies in Its Exploration) by V. D. Pisarev, Moscow, Nauka, 1977, 270 pages]

[Text] This monograph by V. D. Pisarev is the result of comprehensive research and contains an analysis of the economic and political aspects of U.S. maritime policy at a time when the struggle between the two systems has become the deciding factor in the development of international relations.

The author examines two aspects of this policy. On one hand, there is the course of militaristic groups, now working toward the latest buildup of the striking power of sea-based strategic forces and general-purpose naval forces. They are opposed by realistic politicians in the United States, who cannot fail to see the contradictions between politics from a "position of strength" and the actual capabilities of imperialism and must take the futility of an unrestricted arms race into account.

The author cogently shows that the United States, which actually initiated the struggle for the division of world ocean resources, is striving to seize the leading position among its capitalist rivals in this area. In connection with this, the author demonstrates how the United States mobilizes the power of monopolies and the state for economic, political and legal undertakings in the international arena.

An important role in American maritime strategy, the author notes, has been assigned to the reorganization of the system for the legal regulation of the activities of states in the world ocean. From the very beginning, the United States has tried to base this reorganization on principles and norms, derived from capitalist forms and methods of economic management, which would essentially become the code of laws governing the economic struggle of the monopolies and a means of guaranteeing the distribution of rights of access to marine expanses and resources in accordance with the economic power of the parties involved in the inter-imperialist race for the partition of the ocean. The author draws an important conclusion on the need to create an international legal structure which would be in the interest of all states, including the developing countries (p 47).

Policy concerning the use of sources of strategic metals located on the floor of the seas and oceans outside the limits of national jurisdiction is analyzed against the background of the intensification of the American monopolies' economic struggle against their rivals in Western Europe and Japan and the intensification of conflicts with the developing countries acting as suppliers of the same raw materials derived from deposits on land.

The last part of the monograph is of great interest. Here the author examines the peculiarities of the approach taken by the administrators of the American program for the exploration of the world ocean to the development of international oceanographic cooperation and collaboration. In particular, the author conclusively proves that the American side has had to acknowledge the tremendous successes of Soviet marine science and technology. Besides this, American leaders are beginning to realize that a course aimed at gaining onesided advantages in the development of joint oceanographic studies cannot be an acceptable basis for scientific cooperation. The author correctly underscores the important role played by the general process of the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the 1970's in the development of Soviet-American cooperation in world ocean research (p 252).

The author examines the subject matter and first results of the joint studies involving the two nations and demonstrates that the cooperation of Soviet and American oceanologists will aid in the resolution of a group of major scientific and economic problems affecting the interests of all nations without exception. He justifiably feels that, along with the series of recent Soviet-American agreements on questions connected with the use of the ocean and its resources, the agreement on cooperation represents a concrete step by both countries in the direction of international detente and a contribution to the resolution of one of the most crucial global problems of the day.

Post-Mao China

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 114-117

[Review by A. A. Nagornyy of the book "China's Future (Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era)" by A. Whiting and R. Dernberger, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977, 202 pages]

[Text] The subject of this review, "China's Future (Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era)," is a book written by two leading Sinologists, University of Michigan Professors A. Whiting and R. Dernberger. The work has been published under the auspices of the influential Council on Foreign Relations as part of the series "The World in the Eighties of Our Century."

The main conclusion drawn by the authors of the study is that the Chinese leadership will have to concern itself chiefly with domestic tasks for the next few years. To a significant extent, Peking's international activity will become a derivative of its internal needs, which will limit or totally exclude the possibility of an expansionist course on the part of the Chinese leadership (pp 35, 184). It is easy to see, however, that this main thesis of the study is obviously inconsistent with the facts about the latest tendencies in Chinese internal political life and the international strategy

of the PRC. Indeed, internal political difficulties are not keeping the Chinese leaders from centering their economic activity around costly military programs or from resorting to provocative actions in the international arena that are directed against its neighboring countries.

Just as the main conclusion, other parts of the study also evoke some doubt, particularly the analysis of the internal political alignment of forces in China and the foreign policy goals of Peking.

American experts maintain that real power is now being totally transferred from the group of "old revolutionaries," more or less known to the outside world, to political figures who grew up in obscurity during the period of the "Cultural Revolution." These new figures at the top of the political pyramid received their training on the provincial level during the course of economic decision-making and mass campaigns to mobilize the population and in an atmosphere of political purges. All of this, the authors feel, commits the present leadership even more to internal construction and the organization of efficient agricultural and industrial production (pp 18-19).

The changing of the guard in the Chinese political hierarchy, however, does not signify, regardless of what the authors might say, the cessation of factional struggle or a decrease in the nationalist enthusiasm of the Chinese leaders and, consequently, the aggressive intentions of Peking.

We could also argue with the authors' thesis that the significance of voluntaristic decisions on the top level of leadership has decreased since the deaths of Mao and Chou, who enjoyed undivided authority, and that this will supposedly automatically neutralize the aggressive nature of PRC strategy.

Whiting and Dernberger do make some interesting observations; for example, they note that the distribution of funds for military programs among land troops, the air force and the navy makes it much easier to see the particular foreign policy orientation the Chinese leaders intend to pursue. "Military plans envisaging large allocations for air and naval forces," they write, "will signify an anti-Western and anti-American orientation, but the reinforcement of land troops and air defense will indicate unconcealed anti-Soviet aims" (p 20). It is known at present that Peking is devoting approximately equal attention to all areas of military construction in an attempt to reach the foremost frontiers in the development of its own strategic potential and establish itself as a strong "global military power."

In reference to Peking's foreign policy goals and international objectives, the authors note that Peking has always proceeded largely from such traditional premises of Chinese policy as "national security," "territorial integrity" and "a desire to be independent of foreign powers." The American researchers nonetheless ignore the fact that the restoration of "territorial integrity" is associated in the minds of the Chinese leaders with the multitude of territorial claims on neighboring countries, and this serves as concrete proof of Peking's expansionist aims. The authors display a definite

measure of realism, however, in their belief that any steps taken by Peking to promote improvement in interrelations with the Soviet Union could constitute one of the most reliable ways of ensuring the "national security" of the PRC (p 25).

In their stage-by-stage examination of national economic development in the PRC since 1949, the American experts conclude that the nation has reached a fairly high level of increase in industrial production while agriculture is noticeably lagging behind (pp 97-99). On the basis of these data, they predict that the gap between the PRC and such highly developed states as the United States, the USSR and Japan is not likely to be diminished within the next 15 years. This conclusion is based on calculations of "constant" parameters of Chinese economic potential: rates of industrial, agricultural and population growth, supplies of mineral resources, the effect of political change on economic stability and the role of foreign trade.

The authors use this material as a basis for another hypothesis: By 1990 the PRC might have a gross national product equal to the Japanese GNP of 1974 with an average growth rate of 7 percent in industry and 2 percent in agriculture (pp 152-153). In their opinion, these rates are completely realistic for the PRC both with respect to the national economy's supply of mineral resources and with respect to manpower. At the same time, they must be regarded as the minimum rates which will allow the Chinese leadership to avoid a demographic catastrophe and cope with the difficulties of supplying the needs of a rapidly growing population. The American experts feel that the achievement of even this level, however, will be an extremely difficult matter necessitating the exertion of all forces in Chinese society.

It should be noted that, even though the two American Sinologists have obviously tried to balance all of their statements with a multitude of "ifs" to insure their analytical computations against unforeseen circumstances, the excessively confident tone of their predictions of the need for a "pragmatic" course on the part of the Chinese leadership is still striking. The authors, as it were, were convinced in advance that the upheavals in China's domestic political life and the voluntaristic actions in Peking's foreign policy sank irrevocably into oblivion after the departure of the principal rabble-rouser, the "great helmsman," from the political scene.

As recent events have shown, the factors listed by the authors have already forced the Chinese leaders to make a break, although in disguised form, with Mao's more odious ideas about domestic political life and economic construction. But this has not affected the essence of Peking's foreign policy activity. Peking is still guided by extreme nationalism and anti-Sovietism. It is precisely for this reason that we cannot agree with the main thesis of the book on the limited degree to which Peking's foreign policy behavior will be influenced by the "fragile balance" between the economic capability of satisfying the domestic needs of the nation's population and the destabilizing nature of any expansionist deviation from the norm which might be committed by the Peking leadership in a hypothetical situation.

The authors of the study on China do not consider the fact that the history of mankind has also witnessed the opposite precedent, in which case the ruling clique has emphasized foreign expansion because it does not foresee any escape from internal economic and social difficulties. It is precisely this tendency that is now apparent in the policies of China's present leaders. A strong dose of expansionist action regulated by the ruling clique in Peking, according to its firm conviction, will not undermine the economic bases of the state, but will actually aid in reinforcing the group of "siege" feelings, with the aid of which it will be a simple matter to manipulate Chinese public opinion, intensify industrial and agricultural production and reinforce domestic rules of unquestioning obedience.

The authors do not question the fact that the decisive concept in the present Chinese leadership's foreign and domestic policy is concentrated Chinese nationalism. And if this is so, then it is completely obvious that the danger of aggressive actions by Peking against its neighboring countries not only still exists, but is even tending to increase.

It is true that another direction is also possible in Chinese development--a direction not touched upon by the authors of the study being reviewed: Healthy forces, which are fully aware of the danger of applying the outdated nationalist yardstick to today's world, do exist in Chinese society and in the Chinese political structure.

The present atmosphere in China makes it impossible for the advocates of this line to announce their views publicly. Nonetheless, the foreign policy course of the PRC will largely depend on which of these two tendencies will ultimately prevail.

As for the deductions of the American Sinologists, in the majority of cases they, as we showed above, were quite far from the truth. Naturally, this could be the result of simple error. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that the premises set forth by A. Whiting and R. Dernberger were expounded for purely political reasons and motivated by a desire to present the domestic policy of the Chinese leaders and their foreign policy goals in a respectable light and de-emphasize Peking's aggressive aims and global expansionist plans. Admitting the existence of such plans would cast suspicions on Washington's present policy of convergence with China, and this is certainly not the intention of the authors of this work or of other American scientific publications concerned with the same issues.

Treatment of American Dissidents

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
p 117

[Review by A. S. Snegov of the book "SShA: Taynaya voyna protiv inakomyslyashchikh" (The United States: The Secret War Against Dissidents) by I. Geyevskiy and V. Smelov, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo APN, 1978, 264 pages]

[Text] A vast amount of documented and factological information is concentrated in this short book. This information is used as a basis for revealing

of the secret war going on behind the facade of bourgeois democracy. It is being waged by U.S. ruling circles against those who, in their opinion, are working against the omnipotence of American capital. The authors mainly use documents which have either been leaked to the press against the wishes of the authorities or have been published during the course of various legislative "hearings"--before special Senate commissions investigating the activities of the American secret policy (the FBI), as well as CIA operations within the United States. The small numbers in which these official publications are issued make most of the facts printed in them virtually inaccessible to the general public.

Naturally, during the course of official investigations, the public only learns about a small and specially chosen part of all of the secret memos and reports on steps taken to combat "subversive elements" that are constantly being circulated among the White House, the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, the CIA and the Pentagon. But even this "tip of the iceberg" can be used to judge the scales of the activity of the gigantic federal machine for the suppression of dissidents. The main role in this dirty business has been assigned to the FBI, which keeps millions of "unreliables" under surveillance. The classic methods of the secret police--the collection of "compromising" information, the planting of agents provocateurs, the forgery of documents and the physical punishment of the "most dangerous elements"--all of this taken together, not to mention electronic bugging, computers and other technical innovations, has been elevated to the rank of a statewide policy in the United States, carried out quite deliberately and on a genuinely American scale.

At the same time, Washington is stubbornly trying to convey the impression that all previous methods of covert and overt warfare against dissidents are a thing of the past, implying that all of the democratic rights and freedoms recorded in black and white will be unconditionally observed in the United States from now on. American propaganda is sparing no effort or means in its attempt to cleanse Washington of the dirt of Watergate and the blood of Vietnam and overcome the "credibility gap" which has caused millions of Americans to lose faith in bourgeois moral values and government institutions. A prominent position in this new propaganda offensive is occupied by the attempt to represent the current American Administration to the entire world as a "consistent fighter" for civil rights.

The groundlessness of claims of this nature is conclusively proved once again in the book by I. Geyevskiy and V. Smelov.

American Literary Scene

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 117-118

[Review by M. M. Koreneva of the book "Roman SShA segodnya" (The American Novel Today) by M. Mendel'son, Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1977, 398 pages]

[Text] In this new study, the author continues his research into contemporary American prose, the subject of his previous works: "Sovremenny

amerikanskiy roman [The Contemporary American Novel], 1964, and "Amerikanskaya satiricheskaya proza XX veka" [American 20th-Century Satirical Prose], 1972.

Mendel'son surveys the American literary process of the last 15 years and the major features of the novel genre of the 1960's and 1970's. This predetermined the nature of the difficulties encountered by the researcher: After all, the author was investigating features which could only be truly comprehended through a study of the particular place occupied by a certain work of fiction in the career of the writer and in national literature.

These difficulties, however, have not caused the author to express vague opinions. The position of the researcher is declared quite definitely in the book and is linked with his desire to choose the most significant, valuable and viable works from the vast quantities of American prose written in our day. This, according to Mendel'son's firm conviction, depends primarily on the degree to which the writer takes a discriminating approach to bourgeois reality and understands the defective nature of a social system which displays its hostility toward human values. The author justifiably includes Kurt Vonnegut, Joyce Carol Oates and Joseph Heller among the writers consistently using this approach.

This conviction is also totally apparent in the arguments engaged in by Mendel'son with representatives of contemporary American criticism. His approach leaves no room for the indiscriminate denial of all opinions expressed by American researchers. On the contrary, he expresses agreement with those of his American colleagues who, like, for example, John Aldridge, strive to disclose the social content of works written by his fellow Americans and to view them not only as a purely aesthetic phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon reflecting the state of public and spiritual life in the nation.

The author does not take an indulgent view, however, of those who make every attempt to diminish the intensity of the conflicts revealed by writers or to represent works which are devoid of any significant social content and which confine themselves to the sphere of purely formal experimentation as the latest achievements of American literature. Standing up for the achievements of the American realistic novel, he reveals the groundlessness of the positions occupied by such critics as L. Fiedler, I. Hassan, A. Kazin and others.

This is particularly evident in his discussion of "black humor." Mendel'son insists on the impermissibility of an unrestricted and excessively broad interpretation of this term, since this allows some American researchers to indiscriminately call almost all writers "black humorists" if elements of the grotesque are present in their work. This is how Heller and Vonnegut are included in this category, when in reality, and this is cogently demonstrated by M. O. Mendel'son, we are dealing here with a fundamentally different aesthetic phenomenon--satire. It would have been preferable, however, if the subject of "black humor" had been examined more thoroughly from the theoretical standpoint.

The attempt to discredit realism in American literature and to depict it as something outdated and incompatible with the objectives of the contemporary literary process, which is characteristic of some bourgeois critics, is unconditionally condemned in the book. This is related, in particular, to the attempt to establish various forms of anti-realism as a unique aesthetic norm. One of the varieties of this anti-realism is absurdism, which is energetically being propagandized in America by Ihab Hassan.

One of the chief merits of this work is the fact that M. O. Mendel'son approaches contemporary phenomena as one link in the lengthy chain of the historical process, relating them to preceding stages in the development of the American novel.

The historical connection is traced through the works of such great American classic writers of the 20th century as W. Faulkner, J. Steinbeck and E. Hemingway. The author also turns to earlier sources: within the framework of American tradition--to the satirical heritage of Mark Twain--and, on the scale of world literature--to the traditions of enlightenment and realistic satire from Swift to Saltykov-Shchedrin. Objectively evaluating the achievements of contemporary American novelists, M. O. Mendel'son nonetheless stresses the fact that, although they are continuing and developing the traditions of their predecessors, they have not achieved the degree of artistic generalization that marked the American novel of the 1920's and 1930's or Twain's later satirical works.

In his attempt to cover all aspects of the literary process in the United States, the author also devotes a great deal of attention to certain aspects which are generally ignored by bourgeois literary critics. This also demonstrates the polemical nature of his position. He presents a detailed analysis of the work of communist writer Lars Lawrence, whose epic "Seeds" added, according to the researcher, a brilliant page to the history of the development of the American novel after World War II.

The author also examines phenomena which attest to difficulties in the development of the contemporary American novel--in particular, the problem of "mass-market" conformist fiction and the absurdist novel.

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THE CANADIAN TORIES: DOCTRINE AND POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 78
pp 119-127

[Article by S. Yu. Danilov]

[Text] The Canadian Conservatives usually proudly point out the fact that their party is the nation's oldest. For a long time, it was also the ruling party of the Canadian bourgeoisie, but it later had to give up first place to the Liberal Party.¹ Despite the long-range tendency toward the weakening of Canadian conservatism, however, it still represents an impressive political force. In the federal elections of the 1960's and 1970's, Conservatives were supported by approximately one-third of the voters, and their position on the provincial level is even stronger than that of the Liberals: Conservatives are now in power in five provinces (Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick and Newfoundland), while the Liberals hold power in only two (Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island).

The foundations of the Progressive Conservative Party were laid in the mid-19th century as a result of the convergence of the moderate wing of bourgeois reformist currents with Canada's previous masters--the landed aristocracy, the merchant oligarchy, the highest levels of the clergy and the colonial bureaucracy (the "family clique"). The Conservatives were joined by the descendants of the loyalists, who were exiled from the United States after the American Revolution in the 18th century and were known for their loyalty to the British Crown. The power in this bloc was held by financial and railroad magnates in Toronto, Montreal and Halifax, who were closely bound up with the English bourgeoisie. These features of conservatism were the reason for its pro-English foreign policy line. The party itself was actually created according to the model and semblance of the British Tory. All of this guaranteed that the Conservatives would be given benevolent treatment by ruling circles in the mother country, which entrusted them with governing the nation during the period when the autonomous Canadian State was being established as part of the British Empire.

The situation changed considerably with the approach of the imperialist era. The Conservatives responded to the growing strength, unity and activity of the working class and to the general intensification of socioeconomic conflicts in capitalism with extensive repressive measures, which unavoidably

reduced their mass base. They were also unable to neutralize the third parties which came into being in the 1920's and 1930's and constituted a real threat to the two-party system. This caused the Conservatives to lose some of their support from big business when the latter began to look more to the Liberal Party with its more flexible policy.

This same tendency was also stimulated by factors connected with foreign economic and foreign policy considerations--the crowding of English capital out of the Canadian economy by American capital and the declining power and influence of Great Britain in the world arena.

By the mid-20th century there was a new balance of power within the two-party system. The Conservatives, who had lost their previous status as the majority party, assumed the role of a "permanent opposition" which would be called upon to take power during years of economic difficulties and dismissed when market conditions would improve or when social and national conflicts would reach a dangerous level of intensity. Since World War II, they have only won three federal elections out of eleven. The 1958 elections, when the Conservatives won more deputy seats than any party in Canadian history, were also the only elections since 1930 in which they were able to gain a strong majority in Parliament.

The view, dating back to the early 20th century, of the Conservatives as a party primarily reflecting the interests of the Ontario business community is no longer consistent with reality. They still receive various types of assistance from big capital in this province, the most densely populated and economically developed in Canada, but in general elections the support of the business community has been less likely to be converted into the necessary number of votes or parliamentary mandates. An important role in this process has been played by Ontario's transformation after 1945 into the main center of the workers and democratic movement in the nation and by the relative decrease in the number of Canadians of British origin.

Since the beginning of the 1950's, it has become increasingly apparent that the Conservatives are becoming the party of the industrialists, financiers and agrarians in the Canadian West--that is, the big business groups which previously did not have broad access to the helm of government power. The bourgeoisie of this vast region with its growing extractive, petrochemical, construction and defense industries is beginning to crowd the rest of the bourgeoisie, not only in the depressed Atlantic Provinces, which were quite recently providing the Conservative Party with most of its membership, but also in Central Canada. More than half of the politicians who have led the party since the 1940's have come from the western provinces. The election of westerner Joseph Clark as head of the party in 1976 provided new proof of this tendency.

On the federal level, the title of the stronghold of conservatism has been handed down from Ontario to Alberta--a region of wealthy farmers and a flourishing petroleum business. Here the soil for Conservative supremacy was prepared by the Social Credit Party's 36 years in government (1935-1971).²

During the last 10 years, the percentage of westerners in the parliamentary faction of Conservatives has risen from 36 to 51 percent. The percentage is even higher in the party's reserve cabinet, where westerners hold important posts, including posts in the area of trade and industry, transportation, justice, labor relations, national resources and defense.

The structural and regional shifts in conservatism provide a better idea of the peculiarities of the process by which this party has become associated with big business. In comparison to the Liberals, the Conservatives have fewer representatives of the large monopolies that are mainly based in Ontario and Quebec, but they have a correspondingly higher percentage of various groups of the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie in the outlying provinces, some of which have not yet become part of the traditional "power centers" of large capital. Canadian conservatism in its present form is a party made up primarily of the rightist bourgeois strata, especially those connected with the extractive industry and agriculture. Among these, a noticeable role is played by the supporters of the so-called continentalist orientation, who reap the benefits of close cooperation with American capital.

An overwhelming majority of the Conservatives' leaders have come from the large or middle bourgeoisie or from other privileged strata in Canadian society. For example, R. Stanfield, the party's leader in 1967-1976, owns knitting mills in Nova Scotia; S. Stevens, the party's chief financial affairs expert in the House of Commons is a big banker with many connections in the business communities of several provinces who gained fame through his attempt to establish the Bank of Western Canada; F. Moores, premier of Newfoundland, is a millionaire who was previously on the boards of 24 firms. The president of the party in 1971-1974, industrialist D. Matthews, was also a millionaire. The leader of the Conservatives in Saskatchewan, R. Cullver, is a manager by profession. K. Wagner, M. Lamber and G. Fairweather, members of the party's reserve cabinet, and its former national organizer, E. Goodman, are lawyers. In the election of W. Davis as the leader of Ontario's Conservatives, a prominent role was played, according to journalist J. Manthorpe, by "businessmen-politicians": H. McAuley, car dealer, W. Kelly, vice president of the Consumers Gas Company, and D. Latimer, the owner of children's amusement parks.³ Davis himself was once the senior partner in the law firm of Davis, Webb and Hollingrake.

The Canadian bourgeoisie is simultaneously relying on both of the leading parties, and supporters of the Conservatives and Liberals can be found in the same company; even though they are political rivals, they remain partners in the business sphere. For example, former Conservative Minister of National Defense D. Harkness is a member of the board of Toronto's Metropolitan Trust Company along with the chairman of the Liberal Party's finance committee, R. Stanbury, and Liberal E. Kirans' successor to the presidency of Montreal Stock Exchange was J. Heath, member of the Conservatives' reserve cabinet. It is more usual, however, for a corporation to give preference either to the Conservatives or to the Liberals, but this does not

mean that it totally declines to support the "less favored party." An example of the "Conservative" corporation can be seen in one of the nation's oldest monopolies--Canadian Pacific Railway, founded in 1881. This huge company not only controls the trans-Canadian railway of the same name, but also shipping companies and airlines, mines, the Pan-Canadian Petroleum Company, a tremendous amount of real estate and a hotel chain. Its people in the party were R. Bennett, Canadian prime minister in 1930-1935, and D. Roblin, Manitoba's premier in 1958-1967. Conservative leaders R. Manion (1938-1940) and J. Brecken (1942-1948) owed their decline largely to differences of opinion with the bosses of this company.

The Conservatives are supported by most of the oil companies in Canada. The main one is Imperial Oil, a branch of the American Exxon monopoly. Several ministers in Alberta's Conservative Government are connected with this company--R. McDonnell, J. Seymour and D. Getty. The vice president of the corporation is D. Lougheed, the brother of the province's premier. One of the company's directors, R. Ritchey, was R. Stanfield's adviser on economic affairs and ran for Parliament in 1974 on the Conservative ticket. It is indicative that one of the points of the economic platform of Conservative leader J. Clark calls for the liquidation of the state-owned Petro-Canada oil company, the operations of which create certain inconveniences for international oil corporations.

The organizational structure of the Progressive Conservative Party, just as that of the Liberal Party, is distinguished by great complexity and unwieldiness and is aimed primarily at the adaptation of the party machine to campaign requirements. Party organizations on the lower levels make up district associations which focus on the appropriate electorate districts. The next level of the party hierarchy is the provincial organization, which is responsible for provincial and federal parliamentary election campaigns. In the case of federal elections, it operates under the guidance of national party agencies. The total group of local party cells, provincial organizations, the youth and women's organizations associated with the party and the party's parliamentary faction is called the Progressive Conservative Association. Its central agency is a general assembly which convenes once every 2 years and performs overseeing and advisory functions. The meetings are attended by representatives of district branches of the party, party deputies in the provincial assemblies and federal Parliament and delegates from associated organizations--in all, more than 1,500 people.⁴

The national executive committee is of much greater significance. It consists of the most influential party officials: the leader, the president, the vice president, the treasurer and the national director. The executive committee controls and coordinates all party activities.

The leader of the party is a member of the parliamentary faction which, along with the executive committee, represents a body for the discussion and resolution of major political issues, and this faction is of greater significance in the Progressive Conservative Party than in the Liberal

Party. The faction is divided into front-bench (leading party officials) and back-bench figures, with a definite boundary between the two. It is from the first group that the leader forms a government in the event of an election victory and a reserve cabinet during periods when the party is in the opposition. The back-benchers are usually only permitted to make statements on secondary matters in the House of Commons, they do not have assistants and research centers at their disposal and their access to news media is limited. Their role is somewhat more important outside of Parliament: During periods of preparation for party conventions and election campaigns, they serve as a link connecting the party's federal and provincial agencies with its district branches.

The parliamentary groups of the Canadian bourgeois parties, in contrast to the American ones, are characterized by fairly strict discipline: The deputies most vote in accordance with the instructions of the party leader, the faction chairman and the party's organizers ("whips"). Free voting is rarely permitted. In recent years, the only persons who have voted against measures approved by the party have been right-wing figures with so much influence in the party that the leadership has not dared to invoke the usual reprisals: exclusion from parliamentary committees and from the list of persons wishing to speak in Parliament (in which case the speaker of the House will not give them the floor), the confiscation of office space, etc.

The Conservatives began to hold party conventions 34 years after the Liberals-- in 1927. Prior to 1969 these conventions were only held to elect a party leader. In recent years the development of the ideological propaganda function of the bourgeois parties has caused conventions to become more significant as the highest representative and advisory organ of the party. The Conservatives now have two types of conventions: the annual "general party assembly" and the conventions that are specially convened to elect a new leader.

Until quite recently, almost all of the delegates to the Conservative conventions were chosen by the party leader and his authorized representatives. This tradition is still alive to some degree: 15-20 percent of the delegates are still being appointed from above. The party leader, prominent party officials and party candidates for seats in the House of Commons in previous parliamentary elections are automatically given a convention seat. These are so-called "official delegates." The correlation between categories of delegates is not specified in the party charter, and this permits the party leadership to appoint the largest possible number of its own supporters delegates. At the sixth convention in 1967, when R. Stanfield was elected party leader instead of J. Diefenbaker, this correlation, for example, was the following: There were 452 appointed delegates (18.7 percent), 523 "official" delegates (22 percent), 1,320 representatives of local branches (54.8 percent) and 116 young Conservatives (4.5 percent).⁵

Financial channels are also involved in the selection of delegates. The delegate's fee (150-200 dollars) and the high cost of transportation and other expenses make convention attendance a luxury which is only accessible to wealthy people. According to one Conservative Party official, attending the convention would cost a fisherman from somewhere in New Brunswick his month's wages.⁶

Nonetheless, the convention is the most representative party body. The number of its participants is almost ten times as great as the number of deputies in the House of Commons. Whereas women only make up 1 percent of the Conservative parliamentary faction, 23 percent of the delegates at the 1976 convention were women. In 1968-1972 there were no Conservative deputies under the age of 24, but 11 percent of the delegates at the 1967 convention were in this age group.

The influence of the convention on party policy is actually quite limited. The party general assembly is mainly occupied with the discussion of documents which are presented in their final form by the party leadership. The text of these documents cannot be amended and their rejection must be unanimous. Only 3 of 260 such documents were rejected by the general assembly in 1971. At the same time, many draft resolutions introduced by rank-and-file delegates disappear in the convention committees and are not discussed.

For a long time, the mechanism for electing the Conservative leader was of an oligarchic nature. The leader was either elected for an indefinite term by the parliamentary faction of the party or was appointed by his predecessor or Canada's governor general. The strength of his position was measured mainly by the number of seats won by the party in the House of Commons. The Conservatives' chronic failures in federal elections have lead to a situation in which the party has had 11 leaders in the 20th century (while the Liberals have only had 5). Election defeats have not always been followed by the leader's resignation. In particular, the party's lack of success in 1963 and 1968 was not accompanied by a change in leadership.

In Stanfield's time, points which slightly limited the leader's term of office were introduced into the party charter. But the party heads refused the request of rank-and-file members for reaffirmation of the leader's authority or his re-election at each general assembly and instituted a more complex and antidemocratic procedure. Article 12 of the charter states that during periods when the party is in power, only its parliamentary faction has the power to decide this question. If the party is in the opposition, a secret ballot at the first general assembly after the election decides the question of the expediency of convening a party convention during the coming 12 months. In the 9 years of this article's existence, the delegates have never answered this question in the affirmative, since they have been recruited primarily from groups that are loyal to the party leadership. Finally, the charter stipulates that if the last election has

increased the party's parliamentary faction by 20 percent or more, the question of a change of leaders cannot even be discussed.⁷

Researchers of the Canadian party system have pointed out the fact that the Progressive Conservative Association represents an example of the way in which the Canadian bourgeois parties have lagged behind the American and English parties in the development and institution of the latest means of communication with the public and in the modernization of their party machinery. Until 1969, there were no standing committees on political, financial or organizational affairs in the party leadership, and it was only after the federal elections of 1972 that an organ was created for campaign planning.⁸

The mass base of the Conservatives mainly consists of politically backward strata of the population which have remained isolated from the general course of class struggle. It can be said that the degree of Conservative influence in urban and rural areas is inversely proportional to the current correlation between urbanites and ruralites (according to the last census of 1971, 76 percent and 24 percent). Most of the inhabitants of large cities do not support the Conservative Party. Of the 102 seats in the federal Parliament belonging to 20 cities with a population of more than 100,000, the party has won an average of 23 in elections in 1968-1974 (the Liberals have won 67 and the New Democrats have won 12). Canada's two largest industrial and cultural centers--Montreal and Toronto, where around one-third of the nation's urban population is concentrated--elected 6 Conservatives and 37 Liberals to the House of Commons in 1972 and 3 Conservatives and 44 Liberals in 1974.

The westward shift in the party's social base has strengthened its influence in the cities of the Prairie Provinces and British Columbia. The Conservatives hold all of the deputy mandates from the youngest and most rapidly developing industrial centers in Canada--Edmonton and Calgary--and have a solid base in Vancouver, on the Pacific Coast. On the national scale, however, conservatism's basis of support is still the rural districts, small towns and resorts with no modern industry and no large segments of the hereditary proletariat. In the heartland, where the middle and petty bourgeoisie account for a large percentage of the population and the influence of various right-wing currents is quite noticeable, the tradition of voting for Conservative candidates is considered to be part of the way of life.

The anti-labor policy of the Conservative cabinets of the 1920's and 1930's discredited the party in the eyes of the working class. It would be wrong to believe, however, that the Conservatives have no influence on this segment of the voting public. According to surveys conducted by the Canadian Public Opinion Institute, around 27 percent of all workers engaged in physical labor belong to the Progressive Conservative Party.⁹ These are mainly workers employed in the non-industrial branches of the national economy (trade and the public service sphere); people who were formerly small property owners in urban or rural areas and who recently joined the

proletariat but have retained their previous party sympathies; representatives of the ethnic communities whose leaders look to the Conservatives for political direction; and some of the emigrants from the developing countries.

The Conservatives are also supported by many people from the middle strata of the population. This applies, in particular, to middle and petty bourgeois individuals who suffer financial ruin and white-collar workers who lose their privileged status. When they are knocked out of their accustomed niche, they become dissatisfied with the ruling party and with the class with which they have to associate and they frequently become supporters of the Conservatives as a party of "order" which, in their opinion, is capable of protecting them from the mortal grip of big capital and saving them from the pressure exerted by the workers.

The Conservatives' weak position in Quebec has deep historical roots. The collapse of feudal relations and the growth of separatist tendencies in French Canada eradicated the previous significance of the English-speaking elite's alliance with the landed aristocracy and Catholic Church in Quebec, with the aid of which conservatism had kept the French Canadians on its side during the second half of the 19th century. An important role in this process was played by such events as the Conservative Government's suppression of the Northwestern Rebellion,¹⁰ the enforced mobilization of French Canadians during World War I,¹¹ and Conservative politicians' persecution of the French language and culture outside of Quebec. Segments of the population which constitute the Conservatives' basis of support in English-speaking provinces-- farmers, petty merchants, craftsmen and unorganized and unskilled workers-- usually vote for the Social Credit party in Quebec as this party represents the local variant of conservatism. This is why Quebec's 74 electoral districts are represented by only three deputies in the parliamentary faction of the party. The percentage of French Canadians here is almost one-tenth of their percentage in the nation's population.

The Conservatives have, however, established close and deep ties with the top levels of Eastern European ethnic groups. The absolute majority of deputies in the federal Parliament of Polish and Ukrainian origins are Conservatives. On the highest levels of the party, there is a noticeable tendency toward the increased representation and influence of these immigrant communities; in particular, they now hold the posts of the party's main organizer in Parliament (S. Paproski), his deputy (R. Gnatishin) and members of the reserve cabinet in charge of public health and treasury affairs (D. Mazankovski and P. Yevchuk).

After World War II, conservatism actually departed from its traditional pro-English emphasis, although loyalty to the British imperial tradition still occupies a prominent place in party ideology. The Conservative Government of J. Diefenbaker, which verbally condemned some aspects of U.S. foreign policy, simultaneously took such far-reaching steps to reinforce

cooperation with the United States as the signing of an agreement on a joint North American air defense system (NORAD) and an agreement on the use of the Columbia River.

Besides this, the Conservative position has been somewhat affected by the growing economic strength of the Canadian national bourgeoisie and the general increase in nationalist and patriotic feeling in Canadian society. Due to pressure exerted by the "red Tories" and some moderate Conservatives, the party platforms of 1971 and 1974 included points restricting foreign ownership in some key sectors of the economy (banking, insurance and strategically important branches) and making branches of foreign monopolies subject only to Canadian law. At the party convention in 1974, a resolution was adopted in support of the plan to "Canadize" at least 50 percent of the nation's extractive industry by 1990 through the acquisition of stock in overseas firms by Canadian businessmen.

The change in party leadership in 1976 changed the balance of power in the party, and not in favor of the nationalists. The party's present leaders are striving to reduce the entire complex of issues connected with American expansion to the problem of preserving Canada's cultural uniqueness. During his visit to Washington in June 1976, J. Clark underscored his objections to the "exaggeration of differences" between the two countries. In his opinion, the Canadians should avoid taking any steps that might frighten foreign investors away.

The general crisis of capitalism has accelerated the process of the unification and equalization of the bourgeois parties' ideologies, which have the primary goal of preserving the capitalist order at a time when the socialist system is gaining strength. The parties of the Canadian bourgeoisie are no exception to this rule. The Conservatives essentially have the same set of ideological propagandistic aims as the Liberals, including the theses of the public sovereignty, freedom of private initiative, equal opportunities and individual dignity that supposedly exist in the capitalist society. This cannot, however, completely cancel out the effect of other factors--such as differences of opinion within the bourgeois class in regard to the means and methods of exerting ideological influence on the mass voting public. For this reason, although the fundamental premises of the political philosophy of both parties are completely alike, there is still a difference between their doctrines, and although this difference cannot be elevated to the status of an absolute, it cannot be ignored either.

As a rule, the Progressive Conservative Party occupies a position on the right flank of national political life. Legitimist and traditionalist ideas are assigned a prominent place in its doctrine. While the Liberals have based their theories on the ideological heritage of English (Manchester) liberalism and American bourgeois radicalism, the Conservatives have borrowed their ideas for a long time from right-wing bourgeois activists of extremely Conservative leanings: Burke, Salisbury and Hamilton. One of the party's

theoreticians, W. Morton wrote: "Authority and tradition are the cornerstones of Conservative thinking. The Conservative believes in permanency, while simultaneously recognizing the fact of change in human society. But changes must occur as a result of the evolutionary process rather than desperate revolution or artificial manipulations."¹² "The Conservative philosophy," A. Westell writes, "includes the idea of an orderly society...with almost unchanging values. It is necessarily combined with faith in strong government, capable of preserving law and order and guarding society against the destructive effects of rapid change.... Conservative governments are descended directly from the absolute monarchy."¹³

In other words, conservatism looks to the past rather than to the future for its ideal. This is also the reason for the Conservatives' negative attitude toward bourgeois reformism. Many of them view the latter from an obscurantist standpoint, considering the crises in bourgeois ideology and morals and the spread of crime and drug addiction to be somehow derivative of the reformist theories of "overeducated Liberal intellectuals."

During the postwar years, the Conservatives have definitely aspired to the role of the principal fighter, if not the only one, against scientific socialism. According to W. Morton, conservatism is the only alternative to communism. Liberalism is paving the way for it by stimulating class struggle in the system of unrestricted competition. Only conservatism can defeat the communist philosophy."¹⁴

A quite influential segment of the party consists of the factions of the large and middle bourgeoisie that are against state-monopolistic economic regulation and make apologies for private enterprise in its pre-monopolistic forms. Besides this, utopian petty bourgeois currents are widely represented in the Conservative camp. The advocates of these theories naively dream about a return to the free market and "honest" competition. For this reason, although the party recognizes the economic and social functions of the bourgeois state in principle, it is still giving them a fairly narrow interpretation. In the platform adopted by the seventh convention (1971), these questions are elucidated in the following manner: "We must choose between an economy in which the principal stimulator is the government and an economy which receives its impetus from the citizens. The Progressive Conservative Party believes that the latter system, which is dynamic by its nature and responds well to public demand, is the best guarantee of economic growth and prosperity. This kind of system does not refute the need for government control and regulation under certain conditions.... The government does have its part to play. But its authority should be used carefully and on a limited scale. Canada is not a laboratory for the testing of doubtful economic theories."¹⁵

The transfer of the party's social base to the West is increasing the strength of the traditionalist free-trade groups in the Conservative Party and, conversely, undermining the positions of the moderate Tories based in Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces. This is the reason for the failure of the

attempts to modernize the party course, which were made in 1967-1974 by a centrist group headed by R. Stanfield, who believed that the party could be saved if it were armed with some bourgeois reformist slogans and if a fresh current were to be introduced into the party machine. "I do not want the party to see the alpha and omega of society in private initiative," he said. "Government intervention is essential," he asserted, "for the construction of an orderly conservative society."¹⁶ Plans of this kind have not met with sympathy in the old party oligarchy. After a number of sharp intraparty conflicts and election defeats in 1968, 1972 and 1974, Stanfield had to give up his authority as the party leader.

As a result of his resignation, right-wing centrists gained the leadership of the party. Their platform includes such points as the cancellation of the price and wage controls instituted by the Liberals in 1975, the return of several state-owned corporations to private owners, the reduction of expenditures on social insurance and the restriction of labor's right to strike. They maintain that if the system of free enterprise has become less free, this has totally been due to government intervention in market processes. They feel that the state's chief duty is to maintain a favorable climate for business circles--that is, to grant them tax benefits and other privileges.

The current party leadership's refusal to revise the major premises of conservatism has been accompanied by individual concessions to the "spirit of the times." It supports the so-called policy of bilingualism¹⁷ implemented by the Trudeau Government in the French Canadian question, commends the repeal of the death penalty and proposes the liberalization of abortion laws. It is interesting, however, that even these "concessions" are evoking serious dissatisfaction and resistance on the part of the powerful right wing of the Conservative Party, headed by former Prime Minister J. Diefenbaker. The latter, in spite of his advanced age, is quite active in Parliament and still has a great deal of authority among the rural inhabitants of the English-speaking part of Canada.

The high pitch of the sociopolitical struggle in Canada during the 1960's and 1970's has created the necessary conditions for the crystallization of the bourgeois reformism current of the "red Tories" within the party. Its adherents include former Minister E. Hamilton, parliamentary deputies G. Fairweather and H. MacQuarrie, philosopher D. Grant, historians D. Creighton and W. Morton (the latter has now moved noticeably toward the left) and journalist R. Rohmer. J. Minifie, author of "Who's Your Fat Friend?",¹⁸ a book well known to the Soviet reader, was also closely associated with the "red Tories." The idea of renovating the party has been most clearly expressed in their theories. They realize the need to expand the party's mass base by means of workers, the intelligentsia and youth, and the need to make some economic concessions to the workers and, in the words of SATURDAY NIGHT, "to see nothing bad in nationalization."¹⁹ In essence, the "red Tories" are, in many respects, closer to leftist Liberals than to the right wing of their own party. They are backed up by the part of the petty

and middle bourgeoisie of East and Central Canada that, for one reason or another, supports the Conservatives but is upset by the intensity of the conflicts in capitalism and is searching for an escape from them in the tactic of social maneuvering. Despite all of the inconsistency and ambiguity of these views, which represent a mixture of traditional conservatism with Liberal reformism and Christian socialism, their general purpose provides grounds for calling them bourgeois-progressive.

In a number of foreign policy issues, the "red Tories" have adhered to sensible and constructive convictions. They support the development of relations with all nations in the world and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. After P. E. Trudeau's visit to the USSR (in 1971), H. MacQuarrie said in Parliament: "I believe that contacts between our states and peoples should be encouraged. I hope they will strengthen good will. All of us should welcome them." He has also repeatedly defended the rights of the Palestinians and, after a trip to the Middle East, announced his solidarity with Syria in its struggle against Israeli aggression.²⁰

It should be noted that the majority of moderate Conservatives are also beginning to regard the development of relations with the socialist countries as an objective necessity. This is attested to, for example, by the 1977 visit to the USSR made by D. Lougheed, prominent figure in the Progressive Conservative Party and premier of Alberta. On the whole, however, it is taking a relatively long time for the Conservatives to free themselves of throwbacks to the cold war in their ideology and policies. Although the party commended (with some provisions) the Final Act of the all-European conference, its activity, as the Canadian progressive press points out, has not always developed in accordance with the principles of international relations that were declared in Helsinki.

Therefore, the Conservatives, along with the Liberals, still personify the two-party system in Canada. As the parties of monopolistic capital, they have a common class nature and identical sociopolitical functions. This, however, does not exclude a number of differences in the nature of their mass base, political philosophy and ways of influencing the voters. In analyzing the political strategy and tactics of the bourgeoisie, V. I. Lenin wrote about its two basic methods of struggle to preserve its position of class supremacy: The first involves coercion, the refusal to make concessions to the workers movement, the maintenance of all old and outdated institutions and the rejection of reforms, while the second is the method of "liberalism," steps in the direction of the development of political rights, reforms, concessions and so forth.²¹

Both of these tendencies have always been present in the policies of the Canadian Conservatives, but, in general, the first of these has usually prevailed.

The adaptation of the Conservative Party to the realities of highly developed state-monopolistic capitalism and to the level of mass consciousness in the second half of the 20th century is connected with certain difficulties.

During the last decade and a half, the party has not had a positive and logical program that has appealed to the majority of voters. Under the conditions of the economic difficulties and constitutional-political crises being experienced in Canada, the campaign strategy of the party is based primarily on taking advantage of public dissatisfaction with current state of affairs.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed discussion of the Liberal Party, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 1, 1977--Editor's note.
2. A rightist bourgeois party. It is in power in British Columbia and has some influence in several other western provinces as well as in Quebec.
3. J. Manthorpe, "The Power and the Tories. Ontario Politics--1943 to the Present," Toronto, 1974, p 3.
4. R. Dawson and N. Ward, "The Government of Canada," Toronto-Buffalo, 1972.
5. J. Courtney, "The Selection of National Party Leaders in Canada," Toronto, 1973, p 118.
6. "Party Politics in Canada," Ed. by H. Thorburn, Scarborough, 1972, p 119.
7. "Constitution of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada," Ottawa, 1971, pp 10-11.
8. "Canada at the Polls," Ed. by H. Penniman, Washington, 1975, p 107.
9. THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 24 July 1974.
10. A rebellion of Indians and French-Canadian mestizos against the oppression and abuses of the authorities, railroad companies and white settlers, and for democratic development (1885). The execution of the rebel leader Louis Riel evoked vehement protests in Quebec.
11. Pacifist and isolationist feelings have traditionally been quite strong among French Canadians. Their reaction to a compulsory draft, which was connected, in addition, with an army in which the commanding officers were Anglo-Saxon, was therefore quite negative.
12. W. Morton, "The Conservative Concepts," Vancouver, 1959, p 8.
13. THE TORONTO STAR, 31 March 1975.

14. W. Morton, Op. cit., p 17.
15. "Progressive Conservative Party. A National Development Policy for Canada," Ottawa, 1971, p 1.
16. THE OTTAWA JOURNAL, 30 November 1974; 27 January 1976.
17. For a more detailed discussion, see V. A. Tishkov, "Language and Politics," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1977--Editor's note.
18. D. Minifie, "Who's Your Fat Friend?. Canada's Role in a World Seized by Revolution." Moscow, 1961.
19. SATURDAY NIGHT, June 1971, p 2.
20. "House of Commons Debates," Ottawa, 1971, vol 115, p 9298; vol 119, p 1260.
21. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 20, p 67.

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